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ROGER PEARSON
General Editor

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RATIFICATION OF START: LESSONS FROM THE INF TREATY

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Will President Bush's political legacy include a START Treaty? It remains to be seen whether or not a follow-on agreement can be finished soon. If the INF Treaty serves correctly as a precedent, it may be possible to settle outstanding issues of contention in short order.[1] But, it is not altogether clear that the Senate will then expedite matters and ratify the treaty; individual senators may put up stiff resistance. There may be calls for greater measures to ensure that verification will be effective. Administration representatives should be prepared to mount a vigorous sales campaign.

A review of the history of the INF treaty presented here will highlight some of the difficulties encountered during the elimination and verification phase, and will serve to illustrate some of the equally troublesome concerns that will surely be aired in the Senate over START.

* * *

When the West first learned in the early 1970s that the Soviets were developing a three-warhead, very accurate, solid-fuel mobile missile (to be dubbed the SS-20, but with a strong resemblance to the first two stages of the three-stage SS-16) it did not entirely catch us by surprise. It was also known that the new missile used the SS-16's transporter-erector-launcher vehicles (TELs), and that "the only difference discernible from space satellites, was that this more accurate missile was housed in a firing canister that was five feet shorter."[2]

Some of this information came from a Soviet agent-in-place. A "Colonel Boris" on the Soviet General Staff revealed to the U.S. intelligence community that the Five Year Plans of the mid-1970s included the construction of 225 new mobile

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missile launchers and five times as many "Pioneer" missiles. This would "result in a strength of 1,225 missiles at the end of the Plan period."[3] "Boris" also indicated that Soviet warfighting doctrine called for successive firings from different presurveyed locations, using launchers equipped with reloads. U.S. satellites did spot launchers carrying at least one, and in one case, two reloads. Signals intelligence also picked up "indications of possible exercises including multiple reloads." But U.S. Government information in open sources never went further than stating that "SS-20 units carried one reload missile, that the Soviet army maintained stockpiles of reloads, and that we were never able to verify exactly how many SS-20's really existed."[4]

As these deployments took place, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmitt, capturing the sentiments of many alarmed Europeans, expressed concern that NATO formulate a collective response. In 1979, the NATO Council did so by endorsing twin proposals that called for pursuing arms control options while at the same time deploying more accurate U.S. intermediate missiles to Europe.[5] Accordingly, 464 U.S. ground launched cruise missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometers, and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles with a range of 1,800 kilometers, were slated for deployment throughout Europe.[6]

This was a set-back for the Soviets. They neither accepted President Reagan's proposal for a "zero-zero" offer, nor succeeded using propaganda to halt these deployments.[7] Soviet negotiators were left with no choice but to walk out of arms control talks in Geneva as the first U.S. missiles began to arrive.[8] They did not return for fifteen months. By March 1985, the tide of public opinion in the West was against them and the Soviets were accused of dragging their feet.

Once Gorbachev came to power, the Soviets began to display unprecedented flexibility at the negotiating table. Soon after the November 1985 Geneva Summit, Gorbachev proposed a three-stage comprehensive program to ban nuclear weapons by the year 2,000. This was to include drawing down INF missiles over a 5-8 year period. His precondition, however, was that "Star Wars" research must cease, a concession

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President Reagan was unwilling to make.[9] But by the summer of 1986, the Soviets were willing to concede over another sticking point: any reference to either French or British forces was dropped.

If the meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986, was "a blow to Allied confidence in American leadership and American understanding of the underpinnings of Alliance strategy," the Allies welcomed, nonetheless, the agreement in principle to reach an interim global limit of 100 INF warheads per side, to be kept outside Europe.[10]

Gorbachev subsequently indicated to an Indonesian newspaper interviewer that he was prepared to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles. He did insist, however, that Pershing I missiles in West Germany be removed, to which the Kohl government subsequently consented, albeit reluctantly.

When Secretary of State George Shultz went to Moscow in October 1987, an elimination schedule and substantive verification provisions were agreed to. Soon afterwards, Gorbachev was on his way to the Washington Summit. In the final hours before the December 8 treaty-signing ceremony, a last-minute draft of a Memorandum of Understanding and Inspection Protocol was initialed by negotiators in Geneva, and hastily flown to the two leaders already gathered in Washington. Once the ceremonies were over, the Reagan administration turned matters over to the Senate, hopeful that ratification would be swift and noncontroversial.[11]

* * *

In spite of all the public euphoria it generated, the Treaty did appear to have several shortcomings. Those experts who were called before the Senate to testify were asked to what extent the intelligence community could be sure we knew exactly how many SS-20s had been produced? What military utility could be derived from maintaining a covert force? And, what diplomatic costs were involved if this activity were ever discovered and disclosed?

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What really surprised some senators was the agreement stipulating that vital baseline data would only be exchanged thirty days *after* the Treaty came into effect, and not before.[12] "Was the U.S. being asked to participate in a form of blind date?" asked Frank Gaffney, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.[13]

Even before the formal exchange ever took place, the intelligence community was at odds over how many SS-20s the Soviets had actually produced. Seven out of nine intelligence agencies (with the exception of the CIA and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department) "reportedly believed that the Soviets have 300 to 600 more SS-20's than the 650 they have declared." When the Soviets finally made their data available, it did little to clear up the ambiguities; much of it was said to appear "contradictory and inconclusive."[14]

Yet, in an effort to allay apprehensions over these discrepancies, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released an unclassified report which concluded that there was no cause for concern: "By a combination of National Technical Means and on-site inspection, the intelligence community will be able to monitor the drawdown and elimination of declared Soviet missiles (sic) launchers and associated equipment with great certainty." Furthermore, "if the Soviets fail to cooperate, we will know it well before we have eliminated our own INF systems and could retain them until they cooperated."[15]

* * *

But it was still not clear how many SS-20s had really been deployed, and official Soviet pronouncements did little to reassure the skeptics. In fact, they had the opposite effect. It was reported that in November of the previous year, U.S. negotiators had been informed that in addition to over 450 deployed SS-20 and SS-4 missiles, Moscow had another 550 in storage. Moreover, "the Soviets [also] conceded they had

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deployed 120 SS-12 "Scaleboard" systems and, somewhat to the surprise of U.S. negotiators, said they had about 50 SS-23s."[16]

Furthermore, in addition to another 170 short-intermediate ranged SS-12s and SS-23s deployed on Transporter-Erector-Launcher vehicles (TELs), the Soviets also admitted to having 750 non-deployed missiles somewhere in storage. These were most probably being used either for test firings (to establish the reliability of the entire stock), as reloads for expended launchers, or as a covert force on unobserved launchers.[17]

This last scenario could not be ruled out. Since the SS-25 (based on the SALT-banned SS-16) uses TELs similar to the SS-20, it leaves open the possibility that a covert stockpile of medium-range SS-20s can be kept among SS-25s. Overhead methods of detection were no guarantee against potential violations:

> The SS-25 is 3 meters (10 feet) longer, but shares the same first stage, so the SS-20 will fit conveniently in the longer canister and "look" exactly the same to satellite-imaging. SS-25s are being deployed to SS-20 bases already, so the intermingling of the two similar systems will make it close to impossible for the United States to distinguish the two, and make any convincing case for Soviet violations.[18]

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard N. Perle, has said that soon after he arrived at the Pentagon as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, he commissioned a staff study to determine what would be the military consequences should the Soviets maintain a covert force of SS-20s. "The conclusion was that a force of only 50 of the three-warhead SS-20 missiles would be militarily significant."[19] Despite his serious concerns, Perle, nonetheless, argued in public for ratification. He reasoned that the damage to our credibility overseas would be too great to do otherwise. Furthermore, America could not leave its allies dangling in the wind.[20]

There were other studies as well with conclusions which

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were equally disquieting. A 1987 report by the "Critical Intelligence Problems Committee" of the Central Intelligence Agency, entitled, "The Soviet Land-Based Mobile Missile Study," concluded that "there currently are large uncertainties in our knowledge of the deployment, operations and characteristics of Soviet mobile missiles." And a subsequent report by the C.I.A.'s Mobile Missile Task Force Intelligence Requirements and Analysis Working Group stated in the appendix that best estimates were: "there is only a 20 percent probability of the U.S. detecting Soviet SS-20 mobile ballistic missiles in the field, even with the use of significantly improved satellites."[21] The report's Executive Summary stated:

> Even with a NRT [near real time] continuous monitoring system, the IC [intelligence community] would not be able to guarantee that it could quickly detect all possible forms of Soviet cheating. . . For approximately the rest of this century, there will be uncertainties associated with monitoring any arms control treaty limiting mobile missiles.[22]

The report went on to state that a great deal of work must be done to compile an accurate data base on Soviet missile hardware and operational procedures.[23]

Even the President's reports did little to instill confidence. The conclusion that the INF Treaty could *not* be verified was "misleadingly buried" in the classified version of an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report, according to Senator Symms, and not mentioned at all in the unclassified version.[24]

* * *

The INF Treaty was relatively unimportant to most Americans because it eliminated missiles in Europe, not the U.S. But START would be felt much closer to home since it would require scaling back nuclear assets based in the U.S.

While there were many questions raised about the potential effectiveness of the then untried INF verification

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procedures, the Senate eventually ratified the treaty without attaching "killer amendments." The misgivings expressed above were by and large swept aside by the tide of optimism shared by public and administration alike. President Reagan was overjoyed that he had advanced the cause of peace. What is less well known, however, is that the price exacted by his critics in the Senate was that the President had to agree to halt work on START for the remainder of his tenure in office.[25]

His critics had been prepared to insist that Moscow first be certified to be, "in substantial compliance with all arms control treaties currently in force between the parties," but after an emotional scene in the White House, they allowed the treaty to come to a vote on the Senate floor.[26]

* * *

After his inauguration in January 1989, President Bush made clear that he hoped to take up where his predecessor had left off. Accordingly, START negotiations were resumed after a 7-month hiatus, and the interim period had been used to conduct a strategic reassessment of the superpower equation. The panel of experts advising the President on these matters was briefed on the results of various studies, including an October 1988 CIA report entitled, "Monitoring a START Treaty." It argued that the START draft treaty inherited from Reagan allowed the Soviets to develop a major advantage in warheads and bombs — between 15,000 and 50,000, according to one scenario. Also, because Soviet mobile SS-24 and SS-25 missiles were so hard to monitor via National Technical Means (NTM), it was possible that a covert missile force would go undetected and that loopholes in the START counting rules would be exploited.[27]

A second report, issued by the "Bipartisan Defense Policy Panel" of the House Armed Services Committee, generated very little publicity. It concluded that "the Soviets could 'legally' — and are likely to — deploy another nearly 3,000 weapons, and could 'legally' have available nearly 11,000 additional weapons that are a source of a sudden breakout

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from START."[28] Chairman Les Aspin was critical of the *New York Times* and other leading media for ignoring these findings. He accused "its correspondents of being uncritical boosters of the START treaty and the Department of State line."[29]

* * *

Since the INF treaty has been in effect, the activities of our on-site inspection teams in the Soviet Union have received scant media coverage, and what has been made public has been positively upbeat.[30] Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, USA, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) stated in September 1988 that, "there have been absolutely no problems with implementation of the treaty."[31]

But a few public references have appeared indicating that there have been problems.[32] In August 1988, for example, it was reported that a "travelling circus" of missiles ready for inspection appeared to move from one declared site to the next, ahead of U.S. inspectors.[33]

There were also indications that U.S. inspection teams monitoring missiles leaving the Votkinsk factory portal were experiencing "difficulty."[34] It may not be easy to verify that SS-20 production has ceased, while SS-25 production continues — all within the same factory — when the differences between the first two stages of the three-staged SS-25 missile, and the two stages of the SS-20 are so minor. High-technology detection gear and instruments can help to reduce much of the uncertainty.[35]

The treaty permits inspectors to measure and weigh missiles, and photograph them using X-ray and infra-red. They can also apply radiation detection devices to railroad cars that leave factory gates loaded with missiles, and U.S. inspectors are also allowed to perform close, visual inspection on up to eight missiles a year.[36]

The Soviets, having acknowledged these rights in principle, have been reluctant to permit them in practice.[37] The

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U.S. portable X-ray machine, they claimed, posed a health hazard. Nor were the Russians eager to permit the use of sophisticated weighing equipment, photography and geiger counters. They finally insisted that only their equipment be used, which the U.S. team believed to be inaccurately calibrated. As late as mid-January 1989, Senator Helms was complaining to President Reagan that the proper X-ray equipment was still not in place.[38]

* * *

The first SS-20's observed by verification teams were different from those displayed in photographs supplied at the time the Treaty was signed. It was always believed that there was only one kind of SS-20, with a specific weight, length and photographic imprint. But the Soviets later claimed there were at least four distinct versions of the SS-20. "There are three distinct canister lengths, two quite different weights and two different front-end (warhead plus guidance) configurations. The data provided on the SS-12 and SS-23 were equally confusing."[39]

When the U.S. maintained that the treaty permitted inspectors to verify shelters housing individual missile stages, they were told that they would be permitted to look inside only containers and buildings large enough to hold a fully assembled SS-20 missile.[40] Because of the close resemblance between an SS-20 and an SS-25, there was speculation that a site labeled for one type of missile site might really be for another. For example, it was rumored that between 1985 and 1986, "the Soviets converted two SS-20 bases in central Russia into SS-25 bases."[41]

A map in a 1986 C.I.A. report entitled, *The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview*, as well as maps in Pentagon publications of the same period, show missile fields, warhead storage areas, and other INF-related support installations located at sites within a 100-to-200 mile radius of Moscow. These locations, however, remain off limits to U.S. inspection teams, according

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to the terms of the INF Treaty.[42] Similarly, the C.I.A. map also shows installations, including two missile fields near the Barents Sea, that are known to have housed both SS-20 and SS-25s but are excluded from the inspection provisions of the Treaty.[43]

It was also rumored that some SS-20 missiles may be found under garages that were ostensibly lengthened three meters to accommodate the SS-25; there is some speculation that 36 SS-20s lost by U.S. intelligence sources may be housed there.[44]

> One theory is that the Soviets have developed a modular "family" of mobile missiles, starting with the SS-16 of the 1960s, through the SS-20 to the SS-25, parts of which can be mixed and matched to various missions. According to this hypothesis, the various stages and transporters can be assembled like building blocks depending on the range of the targets they are to fire at, and the number and weight of warheads needed. Troops that train on one system are equally capable of operating the others.[45]

Finally, there was some ambiguity as to whether or not U.S. inspectors could check everything else within a declared INF facility as well, or just the buildings within the boundary specifically designated by the Soviets. It was also unclear whether or not the Soviets would control all photographic equipment used within their declared sites. For their part, the Strategic Rocket Forces representatives demanded to inspect Pershing 1A missiles in the U.S., in addition to Pershing 2s, even though these were not central to terms of the Treaty.[46]

In addition to missiles, over 400 SS-20 missile launcher sheds were to be dismantled. There is nothing to prevent them from being assembled elsewhere, however. Over 20 were seen at new locations, within other Strategic Rocket Forces bases and divisional command posts, not listed in the treaty. The U.S. has no right to inspect them or demand an explanation.[47]

The Treaty also contained what critics call the "Major Nicholson clause," after a slain U.S. military observer, which

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permits an inspection to be cancelled due to *force majeure*, or delay, or any major circumstance.[48]

When the U.S. observed Soviet sea-based SS-N-19 cruise missiles flight tested from mobile ground launchers on the Kola Peninsula, it was pointed out that the use of mobile land-based vehicles to test-fire sea-based missiles is expressly forbidden by the Treaty. American negotiators had insisted on a treaty provision to ban the conversion of sea-based missiles, with ranges greater than 550 miles, for use on land. "Sharp and unmistakable" photographs of this activity were apparently shown to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but it is not known how they reacted.[49]

In the summer of 1988, satellite data also revealed that there were some 200 "treaty limited items" at roughly "25 undeclared sites," a reference to SS-20 missiles not in pens awaiting destruction, but visible at locations elsewhere, nonetheless. Another source indicated that OSIA representatives managed to discover SS-12 missiles during an inspection conducted at a site declared off-limits to these missiles and ready to be closed.[50] Press accounts indicated, and the ACDA "Noncompliance Report"[51] confirmed it, that the issue had been discussed in Geneva and that the banned missile parts were subsequently removed from these sites.[52]

* * *

Richard Perle has stated that the prohibition of conventionally armed, ground-launched cruise missiles was the single most important flaw in the INF Treaty. The Armed Services Committee agreed with him, but members of the Reagan administration testified that, to render verification effective, we must ban both nuclear and conventional cruise missile warheads.[53] There was nothing to prevent Soviet testing of unarmed cruise missiles, however.[54] The Senate Intelligence Committee was split over this issue:

> . . . Some members of the committee believe that other national security interests may have been subordinated to

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> verification considerations on the GLCM issue. This has raised serious concerns among members of the committee that similar considerations of verifiability in START could lead to unduly restrictive limitations on future U.S. options for conventionally armed air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.[55]

Soviet negotiators insisted that the SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) trucks not be destroyed. Instead, only minor modifications to the MAZ-543 trucks would be performed, and they would be converted for use by the Soviet oil and gas pipeline industry.[56] The American Pershing II missile trucks, on the other hand, have been cut in half and reduced to scrap.[57]

* * *

At a missile production plant in the Central Asian community of Tabushar (which had apparently been under surveillance by U.S. intelligence satellites for 8 years) it was finally determined that the plant "is a production facility for solid-propellent missile stages, including sections of the SS-16, SS-20 and SS-25 mobile missiles. . . Sources would not reveal what tipped off the intelligence agencies to the real nature of the facility."[58]

Experts were surprised to find the Tabushar installation located at some distance from any railroad facility. Satellite photos indicated the missiles were placed on trailers and hauled 18 miles to the nearest rail line. Because Tabushar, however, is not a site covered by the Treaty, U.S. inspectors have no right to inspect it. Since the Votkinsk plant appears capable of meeting the entire SS-25 production quota, it is not clear what the Tabushar facility is being used for, nor has any public explanation been given.[59]

It was also noticed that, when the missiles cited by the INF Treaty are destroyed, the SS-20 and Pershing missiles do not react in the same manner; the American missiles burn, while the Soviet missiles explode.[60] According to ACDA, "Whether a

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rocket is test-fired, launched, or intentionally destroyed by burning, as called for in the INF Treaty, the products of combustion are the same."[61] The Soviets prefer to wrap their missiles with belts of explosives, whereas the American's incinerate theirs.

The Treaty also provides for 100 launches-to-destruction each year. Critics objected to this as soon as it was made public because,

> In agreeing to the Soviet Union's demand that the accord permit them to dispose of at least 100 INF missiles by flying them to destruction, we have seriously compromised this feature of the INF accord. Indeed, we have offered the Soviets through this device an opportunity to design a *de facto* flight test program, so as to maximize their knowledge and confidence in any covertly stockpiled missiles.[62]

Moreover, the Soviets have been accused of using jamming equipment to prevent the U.S. from monitoring SS-20 launches; it has not been easy to determine whether telemetric data is being encrypted, an activity prohibited by the treaty.[63]

In an attempt to compensate for the withdrawal of SS-20s, it has been alleged that a short-range version of the SS-19, now with a range of 1,400 to 1,600 miles, has been targeted on sites in Western Europe. Moreover, former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci told members of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, according to press accounts, that variable-range, road-mobile SS-25 and rail-mobile SS-24 missiles were being moved to new locations where they could more easily strike at targets in western Europe.[64]

More importantly, however, Ambassador Maynard Glitman, the principal negotiator of the INF Treaty, stated in his testimony before the Senate that both sides "understood that all *future* systems of weapons with a range between 500 and 5,000 kilometers, would be banned."[65] There was concern expressed that this might appear to rule out the use of laser or particle beam weapons, some of the most promising systems currently undergoing research. In the words of one informed

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Senate staffer,

> it is a barely concealed secret that the next generation of cruise missiles and reconnaissance drones will use laser navigation and homing systems. We don't know whether these are allowed or not. The Treaty language simply doesn't address the issue.[66]

A switch from cruise missiles employing active radar terrain-matching navigation (prone to jamming or interception by Soviet air defenses) to those employing 'laser painters' instead of radar would give the U.S. a significant military edge.

In a letter to then-Sen. Dan Quayle (R-IN), former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, however, made it clear that, "there was no understanding of any kind that I knew about that the treaty covered anything related to these so-called futuristic weapons." The issue was dropped once Secretary of State Shultz made his feelings on the matter known, and offered a letter of support from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze which backed the testimony of Ambassador Glitman.

On the other hand, "I would have opposed" [this policy], commented Weinberger, "in the strongest possible terms because it would have had an obvious adverse effect." He also objected to a ban on exotic technologies because it could make the task of verification much more difficult. Admittedly, the lack of clear, unambiguous language within the body of the Treaty, however, did much to cloud these matters further.[67]

Finally, Article XIV of the treaty, a 'non-circumvention' clause, may legally prevent the U.S. from providing its allies with updated missiles in the future:

> Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has said that modernization of NATO tactical nuclear forces would conflict with the INF treaty and could "scuttle" it. The Soviet Union apparently plans to use this article in its political campaigns against any Western effort to compensate for its INF military losses or future military deficiencies.[68]

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While the INF Treaty successfully eliminates two classes of missiles from the Soviet and U.S. arsenals, those with a combined range between 500 and 5,000 kilometers, it does not prevent, however, several nations in the Middle East from acquiring missiles with ranges within these banned distances.[69] China, for example, has made sales to Saudi Arabia of the CSS-2, a semi-mobile, liquid-fueled missile with a range of 2,500 miles. U.S. intelligence officials apparently grew alarmed over the purchase because the "East Wind" missile, as it is called, does not have the pin-point accuracy needed for non-nuclear, high-explosive warheads:

> The low accuracy of the missile indicates that the Saudis may plan to put nuclear, or chemical-biological payloads on their new CSS-2s, which are capable of striking targets throughout the Middle East, including Israel and even the southern Soviet Union. . . Sources also said the Chinese have never tested the CSS-2, a mobile missile, in a non-nuclear mode.[70]

Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Egypt are also known to have Soviet-made SCUD-B missiles. There may be as many as 1000 SCUD launcher vehicles and between 2,000 and 3,000 missiles available worldwide. Because their proliferation has been so extensive, U.S. negotiators were discouraged from trying to include the SCUD-B in the INF Treaty. Nonetheless, the SS-23, which is considered to be an upgraded SCUD, has been included; the Soviets have agreed to remove those that have already been deployed.

The SCUD-Bs and SS-23s are similar in size, shape, and looks. They can be deployed on the same eight-wheeled vehicle, and are operated by the same troops. The principle differences are to be found inside the missile: the SS-23 has better accuracy and range.

> There is nothing in the INF treaty to prevent the Soviets using the improved guidance and propulsion systems of the SS-23 in the legal SCUDs. They can legally have the

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> equivalent of the banned SS-23 missile by declaring them SCUDs.[71]

The SCUD-B in *Soviet Military Power* is listed with a range of 300km, but the missile has been flight-tested to 600km.[72] Moreover, during the Iraqi bombardment of Teheran, SCUD-B's flew in excess of 500km.

> If the Pentagon now comes out and says yes, those are SCUDs hitting Teheran, and yes they are flying 600km to reach there, we are making the INF negotiators look like clowns.[73]

"Without a major effort to turn the tide," declared one commentator in the *Washington Post*, "as many as 15 Third World countries are believed likely to be missile-makers by the late 1990s."[74]

* * *

For all of its apparent shortcomings, the INF Treaty "was not such a fragile construction that it could not be clarified and improved by going back to the Soviets with refinements, modifications and clarifications," as Richard Perle declared.[75] Furthermore, it is very expensive. The General Accounting Office estimated the cost of the INF Treaty to be between $263 billion and $326 billion, over 13 years (a 7 percent change over current defense budget outlays). It would not be cheap to replace Europe's military deterrent by more "traditional means." But the monetary cost seemed unimportant to its supporters; political considerations outweighed all others.[76]

As mentioned above, the Treaty's opponents did consider trying to stall the President by a variety of means. Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) wanted to nullify Senate approval upon discovering that the Soviets had violated any portion of the pact. Even former Majority Leader Robert Byrd was in favor of setting the INF Treaty's provisions in motion only when the last of the 115,000 troops had withdrawn from

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Afghanistan.[77]

Moreover, the White House acted in a manner which did little to allay the concerns of its critics. As President Reagan was about to leave to attend the Moscow Summit, his staff submitted a classified letter to the Senate, describing how the Soviets were raising new obstacles to verification. When a meeting was held with Soviet ambassador to the United States Yuri Dubrinin on Sunday, May 8, 1988, a satisfactory outcome was not achieved.[78] The Soviets claimed that the agreement worked out in great haste the previous December in Geneva, which had sanctioned intrusive on-site verification procedures, had never received the approval of more senior negotiators.[79]

Yet, the proposed "killer amendments" or deft parliamentary maneuvers never materialized. President Reagan shed tears during the middle of a White House meeting with a group of conservative senators; "at that point, opposition to the INF Treaty effectively collapsed," and serious bargaining ensued.[80]

The INF Treaty proceeded with no amendments attached or requests for renegotiation. The critics, however, insisted that the President agree to slow down work on START. As one influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer put it,

> the bottom line is he (Sen. Helms) slowed the train of START and forced a more realistic appraisal of arms control by the administration and Congress. . . We delayed the treaty two and a half months so that START negotiations would not limit our missile systems without a treaty that must be debated and ratified by the Senate.[81]

President Bush continues to benefit from a steady improvement in relations with the Soviet Union, and a strategic arms agreement appears to remain high on his list of priorities. START, like INF,is presumably being pursued on the grounds that it strengthens NATO.[82] And President Bush may be hoping to repeat President Reagan's success and reap the accolades of European leaders, as well as supporters at home.[83]

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But should some of the serious charges mentioned above be further substantiated and, by default, be leveled against the Bush administration, they will do much to raise concerns that a START agreement is unverifiable. It is not in the national interest to make deep cuts in the U.S. nuclear deterrent force if safe and effective verification cannot be assured.

The Bush administration should avoid getting into a position where advocating caution, thus slowing down the negotiation process, becomes politically untenable. Gorbachev's arms control overtures must surely make it difficult for U.S. policy makers to ignore public opinion and act in a measured, dispassionate way. But, since what constitutes "adequate verification" is largely a political question, rather than a technical one, Congress must allocate sufficient resources for intelligence collection and analysis, and the President must ensure that we include sufficient safeguards before we decide that START is verifiable.

* * *

A vocal minority in the Senate perceive that important technical, strategic, and geopolitical considerations may have been obscured for the sake of political expediency (to satisfy the concerns of our European allies over Soviet SS-20s), and they are not about to let this happen again with START. Therefore, it will be a testament to the soundness of the U.S. negotiating position (and the political skills of those individuals involved in reaching a lasting agreement) if the concerns of members of the U.S. Senate can be overcome in a timely fashion – and with little political fanfare. Only time will tell.

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FOOTNOTES

1. With a margin of 93 to 5, the Senate passed the INF treaty on May 27, 1988. Soon afterwards, the President was on his way to the Moscow summit where the instruments of ratification were exchanged. In short, the INF Treaty bans U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and grants visiting rights to more than 130 Soviet locations. It also gives the right to maintain a permanent post outside a missile factory in Votkinsk for 13 years, to ensure that no further SS-20s are being produced.
2. "Given later deployment during the execution of the 1976-1980 Five Year Plan of what turned out to be about 220 launchers, it seems reasonable to associate about 220 SS-20 launchers with the production of 1,200 SS-20s. There seems to be *a ratio of production of 5 SS-20 missiles for each SS-20 launcher*." Quotations are from "Soviet Mobile Missile Worries United States," *Boston Sunday Globe*, 5 September 1976, and reprinted as "Enclosure No. 11" in a memorandum submitted by Senator Symms on behalf of Senator Helms into the *Congressional Record*, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., March 29, 1988, p. S 3206.
3. Ibid. It should be noted that the final version of the INF Treaty called for the destruction of roughly 650 SS-20s, only one half this figure.
4. It was later rumored that after several years of service to the CIA, "Boris" was caught by the KGB, found guilty of espionage and treason, and executed by firing squad in 1979. Quotes are from "1977 Spy Data on SS-20's Cast Shadow Over INF Talks," *New York City Tribune*, 17 November, 1987. See discussion on the SS-20 Missile in the preface to U.S., Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1984. Also, Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960 that they would start to conceal some of their missile assets. He declared, "We have a vast territory and we are able to disperse our missiles and camouflage them well. We are developing such a system that if some means of retaliation were knocked out, we could always fall back on others and strike the enemy from such reserve installations." A similar rationale for concealing missile "reserves" – "whole arms factories and other installations within the vast expanse of the Soviet Union" – is to be found in the 1968 edition of Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky's *Military Strategy*. For Khrushchev quotes see: "Study Shows Far From All Soviet INF Sites Would Be Subject to Inspection by U.S.," *New York City Tribune*, December 16, 1987, p. 1.
5. The following draws upon, *Understanding the INF Treaty*, prepared by the Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1988.
6. The December 13, 1979, decision by Allied ministers in Brussels called for deployments to begin in late 1983, and would be phased over several years. Germany would be the first to receive them, then the U.K., Italy, Belgium, and Holland. Of the 572 missiles, 464 GLCMs would be deployed as follows: 160 in the U.K., 112 in Sicily, 96 in Germany, and 48 each in Belgium and Holland. The remaining 108 Pershing II's were to replace the Pershing IA under U.S. control in Germany. However, the 72 Pershing IA's under German control would remain. This was part of, "Schmidt's effort to limit domestic and Soviet reaction by keeping the "German" dimension of the plan as limited as possible". The immediate price paid by the FRG for the INF Treaty was the removal of their Pershing IAs. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The INF Treaty*, Exec. Rept 100-15 to accompany Treaty Doc. 100-11, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 19.

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7. Rather than agreeing to dismantle all their SS-20s, as well as older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, Soviet counter-proposals instead sought to include British and French systems – without restricting the transfer of SS-20s from east of the Urals, back to Central Europe.
8. SS-20s were deployed at a rate of one per week during the first two years of negotiations.
9. The SDI program began in earnest subsequent to a speech by the President on March 23, 1983. For Soviet criticisms of the Strategic Defense Initiative, see *Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security*, (Moscow: Mir Publishers, 1986).
10. Remarks by Harold Brown before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, quoted in *The INF Treaty*, p. 30.
11. The INF treaty signing was nearly called off because the first picture the Soviets provided of the SS-20 was a simple photocopy of an American photograph of the Soviet SS-20 missile. "The Soviets provided the unsatisfactory picture the day before the signing", according to a State Department spokesman, and "U.S. officials said they were deeply insulted by the indignity of receiving a poor reproduction of their own photograph. . ."The only picture we really wanted was a high-quality color glossy of the SS-20 outside its canister, and we never got it." See "In a Crucial Request for Photo of SS-20, Soviets Insulted the U.S., *New York City Tribune*, Dec. 17, 1987, p. 1.
12. Article IX, paragraph of the INF Treaty provides: "No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the memorandum of understanding."
13. "The treaty does not afford us the right to reject Soviet data supplied at that time. In fact if the United States is unsatisfied with the information provided in the data update – e.g. if we judge the Soviets are understating their INF force – and the Soviets fail to convince us of the accuracy of their new data, then the United States would have no effective recourse. As a practical matter, we would feel compelled to continue to fulfill our obligations under the Treaty." Comments by Frank Gaffney on the treaty's Article IX, Paragraph 3, quoted in "Article-By-Article Review of the INF Treaty," by the American Enterprise Institute Working Group on the INF Treaty, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Chairman, released February 3, 1988, p. 16.
14. Senator Helms stated: "If the consensus estimate of our intelligence agencies is correct, then the claim that the INF Treaty compliance can be verified is erroneous. Moreover, if the intelligence community is correct, then the Soviets, by failing to declare the actual inventory, are not acting in good faith." *The INF Treaty*, p. 188.
15. "Whether or not these differences can be resolved in the future, on the basis of new information or analysis, their potential military significance would be short-lived. This is because the operational reliability and military utility of any covertly maintained missiles would begin to deteriorate immediately; would seriously degrade during the first three years, when all declared missiles are being eliminated; and would vanish entirely within a decade, unless the Soviets can resume flight testing them. This would be both illegal and readily detectable." Quoted in a 21 March, 1988 letter from the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 8. (Copy obtained from the Committee.)
16. The U.S. intelligence community had hitherto believed there were no more than 20 of the 300-mile ranged SS-23 "Spider" missile. The discrepancy may have been due to the fact that the "Spider" uses the same MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) truck as the SS-12 Scaleboard missile. See,"Soviet Admissions of Missiles Moscow

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Hid Shake Confidence of U.S. in Verification," *New York City Tribune*, December 1, 1987, p. 1.

17. The Soviets also admitted for the first time that the SS-25 was a modification of the mobile SS-16, and not as previously maintained, a modification of the older SS-13. The SALT II Treaty (signed but never ratified) forbids each side from deploying more than one "new type" of ICBM. The Soviets specified that their permitted ICBM was the new rail-mobile SS-24; the SS-25 would, therefore, be a violation. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, p. 4. Professor William Van Cleave stated in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, "When we examine the SS-25 'signature' or identifying characteristics, we find disturbing similarities. It uses the same type of launcher; it use (sic) the same type of canister; it uses the same type of garage. The only difference is that each of these items is modified to be about 10 feet longer." "Our satellites, of course, can detect the 10-foot difference. We are able to differentiate between deployments that are clearly SS-20 deployments and deployments that have the SS-25 signature. The problem is that deployments with the SS-25 signature do not necessarily have to contain SS-25's. The SS-25 canister could easily contain an SS-20 missile. The SS-25 TEL and canister could fire an SS-20 missile concealed inside. The canister would have about 10 feet of waste space, but it would not be 'wasted' if the concealment deceived a U.S. satellite." *The INF Treaty*, p. 200. See also, "New Security Risk Seen In Soviet Inspectors Allowed By INF Treaty", *New York City Tribune*, December 14, 1987, p. 4.

19. Perle also believes the Soviets have succeeded in maintaining a major mobile force of SS-16 ICBMs, in violation of the SALT II ban on such missiles. There were others in government who were apparently less certain. See: "Perle Says Soviets May Plan to Keep Covert SS-20 Force Despite INF Pact," *New York City Tribune*, 4 February, 1988, p. 1.

20. It is interesting to note, from the perspective of history, the similarities between the views of Richard Perle and those of Robert Lansing (President Wilson's Secretary of State), the latter having reluctantly agreed to support the Versailles Peace Treaty. "Lansing's memoirs make clear that, for him, his eventual support of the cause of treaty ratification represented no change of heart from his critical stance at Paris, but rather a sense that American ratification of the Treaty and the League Covenant was necessary to the prevention of social chaos:

> "My own position was paradoxical. I was opposed to the Treaty, but signed it and favored its ratification. The explanation is this: Convinced after conversations with the President in July and August, 1919, that he would not consent to any effective reservations, the politic course seemed to be to endeavor to secure ratification without reservations. *It appeared to be the only possible way of obtaining that for which all the world longed and which in the months succeeding the signature appeared absolutely essential to prevent the widespread disaster* resulting from political and economic chaos which seemed to threaten many nations if not civilization itself. *Even if the Treaty was bad in certain provisions, so long as the President remained inflexible and insistent, its ratification without change seemed a duty to humanity.*" (Emphasis mine).

See N. Gordon Levin, Jr. *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 175-176, who quotes from Robert Lansing, *Peace Negotiations*, p. 276. It should also be noted that President Reagan's insistence that not a word be changed in the INF Treaty is reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson's unsuccessful bid to get the Paris Peace Agreement past the Senate without any riders or amendments attached. Moreover, Senator Helms might have argued that (in acting to ratify the treaty, or as a consequence of the INF Treaty) the

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net effect on Western Europe could prove just as momentous as when the Senate failed to ratify the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant.

21. For details see, "Soviet Mobile Missiles Could Make It Easy To Foil Verification of an Arms Accord," *New York City Tribune*, November 16, 1987, p. 1, and "Likelihood of Spotting SS-20s Put at 20%," *New York City Tribune*, November 3, 1987, p. 6.

22. *Ibid.*

23. A quote from page 8 of the report reads, "Many data bases relating to mobile missile issues need to be developed, including data bases on Soviet terminology for mobile missile equipment, Soviet arms control statements relating to mobile missiles, Soviet CP [command post] exercises involving mobile missiles, and construction projects in the USSR that may be related to mobile missiles. . . A number of analytical projects (should) be undertaken to improve the state of knowledge on Soviet mobile missiles. One of the most important of these [projects] is to develop a model of the concept of operations for mobile missile units that are deployed in the field. A great deal of information will be required to model how Soviet missile forces operate, including how often they deploy to the field, how far from their bases and from other units they deploy, how often they are deployed, and how long they stay in one place. . . It is clear that the development of strategies to improve our capabilities will require many more experts than currently are available. . . We cannot obtain information on many aspects of mobile missile operations through technical sensors (alone)." See, "Soviet Mobile Missiles Could Make It Easy To Foil Verification of an Arms Accord," *New York City Tribune*, November 16, 1987, p. 4.

24. "Soviets, Lured by Military Gains, Said Already Cheating On INF," *New York City Tribune*, April 6, 1988, p. 2.

25. See note 79 below.

26. See section entitled, "History of Soviet Noncompliance in Arms Control," which lists violations from the year 1920. "If the Senate ratifies the INF Treaty fully cognizant of this extensive record of Soviet cheating, it sends a clear, if not regrettable, signal to the Kremlin... it invites cheating on the INF Treaty, and *encourages Soviet representatives in Geneva to negotiate a START treaty full well intending to violate it*." (p. 405) [Emphasis mine]. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The INF Treaty*, pp. 390-405. See also No. 80 below.

27. "CIA Says Cuts in Strategic Missiles Would Give Advantage to the Soviets," *New York City Tribune*, March 23, 1988, p. 1.

28. U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Breakout, Verification and Force Structure: Dealing With The Full Impact of START*, Committee Report No. 21, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 5.

29. "CIA, Cuts in Strategic Missiles," *New York City Tribune*, March 23, 1988, p. 6.

30. For example: "It's not just hype at the Moscow level, not just propaganda. The [Soviet Military] guys who are working with us down there at the factory, at the plant, are intent on demonstrating that there are no SS-20s coming out of Votkinsk." Quoted in "Our Men In Votkinsk," *Boston Globe*, 31 August, 1988, p. 65.

31. ". . . the unprecedented probings of restricted U.S. and Soviet military facilities and armaments allowed by the treaty have been an unalloyed success, producing none of the difficulties predicted by treaty opponents in the Senate or quietly feared by some of its supporters." The article cited below also states that "U.S. intelligence officials added that *the Soviets have appeared to be in complete compliance with the treaty's requirements*." This and the quote from LaJoie, above, differ markedly from the conclusions reached in other articles cited. For quotes used herein, see "Brother in Arms Control Off to a 'Smooth' Start," Washington Post, 15 Sept. 1988, p. 23.

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32. There have been newspapers like the *Washington Times* and the *New York City Tribune*, which are owned by the conservative Unification Church of the Rev. Moon, which have run stories detailing allegations of treaty shortcomings and Soviet wrongdoing. While it might be difficult to ensure the complete objectivity of these accounts, in the interest of furthering academic study of these issues, they have been cited throughout.

33. "...there appears to be sufficient time under the treaty arrangements – between U.S. demands for an inspection of a suspect declared site and the arrival of U.S. inspectors at the site – for the Soviets to rearrange items there, so that the Americans do not see anything the Soviets do not want them to see. *We think we may have been seeing the same thing over and over*, a number of times at different sites." Quoted in "U.S. Said to be Growing Impatient Over Soviet Compliance With INF Pact," *New York City Tribune*, 11 August, 1988, p. 1.

34. OSIA representatives are there to ensure that SS-20 missile stages are no longer being produced, that only SS-25 ICBM missiles are being turned out. The Soviets wanted to move their own personnel into the basement of the quarters to be occupied by the Americans. It was finally agreed that, "control over the buildings will remain with the U.S. team, although Soviet officials will be permitted periodic access to the basements of the four structures." The two-story brick buildings will never be considered 'secure', "because eavesdropping devices were built into the structures." Also, the new arrangements permit escorted maintenance personnel to enter basements, "to check the water and those types of things." See "U.S., Soviets Solve Inspection Team's Housing Difficulties," *The Washington Times*, March 23, 1988.

35. "When it is installed, the full array of sensors at Votkinsk will include the X-ray machines, rail scales to weigh each missile and an infra-red 'profiler' that will provide inspectors with a rapid external configuration of loaded railcars leaving the factory. . . Special induction coils also will be planted in the ground near the Votkinsk gate to monitor any vehicles that leave the factory. If any unannounced missiles go out, sensors and television cameras will trigger alarms, officials said." Quoted from: "Moscow Reported Hampering INF Verification," *Washington Times*, 17 October, 1988, p. 3. Soviet inspectors, on the other hand, who monitor the former Pershing II production plant in Magna, Utah, "use marked sticks to determine the exact dimensions of crates and packages leaving the plant." See "Brothers in Arms Control Off to a 'Smooth' Start," *Washington Times* 15 September, 1988, p. 23.

36. It was reported in October, 1988, that since July of that year, the U.S. inspection team had opened one SS-25 canister for closer inspection. An article appearing in March 1988, had the following to say: "Meanwhile, Soviet officials have been 'very cooperative' in allowing U.S. inspectors to check inside missile canisters, the official said. Only two missile canisters have been opened since July, however. Others were inspected from the outside, he said." See, "Sen. Helms Blames Soviet Intransigence For U.S. Inability on Missile Verification," *New York City Tribune*, Jan. 16, 1989, p. 7.

37. "The Soviets have not agreed to permit the use of special radiation detection equipment needed to measure whether missiles in canisters have a single warhead, like those on the permitted SS-25, or possibly a triple-warhead SS-20 banned by the INF Treaty." Quoted from: "Moscow Reported Hampering INF Verification," *Washington Times*, 17 October, 1988, p. 3.

38. Under the INF Treaty, the United States had until December 1, 1988, to set up all imaging and weighing equipment. "During ratification debate," Helms wrote, "the U.S. inspection rights at the Votkinsk factory portal were correctly proclaimed by your administration as the heart or keystone of the INF verification regime." Helms added that the failure to permit the United States to X-ray the missile canisters,

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"constitutes the most serious Soviet violation of the INF treaty so far." The matter was actually discussed by U.S. and Soviet arms officials before the Special Verification Commission in Geneva. However, it was not mentioned in the President's Soviet arms control compliance report to Congress. See, "Sen. Helms Blames Soviet Intransigence for U.S. Inability on Missile Verification," *New York City Tribune*, Jan. 16, 1989, p. 7.

39. "U.S. Said to Be Growing Impatient Over Soviet Compliance With INF Pact," *New York City Tribune*, 11 August, 1988, p. 4. A *Washington Post* article written one month later contains the following quote:

> "Senate treaty opponents predicted the Soviets would use the period between the treaty's signing last December and the start of its implementation July 1 to hide some of their missiles and otherwise engage in unauthorized activity aimed at confounding U.S. 'baseline' inspections to verify key arms data. *But U.S. intelligence officials said they have no evidence of Soviet shenanigans before or during the two month 'baseline' inspection period.*"

Cited in "Brothers in Arms Control Off to a 'Smooth' Start," *Washington Post*, 15 September, 1988, p. 23.

See also page 2 of the response from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs in answer to U.S. Senator Jesse Helms' letter of January 12, 1988, requesting clarification as to "what accounts for the fact that the Soviets supplied four separate numbers for SS-20s in their possession during the last month of the negotiations, differing by as much as 225?" The official response was that, "the Soviets provided MOU data in four separate installments, and there were four instances of inconsistencies [which] are largely a result of re-categorization by the Soviets of known and declared equipment. . . The INF Treaty defines missiles located at missile operating bases as deployed, even when in storage, and the revised figures reflect the Treaty definition." (Copy provided by A.C.D.A. office of Public Affairs).

40. This is important, because assembling a missile from two components in the field is believed to be a routine operation. But, "the terms of the treaty do not specifically provide for detailed examination of missile canisters by either the Soviets or the United States." See "New Questions on INF Inspection Slow Progress of the Treaty," *New York City Tribune*, 6 May, 1988, p. 2.

41. In the process, "some 36 SS-20s disappeared from the SS-20 inventory and are believed to be covertly deployed at the new SS-25 bases." One official added, "We don't know where they went, but it would be easy for them to hide the missiles inside SS-25 storage sheds." See, "New Security Risk Seen In Soviet Inspectors Allowed By INF Treaty," *New York City Tribune*, December 14, 1987, p. 4.

42. They are in towns like Ustinov, Korov, Dubna, and Smolensk, and others adjacent to the Moscow ring road.

43. "Study Shows Far From All Soviet INF Sites Would Be Subject to Inspection by U.S.," *New York City Tribune*, December 16, 1987, p. 1. The towns, Yurya and Verkhnyaya Salda, are roughly northeast of Moscow. The two are shown as SS-25 bases in the 1987 edition of *Soviet Military Power*; the 1985 edition, nonetheless, indicated they were SS-20 bases: "U.S. intelligence "lost" a brigade of 18 of the intermediate range SS-20 missiles from both Yurya and Verkhnyaya Salda some time in 1985 or 1986. Satellite imagery no longer picked up evidence of the 36 SS-20 units earlier identified as located at these two bases, and it could not find them elsewhere. Subsequently, the photo-analysts established that the new mobile intercontinental missile, the SS-25, was being deployed at each of these bases and so they are now classed as SS-25 bases." See, "Soviet Ploy to Circumvent INF Pact Began with Secret Bases 2 Years Ago," *New York City Tribune*, December 7, 1987, p. 2.

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44. Dr. Sam Cohen, a nuclear weapons expert and inventor of the "neutron bomb," has long maintained that the SS-20 is in reality an all-purpose strategic weapon. Missiles are classed by the maximum range over which they have been tested, regardless of their real capability; the number of warheads, by the maximum number tested. Accordingly, in his recent book entitled, *Mesmerized by the Bear: The Soviet Strategy of Deception*, he states,

> "There would seem to be very good reason to believe that from the very beginning the Soviets planned the SS-20 as an ICBM and then proceeded to deceive our technically marvelous but mentally gullible spy satellites into believing it was a theater missile by restricting their flight tests to theatre missile ranges. Even then these test ranges have been barely – only 10 percent – below the accepted definition of an ICBM range, hardly enough to seriously reduce confidence in the missile's performance at intercontinental ranges."

The journalist citing Cohen then goes on to say,

> "The Soviet's testing the missile in a trajectory across the North Pole provides a further indication that the SS-20 was designed as an all-purpose strategic nuclear weapon system. The only possible target for such a track would be in North America, and the test would be valuable in providing the Soviets with data on magnetic and gravitational anomalies that could affect SS-20 accuracy when fired against Canada or the United States."

See "1977 Spy Data on SS-20s Cast Shadow Over INF Talks," *New York City Tribune*, November 17, 1987, p. 4.

45. "INF 'Good Deal' May Be a Disaster," *New York City Tribune*, Nov. 8, 1987, p. 4.

46. "Senate, Fed Up by Soviet Slipperiness, Drawing Line on INF", *New York City Tribune*, 10 May, 1988, p. 6

47. "U.S. Said to Be Growing Impatient Over Soviet Compliance With INF Pact," *New York City Tribune*, 11 August, 1988, p. 4.

48. "That's a green light for the Soviets to take any action they want, like shooting inspectors, to prevent us from finding out if they're cheating, one U.S. official said." See "New Security Risk is Seen in Soviet Inspectors Allowed by INF Treaty," *New York City Tribune*, December 14, 1987, p. 1.

49. See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak's piece entitled "Photos From Russia," *Washington Post*, 16 May 1988, p. 15.

50. "Krasnoyarsk Radar Termed 'Material Breach' of Treaty," *Washington Times*, 30 November, 1988, p.4.

51. To clear up any difficulties, a Special Verification Commission had been set up in Geneva as a forum to discuss how the verification provisions would be carried out. Throughout the spring and summer of 1988, Soviet negotiators were uncooperative. They made it difficult to complete the technical Memorandum of Agreement (MOU) to codify the rights of on-site inspectors. By that fall, several issues were still unresolved. The 1988 ACDA Report to Congress on "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements" reported five "noncompliance findings," but indicated they had been resolved. There were also concerns that strong allegations of new Soviet improprieties might surface before the November elections.

52. A possible explanation: "'One theory is that this is a try-on, a test of our seriousness about the treaty' said one official this week, of the items showing up outside INF sites. He said the approximately 200 violating items are not being camouflaged or concealed, suggesting that the Soviets virtually have put them on display to see how the United States reacts." Quoted from: "U.S., Growing Impatient" *New York City Tribune*, 11 August, 1988, p. 4.

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53. "The Committee recognizes the validity of the concerns expressed during its hearings over the prohibition of a potentially promising option for implementing NATO's follow-on forces (FOFA) and deep strike doctrines. Advanced technology is the Alliance's trump card, and highly accurate, unmanned, long-range, standoff weapons represent a particularly attractive means for redressing the conventional imbalance in Europe." See, U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The INF Treaty*, p. 212.

54. Richard Perle testified, "...The Treaty does not allow unarmed cruise missiles. If the Soviets wished to disguise the deployment of nuclear-armed cruise missiles, they could simply claim they were unarmed reconnaissance vehicles. We would be unable to verify this claim in peacetime, and during a war, nuclear warheads could be easily added. Moreover, there is no practicable way to verify the range of a cruise missile...So, it is simply wrong to assert that a ban on non-nuclear cruise missiles makes a ban on nuclear ones verifiable. It does not." Ibid., p. 213.

55. Ibid., p. 214.

56. The "Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems...," states under the section entitled, "Procedures for Eliminating at Elimination Facilities" that "a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length shall be cut off aft of the rear axle" to render the SS-20 launcher inoperable for its intended purpose. There has been concern expressed, however, that because the Soviet modifications are minor, and, "given that these 'eliminated' Soviet launchers will be permitted to operate throughout the Soviet Union, the question is whether, even if we observe them through overhead reconnaissance, we have the capability of ascertaining whether the alterations have been reversed so to allow the item to perform a prohibited function?" See, comment to Article IV, Paragraph 1, quoted from "Article-By-Article Review of the INF Treaty," by the American Enterprise Institute Working Group on the INF Treaty, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Chairman, released February 3, 1988, p. 5-6.

57. Here, the protocol states that, "the launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

58. "U.S. Finds Suspicious Factory in U.S.S.R.," *Washington Times*, 21 Oct. 88, p. 3.

59. "U.S., Growing Impatient" *New York City Tribune*, 11 August, 1988, p. 4.

60. "Brig. Gen. Roland Lajoie watched the first three disappear in a *roaring explosion* on August 28 at Kapustin Yar, where the Soviet Ballistic missile arsenal was officially born more than 40 years ago. . . A week later, Col. Nikolai Shabalin and other Soviet inspectors visited a U.S. Army base in Texas to observe the *burning and crushing* of a U.S. Pershing II missile." Quoted in "Brothers in Arms Control Off to a 'Smooth' Start," *Washington Post*, 15 September, 1988, p. 23. [Emphasis mine] Lev Navrozov writes that when two missiles were destroyed in Karnak, Texas, on September 9, 1988, the Pershing 1-A, which contains 4,400 pounds of propellant, burned for 40 seconds; the Pershing II, with 7,900 pounds of propellant, burned for almost a minute. Each had been turned into "a red-hot carcass." By this same date, the Soviets were reputed to have destroyed 200 "missiles." Navrozov contends that the Soviets are not destroying missiles with propellants and engines inside. Rather, he believes that they have been destroying "missile canisters," largely empty, and packed with ordinary explosives: "The Soviet gloryboys fix ordinary TNT sticks to empty canisters, and the resulting explosions are so much more dramatic than the American burning!" See Navrozov's commentary piece, "INF Hoax At Work: Empty Soviet Missile Canisters Blasted" *New York City Tribune*, 19 September, 1988, p. 8.

61. These are: "aluminum oxide, water, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen, hydrogen, and hydrogen chloride." See *Understanding the INF Treaty*, prepared by the Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1988.

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62. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The INF Treaty*, Exec. Rept. 100-15 to accompany Treaty Doc. 100-11, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 236.
63. "Soviets, Lured by Military Gains, Said Already Cheating On INF," *New York City Tribune*, April 6, 1988, p. 1.
64. See "Soviets Preparing New Missiles To Replace SS-20s Carlucci Says, ICBMs Tooled for Use At Intermediate Ranges," *New York City Tribune*, 13 May, 1988, p. 1. See also earlier discussion on the similarities between the launchers used for SS-16s, SS-25s and the SS-20s, and the possibilities of a covert stockpile of SS-20s among the SS-25s.
65. Quoted in: "INF: New Questions, No Answers", *Washington Times*, 20 April 1988, p. F2.
66. "Senate, Fed Up by Soviet Slipperiness, Drawing Line on INF," *New York City Tribune*, 11 March, 1988, p. 6.
67. Quotes from: "INF: New Questions, No Answers," *Washington Times*, 20 April 1988, p. F2.
68. Quoted comments attributed to Douglas J. Feith, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; see "Perle Says Soviets May Plan to Keep Covert SS-20 Force Despite INF Pact," *New York City Tribune*, 4 February, 1988, p. 1.
69. During his testimony on January 25, 1988, Secretary of State Shultz noted:

> "While I was in Moscow [in April, 1987], Gorbachev and Shevardnadze said that an INF Treaty should include a zero outcome for shorter range missiles in Europe. I told them that any limits on shorter range missiles had to be global. These systems were highly mobile; it simply did not make sense to try to establish regional limits.
>
> After some discussion, Mr. Gorbachev accepted this point, and said he would be willing to accept global zero for shorter range missiles. . .
>
> In July [1987], the Soviet Union said that it would accept global zero not just for shorter range missiles, but for intermediate-range missiles, as well."

See U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The INF Treaty*, p. 225.
70. "New Questions on INF Inspection Slow Progress of the Treaty," 6 May, 1988, p. 2.
71. "18 Nations Keep INF Missiles," *Washington Inquirer*, 8 April, 1988, p. 1.
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.*
74. "U.S. Seeks to Curb Argentine Missile Project," *Washington Post*, 19 September 1988, p. 6.
75. "Perle Says Soviets May Plan to Keep Covert SS-20 Force Despite INF Pact," *New York City Tribune*, 4 February, 1988, p. 1.
76. "The costs are said to include: losses of Pershing II missiles ($2.9 billion), Pershing I ($2 billion) and ground-launched cruise missiles ($3.1 billion); direct treaty verification ($2.6 billion); enhancement, without enlargement of NATO forces ($17 billion annually, totalling $221 billion); deploying protective measures against chemical and biological warfare (data not made available); enlarging the NATO force structure to provide the extra armored division ($3.7 billion to equip and $34 billion over 13 years); addition of a mechanized infantry division ($3 billion to equip and $28 billion over the life of the treaty); enhancing verification capability by additional satellite equipment ($2 billion annually, to a total of $12 billion); cost of a new national mobilization base for the United States as required by a new NATO strategy, to cover extra manpower, sealift, airlift and increased reserve industrial base (unidentified)." See

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"INF Pact to Cost $25 Billion Yearly, Raise War Risk, Helms Says," *New York City Tribune*, 4 April, 1988, p. 1.

77. See, "New Security Risk Seen In Soviet Inspectors Allowed By INF Treaty," *New York City Tribune*, December 14, 1987, p. 4.

78. "Senate, Fed Up by Soviet Slipperiness: Drawing Line on INF," *New York City Tribune*, 10 May, 1988, p. 6; A summary of the outstanding verification issues follows: 1) the right to inspect missile stages prior to destruction; 2) the problem of areas being declared off-limits at an INF inspection site; 3) the right to look inside SS-20 missile canisters prior to their destruction; 4) the right to inspect all canisters that pass through the exit portal at the Votkinsk missile plant; 5) the U.S. demand to see front-end photos of the SS-20, not just the drawings supplied by the Soviets; 6) the right to inspect canisters containing SS-23 and SS-12 short-range missiles; 7) a U.S. demand that the Soviets supply the exact geographical coordinates for any SS-20 missiles that are moved, instead of the Soviet promise to provide general locations; 8) U.S. demands for the right to photograph any part of an INF inspection site; 9) U.S. insistence on checking all Soviet INF "baseline" data before the treaty goes into effect; 10) U.S. and Soviet demands to correct anomalies in site diagrams provided in the treaty; see "Delay of Debate on INF Pact Seen as Victory for Conservatives," *New York City Tribune*, 13 May, 1988, p.2.

79. "New Questions on INF Inspection Slow Progress of the Treaty," 6 May, 1988, p. 2.

80. "The president, in tears, said he wanted the treaty ratified because of his deep personal commitment to the need for arms control with the Kremlin, even though he only vaguely understood the treaty's terms – that it might remove weapons from Europe, the source said." See, "Helms and Conservatives Shaped Final INF Pact," *New York City Tribune*, June 22, 1988, p. 1. Along these lines, one commentator has uncharitably described President Reagan's political actions as follows: "A politically battered and bewildered President Reagan seems to have developed quite unwarranted enthusiasm for the pomp and ceremony of arms control and the feel-good effervescence of summitry. And advisers who should be cautioning him about the severe limits of verification urge him to sign a treaty that purports to regulate weapons it cannot count or even accurately characterize." See, "INF 'Good Deal' May Be a Disaster," *New York City Tribune*, November 8, 1987, p. 1.

81. "Helms and Conservatives Shaped Final INF Pact," *New York City Tribune*, June 22, 1988, p. 1.

82. It should be recalled that Ambassador Richard Burt in Bonn, for example, argued that, "the INF accord will not lead to the denuclearization of Europe, nor to an American disengagement, nor to a greater exposure of West Germany to Soviet military power. "See Richard Burt, "The Right Lessons of INF Treaty," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 January, 1988, p. 18.

83. Quote from U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Understanding the INF Treaty*, U.S. Government Printing Office, (1988), p. i. The Reagan Administration's views on the INF Treaty are well represented in the following: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The INF Treaty*, Exec. Rept. 100-15 to accompany Treaty Doc. 100-11, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, pp. 1-178; U.S. Department of State, "Achievements of the INF Treaty," (a summary of the statement made by Secretary Shultz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 16, 1988), *Current Policy* No. 1075; "Address before the National Press Club by Ambassador Nitze, December 15, 1987," reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 88, No. 2131, p. 81.

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RISKS AND IMPLICATIONS OF A FADING THREAT

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There are changes taking place in the Soviet Union. To deny this on the theory that what we have been witnessing is all disinformation is not realistic. There is a tendency to claim that the changes, and Soviet activities associated with these, are all part of a communist/Gorbachev conspiracy to create a mirage of a new Russia that poses little or no threat to the Free World. While such a position appeals to some circles it does not accord with an objective appraisal of the present scene.

Some Soviet new policies are no doubt real efforts at change to meet needs such as to overcome technological inferiority, to provide adequate consumer goods, to cope with the bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in the communist system, and to generate a climate conducive to innovations essential to competing with the Free World.

Some apparently new Soviet policies are no doubt efforts to further classic communist goals by different means. These are often perceived in the West as reflecting changes in Soviet attitudes and as such can result in erroneous — if not dangerous — Free World reactions. But these various possibilities and their potential impact are mere trees in the forest when it comes to the consequences we may face if what we are witnessing is the passing of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology of worldwide significance.

Since World War II much of human activity in the major world powers has been shaped if not driven by the ideological competition between communism, with its aggressive and expansionist goals, and the various forms of Western democratic or totalitarian governments. If the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union signify the beginning of the elimination of competing ideologies as the principal basis for international conflict, and with it the likelihood of large scale

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wars, their impact on all nations could be far greater than anything now foreseen. Should this occur the pros and cons of issues such as nuclear deterrence and national disinformation activities would be questions of historical interest only.

It is obviously a little early to arrive at final conclusions as to the nature and extent of the changes we are witnessing in the Marxist-Leninist world. It seems also premature to draw conclusions as to the scope or nature of future national security needs in the absence of ideological conflict between the major powers.

Before the advent of Marxism-Leninism the acquisition or defense of territory primarily drove aggressive tendencies and security requirements. Whether or not a return to this "driver" in today's over-populated and highly economically integrated world can substitute for the threat of communist aggression as justification for continuing past security policies and related activities is doubtful.

Whatever may or not come about, what we should now do is to carefully examine what is real change versus what may be disinformation or else merely perceived as change by those whose wishes tend to be "the father of their thoughts". Having done this we may be able to forecast and accommodate safely to any real, historic, transition from the Cold War to the new world environment – whatever it may turn out to be.

Even if we are witnessing the demise of communism as a driving factor in international relations and national security policies and actions, this will be a slow and evolutionary process at best. It will also probably be characterized by local conflicts and temporary reversals including efforts to return to Marxism in order to restore authority.

If, however, we are witnessing real change, and if America and its Free World Allies are to safely weather what promises to be a major historical discontinuity and the changes it is likely to bring about, the least we can do is to start at the bottom of the ladder and carefully consider all the factors and implications we may now face – and provide for these.

As one first step in this direction we should recognize the role played by what we might call the "lead time factor" or

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"gap problem" in any major changes initiated by governments. This is the impact of the time gap between political announcements of intentions to bring about major changes and the earliest date at which such changes can be implemented in practice. The spread between these dates can often be measured in years and sometimes even in decades.

The Gap Problem

Given the best of intentions, *de facto* changes in, say, military force postures or weapon systems take years to implement. Political statements by a nation's leaders that they intend to make these changes are generally made long before there is any hard evidence that they will be actually carried out. The Gorbachev promises of major troop reductions and/or reorientation of Soviet force postures towards the defensive, are current examples. Given the best of intentions neither of these actions could be implemented quickly. If the U.S. were to decide to withdraw major elements of its NATO forces today it would take upwards of two years to actually get them back to the US.

As a result of this *décalage* there is almost always a natural tendency to suspect the validity of many proclaimed intentions, especially when made by one's opponents. Until actual and near irreversible steps are taken in furtherance of political promises, cautious planners quite properly advise against premature reactions to these. This is especially true in the case of the Soviets who have a reputation for the use of "disinformation" to obtain Free World reactions favorable to their aims.

Unfortunately whether or not the statements of intended change are real or merely intended to mislead, the public and many politicians all too often ignore the time gap between promises and actions and interprets the promises as if the changes they portend are a *fait accompli*. This is especially true when these promises meet their aspirations. This situation not only helps sell real disinformation efforts but also takes the pressure off valid Soviet promises when it comes to actually

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carrying out the announced change.

The impact of the inevitable gap between stated intentions and confirmable actions is by no means limited to U.S.-Soviet relations. A similar "lead time" problem exists within any country with respect to the acquisition of advanced new weapon systems. In the 1950s it took between four and six years to develop and build a new weapon system after its feasibility and the need for it were established by the Government. Today it takes over 10 years.

Logically and presumably any such system would not be assumed to change the national security position of the country until it became available 10 or more years after the President or Secretary of defense announced that it would be acquired as a solution to some given defense problem. In fact the security goals for which it is acquired – *e.g.* meeting a new threat – tend to be perceived as having been met as soon as the announcement of intent to build it has been somewhat confirmed by preliminary funding or Congressional approval.

In the late 1970s, U.S. audiences, when asked what their main concerns were, generally listed the growing Soviet threat represented by the continuing Soviet build-up in offensive nuclear missiles and submarines. After President Reagan's 1983 SDI speech, that was designed to perpetuate a credible deterrent regardless of the Soviet build-up and without our having to match it, many of those asked the same question would name the deficit or trade balance as their main concern. When then asked "what happened to the threat" they would reply: "Reagan took care of that with his SDI"!! In fact we still have no SDI today although much of public opinion seems to have accepted the fact that the threat problem was solved when the solution was announced rather than when it may be implemented. One might call this an unintended form of disinformation!

From this we can conclude that Soviet announcements of new policies, that cannot be confirmed as valid intentions by actual actions taken in the near term, will nonetheless be perceived and re-acted to by the public and some Western

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leaders regardless of the possibility that they could also be disinformation.

If this is inevitable it places a heavy burden on the need to analyze the impact of Soviet pronouncements as well as actions and act to mitigate any adverse effects that misreading these might bring about. This also suggests that it is probably a waste of time trying to persuade democratic countries and leaders to defer any and all reactions to these until there is concrete proof of intent to implement regardless of our past experiences with Soviet disinformation.

Glasnost and *Perestroika*

Glasnost has produced extraordinary and mounting criticisms of the Soviet system by the Soviet intelligentsia. In so doing they are assisting Mr. Gorbachev in purging his opposition in the party ranks. This device was exploited in a less spectacular fashion by Khrushchev who used his own brand of *glasnost*, de-Stalinization and "peaceful coexistence" to help remove his opposition. There is, a good possibility that Gorbachev's more risky *glasnost* will backfire on him by permitting too much criticism but thus far it has had the effect of consolidating his personal power.

Perestroika, or "restructuring," is an attempt to deal with severe economic problems. These problems — low agricultural production, industrial stagnation, wholesale corruption — were all in existence during Brezhnev's regime. However, the trends in the balance of forces in the world — the measure of the CPSU as to how well they were doing — was in favor of the Soviet Union. The U.S. was then internally divided over Vietnam, had scrapped its strategic defenses, and the Free World seemed to be headed in the way of socialism. Brezhnev, whether he thought it necessary or not, could not restructure the Soviet system because the ruling *nomenklatura* could easily resist change on the grounds that trends in those days favored the USSR.

When Gorbachev took over, trends in the balance of forces were in the opposite direction. The Reagan admin-

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istration was restoring military capabilities, threatening to defend America and Europe with SDI, ushering in a new era of high technological progress, and capitalism was on the rise world-wide. These are some of the fundamental factors that tend to support the view that *perestroika* is genuine by virtue of the fact that Gorbachev and the communist party had no viable alternatives. This would also explain why he has so far been able to overcome party resistance to such major and internally destabilizing changes in Soviet policies.

The combination of *glasnost* and *perestroika* may be viewed in retrospect as desperate attempts by Marxists to save Marxism. They may also be viewed as the result of recognition that Marxism just does not work in this day and age. But, whether what is going on is an effort to perpetuate Marxism in some other form, or simply to shift to a form of government that will work, these developments provide opportunities for those of us who seek the demise of Marxism – albeit opportunities accompanied by some risks.

Impact on the West

There can be little doubt that there will be important revisions to the U.S. and NATO's security policies over the next year or so. These changes will be made in large part as a response to the real or perceived changes made in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. We are seeing some of these today. Those who have been consistent apologists for the Soviet Union in the past are taking pleasure in asserting that they have been right all along – "the Soviets pose no serious threat to the West"!

Those of us who recognize the risks that are developing as a result of events in the communist world must be careful as to our response to this challenge if we are to impact policy revisions on our side.

Whether or not the changes taking place in the communist world are strategic in nature – such as the demise of Marxism-Leninism, or merely motivated by tactical considerations, such as a Gorbachev effort to rescue the Soviet economy,

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most observers seem to agree that they are moves away from the absolute dictatorship by Government over life in Russia. Many writers in the West view these developments as first steps towards some sort of democratic socialism that would accept some individual freedoms, competition, initiatives in the private sector, and free enterprise as being the only way to save the Soviet economy if not to stem growing public unrest.

Western Reactions

The Free World has obviously considered these trends and developments as ranging from desirable to miraculous. Many see them as promising not only the end of the Cold War and the Soviet military threats to peace but also as a major step towards the victory of democracy, or related forms of governments by the people, over communism and dictatorships.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union is a communist dictatorship and has been for some 70 years. Most of its people have never lived under any other form of government. For them to now to make the transition to some form of liberal democracy in the Western model cannot but be a major and traumatic change. And, major changes of this nature have always been destabilizing and fraught with risk during the period that they are taking place. Most have in the past come about only as the outcome of wars or revolutions whether the move was from freedom to dictatorship or vice versa.

If, for a minute, we assume that Gorbachev's efforts will succeed we will be witnessing a period of gradual change in the Soviet bloc. Considering the magnitude of the changes required and the inherent resistance to change of any large organizations or group of people it could take a decade or more before the nations now behind the iron curtain settle down to a stable new way of life. Meanwhile, the Free World will be faced with having to cope with whatever threats or problems the transition may generate and security policies and force programs and deployments must be adjusted accordingly.

One mistake many now make is to stand pat and try to argue that no policy revisions are in order because no real

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change in the nature of the threat is evident since promised force reductions and other long lead time actions have not been implemented as yet. My view is that this is a losing proposition. Not only wishful thinking but the weight of real evidence is against it. By standing pat we could forfeit our chance to shape new policy.

A better approach would be to examine the current U.S. and NATO security scene, including developments in the communist world, and try to arrive at a consensus as to the nature of the threats and risks we face over the next few years. Having done this we then might be able to agree on policies and political actions to promote the desirable ones while reducing to a minimum those with adverse impacts.

Were we to do this we also define the threats that remain from past Soviet policies, attitudes, and military capabilities as well as the new threats that the transition will generate, at least temporarily. In the process we may be able to determine whether we are dealing with a tactical change that will have little or no fundamental impact on the Free World's national security requirements, or whether we are facing a major ideological change with potentially profound impacts. And, we could also assess the threats to our security that we are likely to generate ourselves by allowing political pressures to bring about premature Western actions based on Soviet promises that later turn out to be just that: "promises" – *e.g.*: intentional or even unintentional disinformation.

The Immediate Problem

Our immediate problem is to survive the transition from a heretofore stable and reasonably predictable Soviet Government in full control of its resources to some future form of national management which eventually will also be stable and predictable. The key word here is "transition". The danger is that given the euphoria generated in the West by the changes taking place and the prospects of a new era of peace at the end of the road, we dismiss too easily the risks and threats inherent in any such dramatic political adjustments.

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While some may naively believe that a shift from one form of stable, if not desirable, Soviet government to another can be managed smoothly and without internal chaos and/or external threats to world peace, common sense does not support this.

Our experience with past efforts to evolve new forms of government or even changes in major national policies such as security strategy, or in social customs and traditions, all indicate that such moves are at best over very rocky roads. The American effort to eliminate slavery that led to the civil war; the European effort to integrate after World War II that collapsed over the European Army issue; and the more recent Reagan effort to change U.S. security strategy from the offensive, nuclear, dominated Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to deterrence based on effective non-nuclear defenses (SDI) are but three classic examples.

If we are to safely survive a Soviet evolution into a new way of life and form of government we must first understand what we are likely to face during any such transition. We cannot simply assume that whatever occurs within the Soviet bloc is their problem and their management will be able to cope with it. Any such transition cannot but be stabilizing and, as a result, will include almost certain threats to world peace – threats that are likely to be greater than any posed by a Cold War between two different but stable forms of government. One way to anticipate these and prepare for them is to examine how changes of this nature normally take place.

Short of war or revolution, changes of the magnitude we are talking about cannot occur overnight. They must be pursued in a step by step fashion moving only so fast as the "systems" – the people and the establishment – can live with. There generally has to be pauses while the "system" adjusts to the new way of doing business. These can last one or more years. One must also expect periods of regression in the efforts to achieve the new situation even where there is no let up in the goal or change in those managing the transition. The attitudes and actions of outsiders, in this case free world nations, can be important.

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One certainty, however, is that in any such evolution there is a high risk of failure and of a return to the original situation, especially during the early phases of the transition. We must be prepared for this, which means that nations previously threatened by the Soviet dictatorship during the Cold War cannot risk taking unilateral domestic steps in anticipation of the foreseen change that would leave them vulnerable in the event it failed to come about. Put crudely, we cannot gamble on peace with Gorbachev so long as we might wake up and find a Stalin II suddenly in command in Russia.

The Peak Roof Problem

While the above risk is generally understood, if not adequately prepared for, another risk is very likely even under ideal Soviet management conditions. This is the possibility that the Soviet government will lose control over events during the transition, and especially when they have to adopt new ways of doing things before a final form of stable government can be put into place. This risk is the most worrisome because it is not widely perceived and hence little or no planning is underway to cope with it.

The transition from one stable form of government to another equally stable form not only takes time but has to be done incrementally. Fiscal policy, the defense posture, foreign relations, police and security activities, trade, and all other "building blocks" of government have to be modified to fit the new environment. This cannot be done either suddenly or simultaneously but since many are interlocking, attempts to transition them one at a time, or unduly out of phase, can produce great strains on the ability to control and manage the country while this is taking place. The problem is to handle the transition in such a way that none of these get so far out of phase with each other or the roles they serve as to create a crisis.

One way to perceive this problem is to envision the movement from the old but stable situation to the future and presumably also stable one as taking place over a peaked roof

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rather than across a level field. The first half of the trip is uphill. Progress is slow and hard to achieve. And, if and when any activity is unable to function effectively while enroute gravity automatically corrects this problem by pulling it back down into its original, stable and effective form.

Conversely, once decisions are made that take progress past the halfway mark and over the peak of the roof, any inability to function on the down side, or home stretch, is invariably corrected by the effected sector prematurely crashing on down into its ultimate configuration. This is when the transition can pose a serious threat to control and stability, and as such to the maintenance of peace.

An example of this could be the sudden and premature breakaway of a state or ally vital to national security. Even though long term plans envisioned its gradual independence when worldwide security changes made this acceptable, its premature crash could lead to revolts, revolution, or even warfare. The same could be the case in agriculture, industrial activity, currency conversion plans, and other major but interdependent functional areas.

When applied to the present situation this simple model should tell us that it really does not matter too much what Mr. Gorbachev may have in mind as a series of steps designed to eventually establish the new form of government he deems necessary to Russia's internal stability, economic growth, and the retention of her national security and world power status. From the point of view of our near term security, it does not even matter what this new form of Soviet government may look like. What matters is that the pre-Gorbachev government was stable and able to manage the Communist bloc and presumably the new one will also be stable, but the transition from one to the other is likely to be anything but stable.

The Bottom Line

As one concerned primarily with U.S. and NATO security, the message I am trying to convey is that the demise or reformatting of communism now taking place in Eurasia, while welcome if and when successful, is not as yet something we can

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gloat over. There is no such thing as a free lunch. If the Free World is not extremely careful with respect to its involvement in these events, and does not keep up its guard against the new risks and unplanned threats to peace that are likely to emerge in the present environment, the price we may wind up paying to get rid of the Cold War could be much higher than most people seem to anticipate.

In Eastern Europe the ball is rapidly approaching the peak of the roof if not already over it. Whether the most recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were planned or even anticipated by Gorbachev, or whether things simply got out of hand, is now academic. The problem we should be concerned about is what happens next, and if it threatens us, what should we be doing to protect ourselves. For us to proceed, with "business as usual" and assume that what is taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is only a problem for Gorbachev and his communist friends is "whistling in the dark."

Countries and provinces on which the Soviet economy depend are throwing out their communist governments or managers before they have qualified replacements or even the minimum requirements to establish a viable free economy such as free enterprise management experience, sources of capital, or even convertible currencies. In the Soviet Union the people are several generations removed from experience with living in a free enterprise environment. Too sudden a switch without a period of years in which to learn how to survive under capitalism could have disastrous economic and social consequences. These might then trigger off Tiananmen Square type off repressions that the euphoric free world public – lacking vision and caution – could demand their country's oppose with military means. Were this to come about the probability of escalation from such actions to nuclear warfare could be quite high.

On the military threat side there is also the possible loss of control by the Soviet authorities over nuclear or other major military weapon systems. China's Long March nuclear ICBMs are in an area controlled entirely by two Army

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Commanders and their forces. When the student revolt took place, and there were rumors some of the military might support the students, I could not help but speculate on what might happen if these included the Generals in command of the nuclear missile forces.

In the Soviet Union many nuclear missiles and other Atomic resources are now deployed in provinces where unrest in reported. What happens to these if for whatever reasons the Central Government were to loose control, even temporarily? Suppose Gorbachev's Moscow authorities lost control over some of these would not the classic small atomic power deterrent argument apply? Namely, "If you try to subdue our revolt with force we will fire some missiles, at Moscow or anywhere. Are we prepared for this possibility on our side?.

For years countries such as France and India have built up nuclear capabilities on the theory that even though they could be destroyed by the Soviets the risk that any attempts to do this might result in even one or two being successfully fired was a major deterrent to the attempt. The Soviets would probably not view the obliteration of Moscow or Leningrad as a fair trade for the conquest of India. If this deterrent is valid for any small nuclear country why should it not be equally valid for a revolutionary group?. Any logical revolutionary leader with nuclear assets in the area he aspires to take over should make control over these his primary objective. This is a new factor in an atomic world and one which can turn what were previously minor domestic squabbles into global threats.

One thing should be quite clear. While peace in our time may, or not, be the end result of current events in Europe the transition from stable, measurable, and consistent communist threat to whatever may replace will be over a rocky and uncertain road. Security and survival in the West may be at greater risk from accidents, or escalating events and inadequately planned responses on our side, than they ever have been from a deliberate, premeditated Soviet attack. This prospect should tell us three things:

First, that this is no time to drop our guard, reduce our defensive capabilities, and cancel military developments and

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expenditures in a random fashion. In the pre-*Perestroika* era we could forecast the nature, scope, and probability of major threats with far more confidence than we can today.

Second, that now is the time, if ever, for thorough contingency planning and cautious actions and reactions in response to any and all developments during this transition period. Part of being secure is to be prepared for any and all possible threats. Protecting parochial interests by resisting logical changes to accommodate to those being made in the east, and "playing it by ear" when obliged to react, are recipes for waste, failures, and disasters.

Third, that now we need, more than ever, to exploit western technology to ward off the one obvious global threat associated with the on going transition which is the irresponsible or accidental use of nuclear missiles. If missile defenses made sense as a way to strengthen deterrence of a deliberate Soviet first strike, they make twice as much sense now that the worldwide proliferation of missiles is accompanied by chaotic conditions and potential revolts in countries already possessing these.

In addition, common sense suggests we at least try to determine what the policies and national security postures might be in a post-*Perestroika* world before making cuts or changes in those we now have. All governments are bound to be under great public and political pressure to reduce defense spending. If we don't have some idea of what sort of defense establishment we will need in a post cold war period how han we intelligently select what we can now safely cut even under the assumption the transition is peacefully made?

Unfortunately two negative trends are now taking place. Politicians are rushing to make cuts as if all major threats had disappeared and without adequate planning for the likely defense requirements of a post-Cold War environment, let alone for any flair ups during the transition to it. And, the bureaucracy is practicing its classic tendency to resist any major changes that are suggested should be put into place on our side as a result of these events.

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The result of cuts without planning cannot but be waste under the best of outcomes and acceptance of unnecessary risks under other possible outcomes. The result of the desperate efforts of bureaucrats and institutions to close their eyes to those changes that are, or have been, proposed to cope with these events – in order to perpetuate parochial interests or business as usual for as long as possible – preclude cost effective, evolutionary, adjustments when and where these should logically be made.

It is necessary that we all recognize that the potential threat resulting from activities taking place in Eurasia today is greater than it ever has been at any time since World War II. It is a two pronged threat. First, we have a growing probability that massive losses will occur as a result of atomic weapons being used accidentally, deliberately, or as a result of loss of control by Governments. This scenario will increase in probability with the worldwide proliferation of boosters now going on. Second, the inevitable changes that will come about if the Soviet military threat is perceived a terminated, let alone actually gone, could become as destabilizing to the West as are now the changes in the East.

If one examines the extent to which life in the free world has been driven over the past 45 years by fear of and reactions to the Soviet threat of deliberate military aggression, the changes that a perceived, let alone actual, demise in the Cold War will bring about are more worrisome that the increase in the possibility of nuclear explosions during the transition. The sad part is that, while rejoicing over the perception of possible "peace in our time" few if any are looking seriously at anything but the military force and budget implications of this.

Fortunately, the people in major Western democracies are frequently more logical and foresighted than their political leaders. The same common sense that is driving public opposition to irresponsible communist management in the East also works in the West to counter the vested interests and parochial attitudes of bureaucrats, pressure groups, and their institutions.

A classic example of this pertinent to the change in the

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nature of the missile threat can be found in American public attitudes towards SDI deployment versus Congressional and government footdragging on this. In a recent poll, people outside of government that have evidenced an understanding and interest in national security matters were asked what they thought was the probability of a nuclear missile being fired in the present world environment. Forty-four percent thought that there was a chance they would see one fired on purpose, and 44% by accident, in their lifetime. Since purposeful and accidental launchings are independent possibilities this public opinion adds up to 74% believing that they will see a launch for whatever reason.

In answer to related questions 48% thought such a missile would come from a terrorist organization, 24% from a third world country, and only 24% from the Soviet Union. Ninety percent said they knew we now had absolutely no defenses against these although we had made dramatic progress in SDI research and could have, and when asked whether SDI should be deployed even though it would not provide a perfect defense 99% said yes.

What all this should tell us is that instead of worrying about whether the events taking place in the communist block represent genuine political and social change, or Gorbachev disinformation, our leaders should be worrying more about existing policies that make no sense in light of the obvious changes taking place in the threats to our security. One example of this can be found in the continuing efforts of the U.S. Congress to perpetuate the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD and the obsolete ABM Treaty instead of deploying a now available and relatively inexpensive missile defense system.

Neither MAD nor the Treaty make any sense against anything but a deliberate, premeditated Soviet nuclear First Strike which is the most unlikely threat now in sight. How does one deter a terrorist or even a Quadafi with ICBM's? It will be amusing to see what lies and excuses politicians will come up with should an accidental or other launching ever take place. Would it not be more logical to cope with the

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obvious changes in the threats brought about by the apparent demise of communism and the resulting chaotic transition to new forms of government than to waste time defending MAD and the ABM Treaty.

Some non-Defense Implications

In addition to the security problems the press and politicians also seem to be afraid to consider seriously what is likely to happen happens in western nations if *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* succeed. While the wolves among these are licking their chops over how they might divvy up most of the defense budget and pay for ever more social programs, the long term consequences of a world environment without major military threats to bolster nationalism and drive advance technology do not seem to have been thoroughly or objectively studied. The fact is that they are not limited to a few job losses in the defense sector as many seem to believe.

Even a "back of the envelope" examination of how much of America's economy, politics, technology, and wealth has been driven by the Soviet nuclear threat should produce real cause for panic. Most people think of this only in terms of jobs lost either in defense industries or as a result of major force reductions. If this is the only social consequence peace on earth would no doubt be worth it. Some writers have suggested there are a few other consequences that may, however not be so acceptable. These include, the admittedly extreme view that without major external threats to nations internal dissensions are likely to progress to civil warfare to the certain loss of social and economic progress previously made possible as a result of defense activities and spending. One might also ask how much of America's worldwide influence stems from the perceived need by small countries for our military protection?

This is not to say that we must try to keep up the Cold War or perpetuate the Soviet or other threats in order to stay healthy and solvent as a nation. What it does say is that before we rush in to exploit all the benefits of the changes we now

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see taking place in Eurasia — or hope will take place — we should give more careful attention to the new and different types of risks we are likely to buy if they do come about.

I am not arguing against peace or defending the Cold War and a world of tensions. What I am trying to suggest is that changes of the magnitude that may now be underway could have down sides as well as up sides. Any adverse implications, both security and social wise, should be identified and provisions made to mitigate these. At best the transition in terms of security considerations will be rocky. Hedges such as missile defense, should be provided to minimize their more dangerous aspects.

Planning must also include the consequences of success on our economies and national societies. This is not being done to my knowledge. Most Free World governments are acting as would a starving child presented with a banquet. It would be a joyous event unless it died of over-eating.

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BORDER WARS[1]

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Rhodes College

"Border Wars." The very term conjures up images of an earlier America — of dusty cavalrymen on the old frontier, of "Black Jack" Pershing's men pursuing bandits (or revolutionaries!) into Mexico, of the pursuit — and occasionally overtaking! — of pirates, smugglers and slavers. Indeed, it hearkens back to a time when the primary mission of America's armed forces *was* the defense of our borders, and not mounting guard overseas on a so-called strategic glacis or projecting military power into the Third World.

Regardless of how much many within and outside of the U.S. military might wish otherwise, however, the notion of "border war" also refers explicitly to the situation confronting the United States today. We are, in fact, confronted simultaneously with three types of challenges to the integrity of our borders — each of which has its precedents in our history. One is a burgeoning wave of illegal immigration, a challenge whose full socioeconomic consequences have yet to be fully understood, but which are all too likely to be considerable over the long term. A second is international terrorism, ranging in lethality and scope from disasters such as the destruction of Pan American flight 103 to the unsuccessful attempt against the family of an American naval officer in San Diego — the modern variants of piracy and cross-border raids. And the third is the threat posed by illegal narcotics traffickers, the modern version of smugglers and bootleggers that can assume especially bizarre twists and whose consequences for American society are an odds-on certainty to be even more odious.

There have been different levels of response, and success, in meeting this complex set of challenges. Public and official willingness to confront international terrorism is widespread, even though "solutions" remain elusive, especially when one has to deal with terrorist organizations supported by foreign

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countries. Successes have been registered — military strikes against Libya come to mind — but other terrorist organizations and the countries which sponsor them (*e.g.,* Iran) remain largely immune. Yet despite the outrage generated by occasional terrorist spectaculars in the United States or against American citizens abroad, and the consequences to the victims of such incidents and their families, there is also the obvious reality that terrorism has not yet reached the point where it can threaten either the fabric of American society or the political survival of the United States. Far too many portents of the future, however, do not augur well for us in this regard.

Illegal immigration, in contrast, is a politically explosive issue, especially in the Southwest and in Florida. Consequently, efforts to tighten the sieve that constitutes our border security apparatus in order to reduce the influx of illegal immigrants meet with no more than grudging support, and often outright opposition, in many circles. Few politicians, after all, have any interest in reducing the size of their future constituencies, especially when there are strong ethnic or religious bonds at work. Compounding this state of affairs is the conflict of interest inherent in the inclination of a nation composed largely of immigrants and their descendants to view America as a true land of opportunity for others, and the acknowledgement that more immigrants increase competition for jobs and increase demands on social services in an era of increasingly constrained budgets.

The threat posed by illegal narcotics is also politically explosive, but in another way. The magnitude of the problem[2] (perhaps exceeding $100 billion annually in direct costs alone) is generally appreciated; the consequences are acknowledged,if less precisely appreciated; and efforts on the part of many agencies at all levels of government to combat illegal narcotics generally receive public support — indeed, one survey taken in late August 1988 indicated that 75% of those polled would support an increase in federal income taxes to fund the war on drugs, whereas only 35% would do so if the name of national defense.[3] The difficulty is that efforts to deal with this threat have had no discernible effect. Whatever their eventual success

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might be, the responses incorporated into the *de facto* declaration of war on drug traffickers by President Bush suggest an increase in governmental activity in this area.[4]

"Border Wars" Reconsidered

When placed into the larger context of "border wars," it is all too painfully obvious that the United States has been only "nibbling" at the challenges threatening its borders. Barring a fundamental reversal of the prevailing state of affairs, we will lose all three "border wars," with consequences certain to be as damaging to the fabric of American society as the failure of Rome to deal effectively with the barbarization of its borders and society was to the civilization of that era.

There are many reasons for our inability to deal effectively with the challenges to our borders, some obvious and others less so. First, the sheer enormity and complexity of those challenges cannot help but inhibit the design and execution of effective responses. The dearth of applicable (and expensive) resources devoted to dealing with any one of the threats further complicates matters. One need not be an apologist for (*e.g.*) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Border Patrol and the Drug Enforcement Administration to understand at a glance that the disparity between the means at their disposal and the tasks they have been assigned is frighteningly large. Compounding this problem is the fact that efforts to deal with each of the challenges separately, to say nothing of all three together, are fragmented across different levels of government, and among different organizations within any single level of government, which virtually precludes *any* effective response. Coordination between or among different governmental levels and/or organizations is always more time-consuming, more expensive, less efficient, and more susceptible to bureaucratic hamstringing than the dedication of resources to a single organization at a single level of government tasked to accomplish the same mission.[5] Some progress has been made at the margins, to be sure. Even with that progress, however, the net effect with regard to the threefold threat to our borders is to leave in

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place a multi-level, multi-organization "response" mechanism that makes the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on the eve of the First World War appear to be a model in streamlined governmental division of labor.

Second, it has become blatantly clear that the U.S. criminal justice system is unable to deal well with any of the problems, although the reason for that inability differs with the threat. Many terrorists simply elude American police and courts, even when their targets are principally Americans, and are brought to trial in countries whose sympathies are not wholly with the victims of terrorists, or whose laws are more lenient than those of the United States. The sheer volume of illegal immigrants makes even their identification and expulsion a demanding affair, with court involvement handicapped in many regions by the existence of judges and constituencies who simply do not consider undocumented immigration into the United States to be a crime. And in the face of the drug epidemic, an American criminal justice system that functions slowly in the best of circumstances is as outclassed as many law enforcement officials are outgunned. The system is too cumbersome, the potential for corruption is too great, and the penalties that may eventually be imposed after the inevitable lengthy appeals process are usually too trivial in light of the profits to be realized, either to deter or to punish adequately those engaged in drug trafficking ("rehabilitation" is hardly an option, given the profit incentives involved). Yet in all three instances, this is less an indictment of the American criminal justice system *per se* than it is a commentary on the inability of any *national* system of justice to deal well with what is inherently a set of *international* problems.

Third, and finally, any effective response to these challenges to our borders is weakened by a pervasive misunderstanding of the relationship that exists between and among them. Differences exist, of course, in terms of origins and consequences, with the trafficking in illegal narcotics easily the single most deadly threat to our security of the three being considered here. As Figure 1 points out, however, each of these three threats is related to the other two. Thus, narcotics

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FIGURE 1
Threat Linkages in Border Security



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trafficking and terrorism taken together spawn what has been called "narcoterrorism"[6]: narcotics traffickers make use of illegal immigrants (called "mules" in this role) to bring narcotics into the United States; and terrorists have been known to infiltrate into the United States as "mere" undocumented aliens, or to make use of false documentation to conceal the purpose for their entry into this country. *Being* inter-related makes each a more potent threat than any one would be alone. Conversely, a failure to deal actively and effectively with any one threat at least indirectly undermines or dilutes efforts to deal well with both of the others. Thus, a failure to halt illegal immigration permits the aforementioned "mules" to maintain a flow of some narcotics into the United States. A failure to eradicate key terrorist organizations and their supporters permits some of the most prominent drug lords to continue operations. And a failure to find a solution to the narcotics problem means that some portion of the vast profits realized from the drug trade continues to fund some terrorist activities.

Winning "Border Wars"

It should be obvious that it is very much in the national interest to do better in combating these challenges to the integrity of our borders and the society behind them. Somewhat less obvious is the fact that *treating* each threat separately, or as a separable problem, misapprehends the nature of the problem conceptually and makes crafting an appropriate response politically impractical and operationally futile, given the very real differences in domestic political sensitivities that exist here.

But the linkage that obtains among the three threat types also has a positive side, as Figure 2 illustrates. That is, there is an interface among all three challenges such that what deals with the *worst* problem (in this case, illegal drug trafficking) will implicitly or explicitly impact on both of the other problems as well. A strategy that can deal effectively with those involved in the gamut of activities associated with illegal drug trafficking will also make life exceedingly miserable for many of those in organized terrorist groups, and will make mass

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FIGURE 2
Multiple Impact of Responding
To Principal Border Security Threat



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illegal immigration an extremely unlikely proposition at best. And there is a political advantage to such an approach that reinforces the conceptual and operational attributes: one can implicitly bring governmental power to bear against the more politically sensitive problems of illegal immigration (within the United States) and international terrorism (among many American allies) without explicitly asserting that one is doing so.

Understanding this conceptual interplay among linked threats and overlapping responses is an essential prerequisite for effective action in the realm of border security. Actually to *deal* with the problem, defined for political purposes in terms of drug interdiction but clearly impacting on terrorism and illegal immigration as well, requires one to go beyond concepts into practical matters.[7] The details of such an enterprise obviously are beyond the scope of any single article. Certain general principles, however, can be specified.

First, it makes eminently good sense to entrust responsibility for the control — not simply the coordination — of this effort to the Defense Department, thus going well beyond the role currently envisioned for the Defense Department in this effort.[8] All other agencies engaged in aspects of this new "border war" should come under the operational control of the Defense Department, insofar as their participation in this particular endeavor is concerned, just as the Coast Guard comes under the control of the Navy in time of war. The Defense Department has the resources (in terms of money, material, and personnel), the C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) capabilities, and the capacity for disciplined response essential for the successful waging of this form of conflict. Since this would impact principally on active general purpose forces based within CONUS (Continental United States) plus Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and on the reserve components (especially the National Guard), neither our strategic deterrent nor our forward-based forces would be affected. The reduction in East-West tension that is now taking place makes this dedication of mission even more practical.

Second, a combination of Federal training centers and

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instructional teams (perhaps building on the Mobile Training Team, or MTT, concept used so successfully by the military abroad) should be used to upgrade the capabilities of state and local police forces, especially in areas known to be major sources of criminal activity related to the related problems of drug trafficking, terrorism and illegal immigration. The precise curriculum of the Centers and the composition of the MTTs would vary according to the mission to be performed by the police being assisted and their prevailing level of skills.[9]

Third, legislation should be enacted that provides incentives to other countries to terminate the production and/or refining of narcotics within their borders, and mandates diplomatic or economic sanctions for noncompliance. Expanded developmental assistance for countries which are the source of large numbers of illegal immigrants may reduce the influx of such persons into the U.S. by enhancing job opportunities and living standards for them in their native countries.

Fourth, military assistance should be given to receptive host countries along the lines envisioned in President Bush's 1989 proposal as part of the war against drugs. But unilateral military action by forces of USSOCOM (U.S. Special Operations Command) to eliminate key facilities and leadership elements of overseas drug cartels or identifiable terrorist organizations should be carried out — covertly if possible — when likely targets are located, with or without the concurrence of the country in which the operation is to be conducted. Indeed, removing such cancers without compelling another government to acknowledge publicly its inability to control affairs within its own borders may well be beneficial to both sides.[10]

Epilogue

We in the United States are faced with a complicated problem of border security that is certain to become worse before it can be made better. Understanding this basic fact may well be a prerequisite for addressing all dimensions of this problem effectively. I have delineated in this brief article the essential elements of the problem, the interplay that exists

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among both those elements and possible countermeasures against them, and certain general steps to be taken to begin to bring this situation under control. Achieving this end will require a considerable degree of political courage throughout all branches and levels of government. It will require a willingness on the part of the American military to bring its considerable power to bear against an active threat to our national security, rather than simply husbanding that power in the name of deterrence. And it will require the American people to support this new border war for the length of time needed to win it. Perhaps it can all be done.

FOOTNOTES

1. The author is grateful for the thoughtful comments on this subject from numerous colleagues at the Army War College, Georgetown University, and the RAND Corporation.
2. Grant Hammond, "War on drugs is one America must fight, win," *The Commercial Appeal* (April 17, 1989).
3. *Time* (September 12, 1988). See also M.J. Zyckerman, "Poll: Fight drugs with more taxes," *USA Today* (July 24, 1989).
4. Terence Hunt, "Bush declares drug war, pledges U.S. military aid," The Commercial Appeal (September 6, 1989). See also "Cheney approves Guard drug efforts," *The Commercial Appeal* (December 9, 1989).
5. Ronald J. Ostrow, "Trafficker details agency rivalries: Conflicts hurting U.S. drug fight," *The Commercial Appeal* (August 18, 1989).
6. David W. Balsyer, "Narco-Terrorism 'Shooting Up' America," *Family Protection Scoreboard* (n.d.).
7. For differing views on current U.S. "drug war" policy, see Bruce Michael Bagley, "Dateline Drug Wars: Columbia: The Wrong Strategy," *Foreign Policy,* No. 77 (Winter 1989-90): and Ethan A. Nadelmann, "U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export," *Foreign Policy,* No. 70 (Spring 1988).
8. Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Mr. Bush's War," *The Arkansas Gazette* (October 12, 1989). For differing views on the implications of this measure, see Michael H. Abbott, "The Army and the Drug War: Politics or National Security?" *Parameters* (Winter 1988); Jesse Hill Ford, "Suspend liberties to fight effective war" and "Protect our liberties while fighting drugs," both in *USA Today* (April 6, 1989).
9. This is permissible under current law. See 10 USCA, sections 373 and 376, added to Public Law 97-86, Title IX, section 905(a)(1), December 1, 1981, 95 Stat. 1115 and 95 Stat 1116, respectively.
10. Considerations involved in such measures are discussed in Richard L. Berke, "Panel Said To Seek New Military Role in Fight on Drugs," *New York Times* (July 2, 1989); and Elaine Shannon, "Attacking the Source," *Time* (August 28, 1989).

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ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: A CRITICAL TURNING POINT

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Recent Reforms: "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back"

In 1985 and 1986, China exhibited her most liberal tendencies on the economic, political and cultural fronts since the initiation of economic reforms in 1978. Since 1986, however, the pace of economic reform has slowed considerably. In that year, for example, "the Government announced that a sweeping series of price revisions, considered by many economic analysts here to be fundamental to a reordering of the economy, would not be introduced this year."[1]

The end of 1986 ushered in a month-long series of student protests that led to a policy shift away from Western values. In December and January, thousands of college students marched in protest, demanding more democracy. Many were arrested and orders were issued to deal harshly with protesters. Then, on January 17 came the surprise announcement that Hu Yaobang, Chinese Communist Party chief, had resigned because he had allowed "bourgeois liberalization" to flourish.

At the same time, the Communist Party's Central Committee began issuing a series of documents attacking recent liberalization policies, student protesters, and the deposed Party chief. Deng Xiaoping was quoted as saying "The opposition to bourgeois liberalization must be pursued for 20 years. We have arrested Wei Jingshen and we will not release him. We do not need to pay attention to the faces of foreigners in doing this."[2]

Educational reforms were also announced stating that government-sponsored students who want to study abroad would thereafter need to have 5 years' work experience and be trying to earn a doctorate.[3] In June of 1987 a visiting high-level delegation urged the United States government to compel

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20,000 Chinese students to return home when they finish their studies.[4] And at Beijing and Fudan Universities, nearly 300 political propagandists were given the title of "lecturer" or "professor," effectively equating propaganda work with academic teaching.[5]

New rules were issued in 1987 stating that state enterprises would no longer be able to issue stock to the public but could continue selling bonds, albeit with more restrictions. And the government's State Council issued regulations aimed at controlling price increases and cracking down on so-called "profiteers".[6]

> ....An array of newspapers many of which regularly published divergent views on a range of economic and political matters, [were] closed.[7]

As a result of these new policies, Western investors began to fear that the political crackdown would reverse the economic gains already made. Nevertheless, there were indications that economic reforms would quietly continue. For example, Shanghai's Bank of Communications opened early in 1987, ending China's state bank monopoly. In addition, selected state-owned companies continued to issue stock shares to their workers. In May of 1987 the Bank of China offered one-year bonds for sale to the public for the first time.

In retrospect, those investors' fears were mere shadows of the gut-wrenching terror felt after the Tiananmen massacre of June 1989 and the subsequent political chill, including the removal and criticism of Zhao Ziyang who had replaced Hu Yaobang as Communist party general secretary. The unfolding events of recurring student demonstrations and public denunciations of Prime Minister Li Peng, who had implemented austerity measures in September 1988, were witnessed by television viewers worldwide, including foreign governments and business leaders. A critical turning point had, indeed, arrived.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that had the June 1989 events not occurred, economic reform would have continued unchanged. The reality is that China's economic problems have been worsening for several years. Rising

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inflation, a decline in grain production, increasing levels of "economic" crimes, a severe credit crunch, continued low industrial productivity, declining foreign investment, trade deficits, and other difficulties led China's leaders down the road of austerity and, finally, in June 1989, to bald political repression.

Resistance to Reforms

Almost any change away from a centrally-controlled economy yields beneficial economic results. For example, since 1978, the move from huge communal farms to inefficiently-small family plots still yielded substantial farm output increases because of the change in work incentives that rewarded high productivity farmers.[8] Generally, a shift away from central control allows resources to be more efficiently allocated to their highest valued uses. Gross waste begins to be eliminated. Economic waste is evidenced by shortages of materials, capital equipment or labor skills in resource markets, or their obverse, redundancies of particular resources which either do not get utilized or, when they are used, are used at low or even zero productivity. In product markets, both shortages, long queues and/or long periods of time during which products are not available, and surpluses wherein excessive quantities of goods are made available yet go unpurchased, are evidence of allocative inefficiency and waste. Furthermore, because of China's price controls, enterprise share issues may well not reflect their true economic performance and may lead to further resource misallocation.

China's shift from a command economy to a market-driven one has inevitably moved the economy towards increased consumer goods production since that is the area that is typically shortchanged by planners. This frustrates planners who perceive an unwelcome drop in "worthwhile" investments.[9] Decentralization of economic power has stimulated innovative economic investment projects of benefit to provincial and local 3areas to the detriment of the central government's construction projects and long-term development plans because of strained energy, raw materials and financing

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sources.[10]

Of course, these developments tend to be enthusiastically received by the general populace. Yet, Chinese economic reforms to date, by their very success, have generated various forms of resistance which have developed into the following arguments for rolling back economic reforms:

1) Managers who used to get orders from above, but are now told to make their own decisions, worry about the extra responsibility and they grumble that nobody guarantees they will get the supplies they need. This is simply one of many expressions of the age-old tension between freedom and security found in virtually every society. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has noted that a salient Chinese trait through the ages has been the fear of disorder and chaos. Since Confucius, social harmony has been valued above all.[11]

2) Workers can lose their jobs, although that is still the rare exception.

3) Intellectuals agonize over corruption and vulgar consumerism. Income inequalities in combination with the relatively high unemployment and underemployment increasingly being experience by youth have fostered more criminal behavior. Foremost among crimes is what is termed "economic crimes" which jumped an estimated 45% in 1988 over the preceding year. These included theft of resources, and the sale and resale of raw materials and commodities.[12] Other reported crimes include child labor, prostitution, gambling, criminal gangs and unregulated production of "harmful" and "useless" goods.[13]

4) New taxes can take fifty to seventy-five percent of rural business profits.[14]

5) Price decontrol worries shoppers and urban dwellers, as well as government leaders who still remember the political instability that accompanied China's previous periods of inflation. Yet many food prices, such as those for rice, wheat and soybeans, are still below their free market levels. "Farmers are already rebelling by turning over rice and wheat fields to more profitable free-market vegetables and what the Chinese call 'sideline' activities, such as poultry-raising." In 1985 and

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1986, grain output fell.[15]

China's retail price index rose 7.3% annually between 1985 and 1987.[16] The 1987 rate was reported at 8.8% and 19.0% in 1988.[17] In 1988, inflation was estimated to be running 30% in the major cities where the inflation triggered a rash of bank runs and panic buying.[18] Reports in 1989 indicate that price increases have officially reached 27% or more.[19] Unofficial estimates place the rate closer to 40%.[20] At present, average citizens in Shanghai complain that many foods such as fish, meat, chicken and eggs are no longer easily affordable.[21]

6) The opportunity for wealth accumulation by some creates envy among many urban dwellers as well as relatively poor rural dwellers. It should not be forgotten that the average Chinese still believes that capitalism, *i.e.*, ownership and production solely for profit, is fundamentally wrong as an economic system. (The irony is that bribery and financial greed become blatant among party and government officials.)

7) Diminishing returns from the ongoing economic reforms will reinforce the cause of those party members who question the legitimacy of continued use of disguised capitalist methods. "Some Communists also fear that the growth of the private sector will embarrass the predominantly Communist components of Chinese society, committed to collective ownership, and they also resent the fact that even this functioning may be perceived by the outside world as an abandonment of orthodox Marxism...."[22]

Requirements for Continued Economic Improvement

What of China's future? While no reputable economist would claim to have a crystal ball, one can identify what appear to be future roadblocks to continuing improvements in economic performance.

1) Most knowledgable observers have concluded that reform of the price system is crucial to continued high performance of the economy.[23] Realistic prices are desperately needed in China's basic industries, both for allocative efficiency improvements in pricing and investment, and to reduce illegal but highly profitable resale and arbitrage activities. And

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there must be increases in retail prices for staple foods in urban areas, the prices of which continue to be held at unrealistically low levels. These artificially-low prices cause wasteful consumption practices and, because of the subsidies needed for some food items, drain state coffers of much needed revenues.

> ... the creation of true factor markets (land, labor, and capital) remain as an objective yet to be achieved. And although markets and market forces have been introduced widely for outputs, the benefits to be obtained from relying on market forces are still denied: the use of true scarcity prices in allocating resources and competition among buyers and sellers so as to weed out the less efficient suppliers and less urgent buyers. [24]

Wage controls that continue to be imposed on urban workers must be lifted, but the government's budget deficits prevent it from carrying out this policy. "Compounding the problems caused by wage rigidity is an almost total lack of labor mobility. Workers, whether in government or enterprise employment, cannot change jobs without their employers' consent. This generates deep frustration and resentment in those who are caught between rising prices and slowly-adjusting wages, with little freedom to change jobs."[25]

2) Our second concern is, oddly enough, with agriculture. Farm-size restrictions have served to limit further productivity improvements in agriculture and human resource movement out of farming. But in an interview with a World Bank senior vice president, a significant new positive policy direction was identified: China will soon allow the subleasing of farm land in order to encourage larger parcel holdings.[26] The coming reforms on land subleasing will begin to correct newly-developing inefficiencies by allowing, in effect, a market for land to develop. If the proposed reforms are implemented, we will begin to see the creation of larger, more efficient farms that can take advantage of large farm machinery used in more developed economies.

3) Another area of continuing inefficiency is housing.

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There are many interconnections among factory, housing quarters, and family relationships. While these relationships serve, in part, to reinforce China's strong familial traditions, they clearly constrain the ability of workers to switch to better jobs or to move to other regions of the country. Furthermore, the price of company-provided housing units is so unrealistically low that it provides little useful information to resource buyers and sellers regarding relative scarcities in a potential housing market. Reforms are desperately needed in the way in which housing is provided to the populace. A possible first step would be to privatize state-owned apartment buildings by phasing in ownership to those presently occupying the units over, say, a ten-year period.

4) Control over inflation ranks among the most important problems faced by Chinese leaders. The dilemma is that a more realistic set of relative prices, needed to improve productivity and efficiency, would generate additional inflationary pressures, partly because such pressures have been suppressed by controls. Thus far, the governments's austerity measures have hurt the nation's large and medium-sized state enterprises by severely restricting access to credit. In contrast, independent enterprises have large holdings of cash and have thereby been little affected by the credit squeeze.

China does not have control over its own money supply. Hence, this critical macroeconomic policy "handle" is unavailable, by and large, to help contain inflation. "For years, the Bank of China had printed the sum of money required by the government and the state enterprises. Despite China's economic progress, no progress was made toward holding down money supply or establishing the yuan as a convertible currency."[27]

5) Another problem, and one that appears to be a growing one, is the development of numerous regional monopolies in light industry throughout China. The body of economics tells us that monopolies tend to restrict the quantity of output, employ fewer workers, and charge higher prices than their competitive brethren. The decentralization of economic power in industry that has been taking place in China has, unfor-

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tunately, not penetrated far enough, that is, to the front lines of the economy where factory managers and workers function and make decisions. Rather, provincial and municipal cadres now wield enormous power relative both to Beijing and to the factories that operate within their jurisdictions.

"Each province has pursued a policy of local import-substitution so industry has grown fast through wasteful duplication....Inefficient small factories in the provinces survive because local governments protect them by erecting internal trade barriers and by granting regional monopolies. This practice is illegal but widespread."[28] What is needed is a more thoroughgoing reform that will put comprehensive decision-making in the hands of plant managers, not provincial officials. But this would appear to be an almost impossible feat to accomplish because of the politicized nature of China's society today. The same kind of barriers to internal trade would have developed in the fledgling U.S. economy in the late eighteenth century were it not explicitly prohibited (and enforced) in the then-new Constitution.

6) Thus, another enormously productive reform would be legal rather than economic: the yielding of political power by the Communist Party to a constitutionally protected set of laws. Without basic legal guarantees, the political system is subject to the changing priorities of the leader of the moment. This is the nature of monopoly rule by one political party.

Since mid-1989, an ideological retrenchment has been occurring that has led to economic retrenchment. Some have noted that China's "2000-year experience of authoritarian government has enabled China to implement policies with a speed and completeness that no other developing country could match."[29] Conversely, each new political wind brings with it potentially sharp changes in economic policy direction. For example, China's 51% control over joint ventures could legitimately be utilized to confiscate capital resources, should the need arise. Or the current regime might attempt to reinstate central planning over provincial private enterprise.

Unless China can adopt a true rule of law, despite the great progress made in recent years, the Chinese are still

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potentially at the mercy of the next despot, fanatic or faction that comes along.[30] But that is precisely why resistance to further economic reforms exists: astute leaders fear that economic freedoms will lead to political ones. Unless the philosophical foundations of the system of central planning are changed, there is little likelihood that economic reform can be continued indefinitely.[31] Close observers of communism's evolution continue to remind us that the obstacles to changes in communist philosophy are still formidable.[32]

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SOUTH AFRICA: THE SECOND REVOLUTION

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Decolonization without a Colonial Power

To be sure, it is a rather special type of revolution, quite unlike the celebrated European and American revolutions over three centuries. However, it does have much in common with the typical stage-managed African revolution of the mid-twentieth century. In particular, it resembles those in which the conscience-stricken and cash-strapped colonial powers were challenged by a westernized non-traditional élite, and, after lengthy negotiations spiced with a modicum of black-on-black tribal violence, duly served up by the international media, agreed to be 'expelled'.

Invariably, for the benefit of the face-saving colonial powers, there was an understanding between the abdicators and their successors that transitional processes were to be conducted in a seemly fashion and that 'democratic' structures, designed to protect the masses against the extravagances of the new élite, were agreed upon before 'independence'. Paul Johnson has summed up the essence of the revolutions which led to self-determination in the colonies in his comment that "... if decolonization did possess an ethical principle, it was that political forms were the ultimate standard of value."[1]

South Africa's second revolution during this century, the revolution of the 1980s,[2] is from motivation to execution a revolution of this genre, but *sans* the colonial power. The protagonists are the African National Congress (ANC) in alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the features which characterize this kind of revolution are the following:

(a) The Main stimulus for the revolution is not indigenous, and does not come spontaneously from the masses:

The notion of self-determination is fundamentally mean-

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ingless to most of the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa since they do not share the western conception of nationalism. In Africa, the source of the demand for national states lies in external social and political movements, and governments, whose object it is to 'liberate' black people from the governance of whites for a variety of reasons, some of them self-interested. Nationalism is, therefore, not a 'natural' aspiration among the people of Africa, as the use of the term 'self-determination' might suggest. This explains largely why nation-states had no prior notion of territorial boundaries or of institutional permanence, before colonialism tried to instill these concepts, and failed.[3]

The ANC, like many other 'nationalist' movements in Africa during the height of the decolonization period, is sustained by external forces which make use of the idea of 'nationalism' to promote the overthrow of the existing, usually white but in the case of Ethiopia non-white, regime. Wherever whites or other non-Africans are involved (Asians in East Africa) the external forces do not seek, in the first instance, to promote the emergence of a nation, but to remove the 'foreign oppressors'. In South Africa the whites are viewed in the same light as were colonial governments in pre-independence Africa. An African Nationalist government, therefore, is one in which Africans do the ruling. External forces which support 'African' rule for the sake of African rule, are less concerned with the quality of that rule than with the fact of that rule. It follows that the criteria governing external support for political contenders strongly favor long-standing political organizations, high on rhetoric, which claim the sanction of tradition. Aggression, a willingness to sacrifice, and to die (or to kill) for the cause, is an essential recommendation; in short, revolution is a romanticized ideal. The ANC, in the late 1950s, became the epitome of such an organization — under the tutelage of its foreign sponsors.

(b) The revolutionaries are few in number, relative to the size of the population[4]

Revolutionary organizations are made up of two elements:

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(i) *an externally based core group*, which is heavily dependent on foreign support, expertise and money. This group acts principally as a propaganda and publicity machine for the promotion of the revolutionary ideal in South Africa. It maintains close links with organizations and governments around the world, which, for one reason or another, favor revolution rather than reform in South Africa. In the cases of the Soviet Union, its satellites and dependencies, revolution is favored, *inter alia*, for ideological reasons.

(ii) internally active cadres,[5] who develop and exploit whatever elements and ingredients of the South African situation that offer the opportunity for sowing disorder and dissent, principally, though not entirely through the use of violence and the establishment of front organizations.[6]

(c) The classic conditions which are commonly associated with revolution in the Western mind are not present in South Africa.

Frantz Fanon argues, with regard to the colonial states, that The proletariat in the colonial countries is not the suppressed masses of the poor industrial workers, but a small privileged group of wage earners, who have, in contrast to the peasants, far more to lose than their chains.[7]

In South Africa, too, the proletariat closely resembles that of the erstwhile colonial states, but in South Africa, the governing elite is neither a colonial administration able to pack up and leave nor in terminology appropriate to Fanon a parasitical bourgeoisie profiting from the colonial economy. It is an "inventive, productive, entrepreneurial class,[8] the epitome of the 'Marxian' bourgeoisie, in fact. The ruling élite is today, therefore, more than willing to negotiate a settlement of the political future of the country on any terms which take into full account the essential role which it plays in maintaining the welfare of the society and its inhabitants, including themselves.[9]

In conforming with this requirement, which greatly complicates the situation of the would-be revolutionaries, the ruling white élite lays down the following conditions for

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negotiations:

* That parties to the negotiation should renounce the use of violence as an instrument of political action; and

* That in any future dispensation, provision must be made for the protection of the right to the preservation of group identity and for inter-group sharing of wealth power and resources.

Because the ruling white élite is willing, and as external pressure on the society mounts, is ever more eager to negotiate, there is impatience about the slow rate at which reform is taking place, but there is also comparatively little outright antagonism towards the government on the part of what are increasingly termed the 'moderate' black people, *i.e.* the 'masses', in the jargon of the left, or 'the silent majority', in that of the right.

The Moderates

The moderates fall into a number of loosely coordinated political groups[10] together with the ruling parties in the national states or homelands which are not to any significant degree beholden to external sponsors and which, therefore, do not act, consciously or unconsciously, as the instruments of foreign governments and organizations, as are and do the exiled movements ANC (African National Congress) and, to a far lesser extent, the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress).

These moderates – of which the leading figure (though not, of course, the leader, since the groups represent various different constituencies including tribal constituencies) is, at least for the time being, the chief minister of Kwa Zulu, Dr. Mangosothu Buthelezi – recognize that fundamental changes have taken place, and are taking place, in South Africa.

Black moderates are fully aware that changes in the political sphere have been modest and, thus far, not in the political sphere of central government, but they recognize the significance of black political advances in the realm of local government and in particular with respect to the conditions of life of blacks, without their having to do very much to push

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the process along.[11]

Moreover, the moderates are acutely aware of and fear the claims to sole legitimacy made by the ANC, and they hesitate to become more fully involved in the process of directing and accelerating evolutionary peaceful change (*i.e.* reform as opposed to revolution) for fear of reprisals from the ANC's murdering thugs in South Africa. These latter are the agents of revolution and have nothing to gain from reform.

What is missing from the South African political scene, and in effect, what has delayed the negotiation phase of the second revolution for the last two to three years, is a mechanism for getting negotiations on the road. During colonial times this role was played by the colonial power themselves.

Several reasons may be offered for this inertia in the case of present-day South Africa:

* None of the moderate black groups has so far been prepared to take the first step towards accepting the proposals for negotiation – in which they themselves do not participate – as collaboration.[12]

* Some moderates feel that since the process of change is moving along so well, there is little reason to commit themselves to negotiations. One well-respected moderate, who is regarded favorably by the government, has only half humorously stated that all that was necessary to keep the benefits rolling was to keep on making demands. Naturally, this strategy may be applied most successfully to the campaign for material benefits like new houses, recreational and other and communal facilities mainly for urban blacks, and education. But there is little denying that material benefits are of far more interest to the black masses than they are to aspiring black leadership élites, for whom the object of agitation and unrest is not material benefits, which as leaders they already enjoy,[13] but the power to confer upon or to deny them to others.

* Whilst the ANC is explicit about its aim to seize

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> power and install a socialist economic order, none of the moderate groups know precisely what demands to make in 'open-ended' negotiations with the government. Dr. Buthelezi's frequent calls for a 'declaration of intent'[14] by the government, illustrate the nature of the problem.The moderates want an offer of a new political dispensation from the government in order that they can challenge it and, thereby, experience a sense of political purpose and, at the same time, enhance their credibility amongst their followers. If, in the other hand, they themselves initiate the negotiation process, by making the opening demands, they can hardly ask for less than the ANC asks, that is, 'one-man-one-vote in a unitary system'– the 'total power' formula.

The moderates cannot make such a demand, partly because it would threaten to unleash a raw struggle for power which would advantage the men with the guns – the government and the ANC – and possibly sow divisions amongst the moderates themselves. Sensing that their strength lies in time, numbers and unity, the moderates have a strong vested interest in a gradual transformation. There is, naturally, a great deal of sympathy among moderate blacks for a 'federal solution', that is, one which would enable the whites to feel secure enough not to halt or reverse the processes now going on in South Africa, which is steadily empowering the far more numerous black people.[15] Moreover, the moderates know that they cannot wrest *total* power in the South African polity from the government instantly either by negotiation or, as the ANC appears to think, by force. Ideally, the moderates would like to be seen by the outside world, by the whites, coloreds and Indians and by the black masses as winners in the outcome to reasonable negotiations. But if the government claims no ground, (*i.e.* it refuses to stake out an opening position – a declaration of intent) and the moderates have, therefore, either nothing to negotiate about or nothing to gain from the negotiating process, they must eventually end up looking like

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'stooges.'[16]

Yet another reason why the moderates need the government to declare its position ahead of negotiations, is that they are not 'monoliths'. Each group amongst the moderates has its own position and would, in negotiations, make its own demands. Moreover, for tribal and other reasons, the moderates would, certainly ahead of negotiations, find it difficult to unite.

The ANC

The ANC has, up to the present, been encouraged by its external supporters throughout the world to maintain a belligerent revolutionary stance.[17] For this reason it has thus far refused to abandon violence. The violence which it threatens is directed both at the state, which it hoped to render impotent, and against any groups which enter into negotiation with the government. The evidence is contained in the unmerciful attacks made on black councilors in the townships, their homes, which have been gutted, and their families.

On the strength of this last point, it may be argued that, as has been the case elsewhere in Africa, in particular, in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, the 'managed' revolution in South Africa has been stalled by the reluctance of a radical elitist faction, strongly influenced by Marxist/Leninist ideology, to compete with other interest groups for political participation under a new dispensation.

The ANC is, in effect, demanding a transfer of power directly from the dominant white group (the Afrikaner group) to itself. If the ANC is successful, it is not unreasonable to assume that South Africa will travel a road similar to that traveled by those other states in southern Africa which have become, or like Zimbabwe, are in the process of becoming, part of the Soviet African imperium. The ANC already poses rhetorically as a vanguard party of the working people. The principal features of such parties are ...'(to) acknowledge Marxism-Leninism as their ideological basis, build their activity on the principles of democratic centralism, and add to

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their ranks by individually selecting the best representatives of the working class, the peasantry and other working strata of the population. (They) are prototypes of Marxist-Leninist parties ....'[18]

The Two Stumbling Blocks in the path of the ANC and other revolutionary parties.

The government's opposition to the use of violence:

It is by no means a foregone conclusion, as many external observers appear to think, that the ANC will succeed in its efforts to gain sole undisputed power in South Africa. A number of obstacles stand in its way of which the following may be decisive:

The first is the rigid determination of the South African government not to make concessions that would give the ANC or its sponsors any reason to think that there will be a weakening in the resolve of the government not to negotiate with the ANC as long as it advocates revolution, practices violence and executes terror against the civil population. In spite of the considerable pressure placed on the government to release the imprisoned leader of the ANC, (an act would undoubtedly earn South Africa considerable relief from its Western critics) the government continues to insist, right up to the date of writing, that it will release Mandela, who is in prison because of his former conviction for involvement in violent crimes, only if he forswears the use of violence and desists from its advocacy. Mandela, for obvious reasons and at least for the present, cannot accept these terms and maintain his credibility within the ANC. He therefore remains in prison. The government's insistence on this point and the ANC's (and no doubt its principal sponsor's) unwillingness to give up violent tactics will continue to inhibit any official contact between the two, regardless of how many unofficial meetings take place, and regardless of who sponsor them. Of course, if the ANC abandons violence, it will lose the edge it currently has over the moderate groups. Its tough, no-compromise stance is partly responsible for retaining its

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present following, as is its readiness to use violence in order to intimidate its opponents.

The South African government's determined attitude on the related questions of holding Mandela and of negotiations with the ANC is a major source of vexation outside of South Africa and is exploited to the hilt by the ANC, and by its domestic and external allies, including the anti-apartheid lobbies entrenched in the West. This refusal to bend is branded by these lobbies, and characterized by the media, as evidence of the South African government's determination not to make concessions to black demands for political rights, and as it is usually expressed, to 'perpetuate apartheid'. Even some of the moderate groups in South Africa, like Inkatha, are uneasy about Mandela's continued imprisonment.[19]

However, these allegations that the government is unwilling to bend or, worse, is determined to entrench apartheid, are scarcely borne out by the record. The government's reformist actions (many of which are demonstrably in response to specific black demands in such fields as education, wages, employment conditions, housing, etc.) and its repeated affirmation of its determination to eliminate apartheid in every sector, clearly testifies to its readiness to carry through the reform process, but in a controlled fashion. Furthermore, of equal, if not even greater importance, is the white public's continued support for a government committed to and engaged in reform – as elections and referendums constantly confirm.[20]

The government's refusal to negotiate with the ANC as long as the latter uses violent methods against its rivals, or indeed against anyone, as it does at present, would be more easily understood outside South Africa if the transition from white to black government in South Africa were not regarded as so burning a moral issue. That it is, is a product of two things: misunderstanding based on ignorance of the nature of the South Africa society and polity (what is being attempted is not simply decolonization) and the complexities of conducting political reform in an ethnically and

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developmentally diverse society; and an emotional anti-white – in some cases anti-Afrikaner – and pro-revolutionary rhetoric supported by a sustained propaganda campaign against the Nationalist government in South Africa.[21]

But it is evident, nevertheless, to anyone who is pragmatic about change in South Africa, that unless all the political, ethnic or tribal minorities are free from all restraints to participate openly in any negotiations about South Africa's future, no progress towards a more open or freer society in South Africa is possible. Violence on the part of the ANC inhibits the negotiation process, and can only produce secret deals between the non-violent black opposition and the government.

As things stand at present, the South African government clearly cannot do what the outside world wants it to do, that is, to simply hand over control of the country to the ANC. The organization's impressive external support is totally out of proportion to its weak internal support, a fact which has led to its campaign of violence and necessitates the continuation of violence. The ANC, on its record, finds no moral impediment to practicing violence and has no intention of refraining from intimidatory acts of violence against any other group of whatever race, color or persuasion which is willing to negotiate with the government on the question of power-sharing. The result of this stalemate is that the ANC's campaign of terror against all sections of the population, but especially against black moderates, continues, constrained only because of increased vigilance of the authorities made possible by perpetuation of the state of emergency.[22]

Through its agency, violence has been curbed by the government, but it has not stopped. Deaths continue to occur not only, but mainly, in the black townships as a consequence of mob actions and police reactions, and black retaliation against revolutionary elements associated with the banned ANC and UDF, and their numerous affiliates. The state of affairs in the Pietermaritzburg area of Natal is especially bloody.

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The Independent and semi-Independent Black States

The second stumbling block to the ANC's confrontational strategy is the existence of independent and semi-independent black states in South Africa. In spite of the refusal by the international community to recognize them, four black states have accepted independence from Pretoria under elected black governments. The four are Transkei, Ciskei, Bophutsatswana and Venda.

These states are territorially based on land excised from South Africa an substantially, though not fully, consolidated. The anomalies of 'islands' in South African territory still do remain. Naturally, South Africa's critics, including the United Nations, uniformly refuse to recognize the validity of these arrangements, but it is undeniable that their black governments do exercise control as completely over these territories as does any other state on the continent. Moreover, the states are multi-party democracies.

Two of these states, Transkei and Ciskei, are peopled almost entirely by tribesmen of the Xhosa tribe, the first tribe to come into contact with whites in the Cape Colony in the 18th century. There is an endemic rivalry between the two states which has led to open conflict more than once since they became independent, conflict which South Africa has mediated. A curious feature of the Xhosa tribe is that the bulk of the supporters of the ANC are Xhosas, the majority of them living and working outside of the two Xhosa homelands. This group therefore constitutes the third faction amongst the Xhosas. Both Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tamba are high-born Xhosas.

Bophutatswana, situated to the north-west of South Africa is home to those Tswana tribesmen who lived in South Africa at the time when the other Tswana state, Botswana, across the border[23] became independent in 1967. Like the two Xhosa states, the Tswana states are rivals, sometimes enemies. Batswana (people of Botswana) frequently cross the border to shop in more prosperous Bophutatswana, and to visit relatives there.

The state of Venda on South Africa's far northern borders,

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is home to the Venda people who have fellow-tribesman across the border in Zimbabwe, where they constitute a tiny minority.

There can be no doubt that the four states which have claimed independence constitute a serious obstacle in the path of the ANC. Although the international community has resolutely resisted all the blandishments of the South African government, as well as of the governments of the states themselves, to endorse their independence, the years alone have gone a long way towards consolidating their independence and legitimating their leadership. Naturally, the leadership in these states is intensely hostile to a political movement which would have them dismantled and returned to the body of South Africa to be ruled after an ANC take-over by the ANC, and subjected, accordingly, to the domination of a faction of the Xhosa tribe supported by the USSR and its satellites.

The ANC has for long been fully aware of the dangers and difficulties presented by these internal offspring of separate development, and has been vigorous in damning them abroad. In this it has scored a major triumph. The independent states have not managed to obtain the smallest degree of recognition in the outside world. However, its internal efforts at creating disaffection amongst their inhabitants have been singularly unsuccessful.

So the ANC's external triumph has, in a sense, been a Pyrrhic victory, because international recognition or lack of it does not feature in the internal contest between these states and the ANC and between the ANC and the people of the independent states. And since these four states are home to about 6 million people, or approximately 20% of the population of the entire territory which the ANC regards as constituting South Africa, (i.e. South Africa's original borders) the loss is a serious one.

The six semi-independent, or internally self-governing 'national' states, created by the partially implemented policy of separate development, compound the problem for the ANC.

The difficulties confronted by the ANC over these states, is that they legitimate, validate and even help to consolidate

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tribal groupings in the political contest for the future of South Africa. In this respect, they present just as much of a threat as the independent states, described above. However, internal political rivalries within these states are susceptible to ANC meddling, because, unlike the independent states, the central political question of independence has not yet been resolved, *i.e.* the question of whether or not independence should be accepted. Naturally, those who oppose independence find a natural ally in the ANC, which is ready to resort to violence and intimidation in order to prevent these territories from accepting independence.

One of the national states deserves separate comment, the state of Kwa Zulu which is situated in the province of Natal. It constitutes the most serious barrier to ANC aspirations because the majority of the Zulu people, and the overwhelming majority of rural Zulus, do not accept the political leadership of the ANC on any grounds. It will be recalled by those who are familiar with nineteenth century South African history that the mighty Zulu empire was the only black political entity which offered any determined resistance to both Boers and the British, when they clashed over white dominion in South Africa. This leads us to several important observations.

First and foremost, it is important to realize, the Zulus will not bend to Xhosa leadership. Second, whereas the ANC, in common with most African nationalist movements, represents, behind a facade of multiracialism, a black/white confrontation, the Zulus consider themselves a separate people and see the political struggle in different terms: that is, as Zulu power against Afrikaner power. Third, the Zulus are the largest tribe in South Africa, numbering some 4 million people. Clearly, given their historical role in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the arbiters of the fates of all other tribes in the region, and their superior numbers today, the Zulus will not be contented to play second fiddle to any other black or colored group. Finally, the largest political party in South Africa, outside the National Party, is probably the Zulu party

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Inkatha. It has offices throughout those parts of the country where Zulus live and party organizers operate in the urban areas, where concentrations of blacks are found.

The Chief Minister of Kwa Zulu, and leader of the Inkatha party, Gatsha Mangosothu Buthelezi, is a former member of the ANC, expelled because of his willingness to co-operate in the creation of the Kwa Zulu state as part of the system of national states which was the principle goal of the Verwoedian policy of separate development. Although Chief Buthelezi claims to support the leader of the ANC, Mandela, in his struggles to attain greater freedom for blacks throughout South Africa, Buthelezi opposes the ANC, and in particular its violent actions which have caused serious losses to his people, and he deplores its Communist associations and its external affiliations. Buthelezi is a Christian and strongly supports the free enterprise system.

It is highly unlikely that the Zulus will throw in their lot with the ANC. Having fought a long and bitter struggle against the whites in the nineteenth century, the Zulus will continue to resist the intrusion of new external elements of ideologies from abroad, which would inevitably accompany ANC rule in South Africa. They regard themselves as the indigenous élite in South Africa, and are not likely to surrender that claim. For this reason, although Buthelezi has accepted the power base bestowed upon him by Pretoria in the shape of Kwa Zulu, he will never accept the formal separation of the Kwa Zulu from the rest of South Africa. Clearly, the Soviet Union has recognized in Buthelezi and the Zulus a formidable opponent in the stakes for political control of South Africa. For the ANC, the fragmented Xhosas represent an easily exploited tribe, whilst the united Zulus offer no hope of penetration.

The Odds against the ANC

As the above discussion suggests, the ANC is far from occupying the overwhelmingly dominant position in South African politics that its foreign backers and propagandists would have foreign observers believe. On the contrary, the

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amount of popular support which the ANC could muster in an open competition with other political organizations would probably be far below that which the Afrikaners (in the shape of the National Party) could muster under the same conditions. The following factors might be mentioned in a debate on this issue:

* The ANC is tribally rooted in one faction of the Xhosa tribe.

* The ANC's leadership has been in exile, and therefore out of touch with events in South Africa for many years.

* The leadership provided by the ANC prior to its banning in the early 1960's was clumsy and inept. As a result of its amateurish efforts, its leaders were caught red-handed in a foolhardy and premature attempt at violent revolution and the organization was effectively put out of action for the following fifteen years.

* The movement's military wing, Mkhonto we Sizwe, (The Spear of the Nation) has signally failed to score any victories against the South African state during its two decades of existence. Its attacks on civilians have resulted in the deaths of more blacks than whites. Its membership has been thoroughly compromised by penetration over and over again.

* The ANC is heavily dependent on the dedication and organizing ability of the South African Communist Party, which has for many years, since the 1920s in fact, exploited black dissatisfaction in order to advance its ideological cause. The SACP has, for over seventy years, been a devoted vassal of the Kremlin.

* The ANC has amply demonstrated its rejection of the free enterprise ethic, and its unswerving allegiance to Marxist socialism. Blacks in South Africa, like many on the continent, endorse some form of socialism, which they believe corresponds to the regimen under which they lived prior to the arrival of whites. However, they are not prepared to embrace the kind of socialism which might bring the Soviets into the country as latter-day colonialists. Neither are they prepared to import the failed economics of Soviet socialism. The impact on the ANC of current changes in Eastern Europe

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has yet to be assessed.

* The ANC's determination to render the country ungovernable in an effort to precipitate revolution does not readily appeal to the majority of black people. Too many urban blacks have a stake in stability and associate revolution with the behavior of uncontrolled youth and thugs. Rural blacks (who actually make the vast majority of black people) are heavily dependent on whites and on government for survival under difficult circumstances. If the ANC were to triumph in South Africa, blacks would have to experience very severe deprivation in the cities (since revolution would assuredly bring with it an economic collapse and massive unemployment) and would be subjected to greatly intensified intimidation, as happened in Rhodesia, Kenya and elsewhere in Africa.

* Although the ANC would appear to be an ideal tool in the hands of external interests, it is the product of non-indigenous forces: it espouses an alien ideology; its leaders do not suffer with the people, but enjoy comfortable lives as celebrities abroad; its leaders do not communicate with the mass of the people and wishes of the ANC are enforced by coercion and violence. The ANC seeks to impose ideals on the people which are at odds with their traditional norms and beliefs as well as their experience in a modernizing western socio-economic environment. In short, the ANC is the South African counterpart of the romantic illusion of liberation movements which has become part of western consciousness in the twentieth century. Its only reality lies in Soviet military support, the prospects of which may be fading if Gorbachev's policies result in reduced Soviet support for their dependencies in the third world.[24]

Measuring ANC Support

One of the more difficult tasks which has confronted commentators on South African affairs over the years has been to assess the degree of support enjoyed by the ANC in South Africa.

The problem has not been solved satisfactorily yet, and,

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indeed, may not be solved until an election in which the ANC participates is held. Yet, the issue is a crucial one to the ANC, because its claim for legitimacy, as the authentic representative of the people of South Africa, rests morally upon the degree of support which it enjoys amongst the South African population. This is because the ANC demands from its external backers not simply moral rhetorical support for its cause, but also material support for its military campaign and for its acts of terror against the civilian population. Such support requires some degree of conviction in the minds of the donors, certainly those in the West, that the ANC must, demonstrate to its supporters that it is fighting not any war, but a just war, and that its credentials are impeccable. This requires more than a mere handful of followers; it requires the overwhelming endorsement of the masses, which are asked to suffer and perhaps die in the foreign-backed crusade of the ANC.

Until fairly recent times it has been difficult for the ANC to show how much support it has – just as difficult as for the government and moderate black leaders to show how little the ANC has. Failing an election, the ANC on the one hand, and its opponents on the other, have resorted to making educated guesses for propaganda purposes which have been almost entirely arbitrary. For its part, the ANC has claimed the support of the 'black masses' in South Africa (which certainly suggests an overwhelming majority) together with that of 'progressive forces' in the other groups. It has dealt with high-profile blacks like Chief Buthelezi, who vociferously oppose the ANC and challenge its claims, by alleging that they are 'stooges' of the regime.

As regards the whites, although white youth has increasingly, during recent years, been wooed with some success through the anti-conscription movement (the ECC), the ANC has written off the majority either as racist oppressors or as unwitting and conscienceless collaborators in racist oppression.

Some recent polls conducted in an effort to determine what domestic support exists for sanctions, (a campaign solidly

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supported by the ANC) have provided some insight into internal support for the ANC. The following results, though not by any means conclusive, are worth noting:

1. The Schlemmer Surveys:

In mid-1984, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, a respected sociologist, undertook a survey among a representative sample of 551 black factory workers in seven industrial regions throughout the country. Trained black field-workers asked six questions designed to discover the extent of support for sanctions. The results showed that a minimum of 75% of the workers opposed divestment (*i.e.* not more than 25% supported it). This result confirmed that of a survey conducted by the same researcher in 1979 in Natal.[25] Following criticism of his survey based on the nature and extent thereof, Schlemmer commissioned another survey through a reputable research organization. In this survey, a minimum of 79% of the interviewees rejected divestment.[26]

In the latter survey, as well as others conducted by other researchers,[27] it has been shown, according to Schlemmer, that "some 46% of the middle class (black) elite support divestment."

2. The Orkin Survey:

In 1987 another survey, this time of all segments of the black population, was attempted by the sociologist, Mark Orkin, a director of the independent Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE). In Orkin's survey there were 800 respondents.

With regard to support for sanctions, Orkin's results differed markedly from those which Schlemmer had commented upon or had produced. In Orkin's findings, about 40% of the respondents favored sanctions, and 60% were cautious (or unenthusiastic).

However, in the process of this survey, Orkin also tried to establish the degree of support enjoyed by the ANC. He found that in the urban areas, 35% supported the ANC and 13% the

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ANC affiliate, the UDF, a total of 48%.

This figure compares with that which Schlemmer noted in support of divestment in the 'middle class élite' of the urban areas, viz. 48%.

Likewise, in the rural areas and small towns, Orkin found a lesser degree of support for the ANC/UDF. This figure is not available to the writer, but the nationwide figure shows 31% support, which is not too far from the figure Schlemmer gives for support for sanctions, in his first 1984 survey, *i.e.* 25%.[28]

3. The Chamber of Mines survey:

In May, 1989, the Chamber of Mines commissioned a Gallup[29] poll to determine the degree of support for sanctions. Its results showed that some 84% and 85% opposed sanctions and divestment respectively. 85% of blacks think that divestment is a bad idea and 82% that sanctions are undesirable. The sample in this survey comprised 2000 individuals, (1400 blacks, 400 whites and 200 Asians and Coloreds (of mixed race).

An interesting sidelight to this survey was its reflection of the low level of support for the ANC and its affiliates. Given a choice of parties and leaders, the following results were recorded:

First Choice:

ANC	11%
The State President, Mr. P.W. Botha:	11%
Chief Buthelezi:	10%
Bishop Tutu:	6%
Cosatu (an ANC supporting trades union)	5%
UDF	6%
Mrs. Helen Suzman	4%
(figures below 2% are disregarded)	
The figures for ANC, Cosatu, and UDF total:	22%

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4. '*The Star*'s Save South Africa Poll':[30]

In this poll a sample of 1052 men and women over the age of 18 years was surveyed.

In answer to a question about sanctions the following results were obtained:

Support sanctions though they might lead to hardship:	15%
Oppose sanctions:	83%

On the question of whether the ANC ought to be drawn into negotiations about South Africa's future, the results were:

ANC should play a relevant part in negotiations:	33%
ANC should be admitted under certain conditions:	37%
ANC should be ignored:	28%

The latter result is open to the interpretation that 33% of the respondents felt that the ANC, regardless of its radical policies and of its violent strategies, ought to be admitted to negotiations, a position which implies a radical stance on the part of the responder, whilst 65% was either not prepared to accept the ANC as a participant or would impose conditions, a position which does not favor the ANC as it is at present.

If it is assumed that the pro-sanctions position represents the views of South Africans who have adopted a hard line on the question of political, social and economic change in South Africa (a position which the ANC whole-heartedly supports in its external propaganda), it would not be too far-fetched to conclude that the percentages of the population which have come out in the several polls in favor of sanctions would roughly correspond with the percentage which would, *mutatis mutandis*, support the ANC in an open election. What the above figures show is that those who have come out in favor of sanctions number somewhere between 25% of the population by the Schlemmer findings, 40% by Orkin's findings, and 15% by the Chamber of Mines Survey and by '*The Star*'s' poll.

It might be argued that the percentage which supports

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sanctions, to judge by these results, must be at any given time, in the region of 25%. Accordingly, about 25% of the population may be regarded potential supporters of the ANC in the event of an election in terms of the sanctions polls.

A second deduction can be made from the figures quoted above that points in the same direction, namely that by Orkin's figures as well as by the Chamber of Mines survey on the popularity of leaders, not more than about 27% of the population indicates support for the ANC and its affiliates (*i.e.* 31% in Orkin and 22% in the Chamber's survey).

The Star's poll suggests that the estimate of approximately 27% may be a little on the high side. Perhaps it would be reasonable to conclude that overall the ANC with its radical policies is favored by not more than about 26% of the population and possibly fewer.

The Impact of the Geographical, Racial and Tribal fragmentation of South Africa on the support of the ANC

If one considers the demographic patterns which emerge from the fragmented structure of South African society, the odds seem to be stacked against the ANC. Let us consider the following: (All the percentages are based on the answers to the question 'Which one of the following leaders or organizations do you support most?' in the Chamber of Mines Gallup poll, except the figure for the Zulu homeland which is an estimate based on personal discussions with Zulu leaders)

Group	Total number	Estimated % for ANC	Total for ANC
Non-homeland:			
Blacks	8,287,552	20	1,657,510
Whites	4,576,690	1	457,669
Coloreds	2,832,705	12	339,924
Indians	783,978	10	78,397
Homeland:			
Zulu	3,736,802	20	747,360
Shangaan	494,987	20	98,995

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Swazi	388,783	20	77,756
Ndebele	282,568	20	56,512
N. Sotho	1,842,206	20	368,440
S. Sotho	182,629	20	36,524
TOTAL	23,408,900		3,433,304
PERCENTAGE FOR ANC			14.7%

If the independent states are included, the figure for the ANC would improve somewhat. Here, the assumptions might be made that domestic opponents of the ruling élite, (in effect, the ruling clan), of any one or of all of these states may consider that the only chance they might have of gaining political control would be by allying themselves with a powerful outsider, such as the socialist bloc, through the mediation of the ANC. This has certainly been the pattern which has been followed elsewhere in Africa and, indeed, in Southern Africa. In terms of this scenario, one might speculate on domestic support for the ANC reaching as much as 40% in these states (i.e. twice that which the ANC might obtain in the homelands).

Group	Total number	Estimated % for ANC	Total for ANC
Transkei	2,947,058	40	1,178,823
Ciskei	925,095	40	37,003
Venda	454,797	40	181,918
Bophutat-swana	1,667,478	40	666,991
TOTAL	29,403,328		5,498,039
TOTAL PERCENTAGE SUPPORT FOR ANC			19.88%

On this basis, the ANC might command at present about 20% of support from South Africans of all groups, both within the National States and outside of them.

If the independent states are excluded (as they might well be in a 'final settlement', the percentage of ANC support based

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on the above estimates declines to 14.6%.

However, in spite of the probably low level of support which the ANC currently enjoys, some important concessions must be make to the movement with regard to its claim to political leadership segments of the South African people:

(a) First, the ANC, in spite of its present affiliations with Communist states and movements, has a long history of black resistance to white domination, although it is less certain whether it can ever have warranted the description 'nationalist', in the sense of "South African," in view of its close identification with the Xhosa tribe.

(b) Second, the ANC has succeeded in attaining the status of a legitimate government-in-exile outside South Africa. This recognition is of particular importance in the United Nations, in the OAU and amongst the leadership of the so-called 'Frontline States'.

Beyond this, the ANC's diplomatic successes are impressive. It has achieved a high standing amongst both state and non-state actors in the international community, and frequently operates in tandem with the PLO, IRA and other movements which employ terrorism and mass propaganda as a strategy to maintain international status. The ANC is a fully-endorsed and supported front organization of the USSR and, along with many other organizations of similar character, it is recognized by most governments. Its financial support derives from public support, worldwide, international organizations and government aid grants.

(c) Third, the ANC is at present the only organization which claims to represent elements from all segments of the South African population. It claims that its membership shows that it is 'non-racial', *i.e.* it boasts support from whites, blacks, coloreds and Indians, although in fact, blacks are dominant. Apart from known Communists (members of the SACP, for example) and 'fellow travelers,' few whites have had links with the ANC.

(d) Fourth, the ANC can with some justification claim to have been 'effective'. Certainly the government has not been

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able to ignore its existence. Ever-growing numbers of foreign governments regard the ANC as the 'authentic representative of the South African people', thereby according the organization legitimacy while denying the white South African government's claim to legitimacy. Domestically, ANC terrorist attacks on civilian targets have cost hundreds of lives and resulted in substantial damage to property. Moreover, government efforts to counter ANC initiatives have cost the South African economy millions of Rands annually, much of which might otherwise been added to the millions which have been put into developmental programs for blacks, particularly since the late seventies. To the direct costs, which include the massive loss of highly productive white manpower to the economy because of the need for conscription, must be added the loss of reputation as a result of cross-border raids against ANC bases in neighboring states, acts which facilitated the major international campaign against South African destabilization.

In attempting to evaluate the ANC's claim to power in South Africa, one must endeavor to place these ANC 'assets' in perspective.

What value can be attached to the long history of the ANC? Is institutional longevity, *per se*, a qualification for accession to power? Incidentally, the same questions might be asked about personalities like Tambo, Mandela or Slovo. Is the Presidency of a future reformed South Africa to be awarded as a prize for endurance or for long prison sentences? Where this has happened elsewhere in Africa, as part of the managed revolution, it has often had disastrous results.

Even the ANC's diplomatic successes may not constitute valuable assets, once in power. The dilemma of Angola and Mozambique demonstrates this point graphically. Both are ruled by governments which once enjoyed, as 'liberation movements', the wholehcarted endorsement in the West. Today, both Frelimo and the MPLA, under Soviet\Cuban control, reject Western values, and, apart from welcoming Western aid, they have no desire to become involved with or

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beholden to the West.

Whilst the claim of the ANC to be 'non-racial' has an instant appeal to many Europeans and Americans, there is very little substance to the ANC's claim. The 30-member National Executive of the ANC in 1985 boasted only one white, Joe Slovo, reputed to be a Colonel in the KGB and therefore scarcely a representative of white South Africa. There are only two Indians and two or three coloreds in the ANC Central Committee. The Chamber of Mines poll showed that both coloreds and Indians favored P.W. Botha, the former South African State President, over all other leaders and parties.[31]

If the National Executive is to be taken as a sample of the cross-racial composition of the ANC, it is, by comparison with dozens of other groups, organizations and institutions in South Africa, a very poor showing. A white political party such as the Democratic Party, for example, can actually show that it has substantial support from all groups in South Africa. Even the much-abused tri-cameral parliament, which as an institution has been pointedly rejected by anything up to 50% of the colored and Indian electorate, can still boast a far higher degree of multi-racial co-operation than can the ANC. The fact of growing non-racialism in South Africa seems to have passed the ANC by during the long years in exile. During the sixties, for example, open association between and amongst whites and blacks in South Africa was only practiced and accepted socially in politically radical circles. Since the late seventies however, and particularly during the eighties, there has been a noticeable flowering of cross-racial contact to which, ironically, the ANC leaders, who live in the past, have not been able to adjust. What has happened in South Africa is that whites, in very large numbers, have made the effort to accept and to welcome the new social and economic roles which non-white people now play in South Africa. One result has been that it is no longer *socially* acceptable for any whites to be overtly abusive or rude to black or colored people.[32] Even those with the deepest and most stubborn prejudices

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publicly display a manner which does not give offense to blacks and does not embarrass other whites.

But does this mean that blacks who are non-Marxist must also be excluded? Clearly not – because according to the strategy of Marxists 'war of nationsl liberation'all blacks, whether or not they are Marxist, are members of the oppressed class, and must be encouraged to accept liberation by the ANC (in alliance with the SACP). The following passage from the ANC publication, *Sechaba* (printed in East Germany), of September 1985, puts it clearly:

> We in the ANC know that the nationalist struggle and the socialist struggle are not one and the same thing, and they do not belong to the same historical period. The two represent two distinct categories of the revolution...[33]

Once "liberation" of the blacks is accomplished, the struggle for socialism commences. As *Sechaba* puts it:

> We must not allow our desire for socialism to intoxicate us. The people of South Africa must be taught the bitter truth simply, clearly and in a straight forward manner: the chief content of the present phase of our revolution in the national liberation of the black people. It is actually impossible for South Africa to make even that advance to socialism before the national liberation of the Black oppressed nation.[34]

Finally, it is necessary to comment upon the fact that the ANC has succeeded in attaining the distinction of becomming accepted throughout the world as the 'authentic' interpreter of the aspirations of South African blacks. This is, without doubt, its greatest achievement.

Yet the fact that the outside world believes the ANC to be a suitable successor to the present government, hardly confers legitimacy on the organization in the eyes of the black people of South Africa. In the light of its present support, it would in free competition with other groups, parties and movements, be only one of a number of alternatives. It would hardly be able to exercise democratic power without forming a coalition with

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other groups, and it is difficult to see what other group would feel comfortable in an alliance with the ANC. Given its proclivity for violence it is scarcely to be believed that once in power it would adhere to liberal-democratic principles, guarantee individual and group rights and freedoms or even retain the international support which it presently enjoys. In fact, the ANC's claim to legitimacy is based exclusively upon the weakness of the South African government's claim to legitimacy. if legitimacy is to be defined as "founded on opinion... (It is) nothing but the regard in which a polity is held by its members: the extent to which that polity is thought to be worthy of support".[35]

As far as contemporary world opinion is concerned, no white (or non-African) government in Africa can be legitimate, simply because it is non-African. But any black (or African) government is presumed to be legitimate until it behaves so abominably that even the most indulgent are forced to withdraw their endorsement.[36] The fact that the present white government of South Africa is not regarded as legitimate, coupled with the fact that the ANC is the only political organization which has been able to convince external opinion that it totally rejects the South African government and all its works (*i.e.* including separate homelands) creates an opinion which favors the presumption of legitimacy with regard to the ANC.

Quite simply, the ANC is supported in its outrageous claim to be the only true representative body for blacks in South Africa because there is no other credible claimant to that title. As things stand at present, the ANC is quite determined that no other claimant to that presumed legitimacy will arise. This is what lies behind the campaign of terror conducted in South Africa against blacks who have attempted to forge other alliances. In the outside world, of course, the ANC has successfully disposed of its rival, the PAC, which was not backed by the Soviet Union (but in an earlier phase by the Chinese).

The long-term prospects of the ANC hang on its ability to

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suppress its rivals. In particular, it must discredit or, eliminate groups which might be predisposed to enter into negotiations for a non-violent settlement of South Africa's political problems. Particularly dangerous are groups which may succeed in bringing about alliances across tribal lines, first, because tribal alliances (like Inkatha) are not regarded by contemporary Western political theorists as politically worthy successors to Afrikaner rule; second, because the ANC uses tribal antagonisms to incite violence; and, third, because the only identification amongst black people which overrides tribal affiliations is a religious, and, in particular, a Christian identification. There are, of course, two problems here for the ANC: the unifying propensity of Christianity in its African forms, and the ideological conflict between the Old Testament Christian beliefs of the African churches and Marxism/Leninism.

Conclusion

"One black leader said to me: You will probably talk to a lot of whites, including members of the government. Just give them one message, and that is we don't want to replace them we just want to join them."

This was part of the farewell statement to the press in South Africa of the outgoing American Ambassador, Edward Perkins, who left the country in May 1989 optimistic about the future:

> I have a sense that among blacks and whites – and I don't just mean those in government – there are people who are trying their best to figure out a way to get closer to a model which allows people to continue to examine where they are and to enable them to move onto the next step.

Ambassador Perkins' conclusions about the second revolution suggest that it is far from over, but that the way things are going, it will not erupt into the violent confrontation which the ANC, their Communist Party backers

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of long standing and their Soviet bloc sponsors desire. The reason is that violent confrontation is not a viable strategy for the majority in South Africa, and the majority knows it. South Africa is not a colonial state wherein blacks can eliminate the inhabitants by calling on the colonial powers to do the job for them. White South Africans have no home country to which they can return.

If, then, whites are to be permanent, it is obvious that they will not voluntarily surrender their security, the most important element of which is the privilege of living in an orderly society governed according to the norms of Western states and societies. The consequence for blacks is that they will have to find ways to enter the society which whites have created in South Africa and to compete with whites for the goods available in that society. The evidence that this can be done is all around them as more and more black people move up the professional, economic and social scale. Blacks are already joining whites in substantial numbers, and this process will continue unless the leaders of the outside world insist on the romantic solution of bloody revolution.

For the West, the fact must be faced squarely that South Africa cannot be 'decolonized' because it is not a colonial state. The well-trusted remedy for solving third world problems must fail in South Africa.

FOOTNOTES

1. Johnson, P., 'Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties', Harper Row, New York, 1983, p. 510.
2. The first, having taken place in 1899 against the British colonial rule, was brought to a conclusion in 1910 when the British agreed to the eventual independence of the country.
3. Bozeman, Adda B., 'Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities', Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 24, observes that 'None, (of the African states) however, with the possible exception of Somalia, can be convincingly described as a nationally and territorially unified state, for all are conglomerates of multiple, often hostile, tribal communities... Indeed, it is difficult not to acquiesce in an African scholar's (*i.e.* Christian Vieyra's) judgement that the modern African state exists under the trusteeship of indigenous forces'. On the question of the formation of nations, the reader is referred to Smith, Anthony D., *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986. Smith speaks of the triple revolution in the West which favored nation formation. 'These were the revolutions in the sphere of division of labor, a revolution in the

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control of administration and a revolution in cultural co-ordination.' The revolutions have not yet taken place in Africa. (p. 131)

4. Tom Lodge, writing on "The ANC of South Africa", has quoted Stephen Davis, *Season of War: Insurgency in South Africa*, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 1982, p. 207, that the 'total ANC establishment numbered 9000 people, of which 5,400 were military personnel and the rest being either administrative or educational'.

5. Numbering 200-300, according to *ibid.*

6. For a description of the ANC's role as a Soviet front organization, see Radu, M. 'African National Congress: Cadres and Credo' in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXXVI, dated July-August, 1987.

7. From Grohs, G.K., 'Frantz Fanon and the African Revolution' in Apter, D.E., and Andrain, C.F., (eds.) *Contemporary Analytical Theory*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1972, p. 274.

8. *Ibid.*

9. As recently as May 14, 1989, the new leader of the National Party, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, in a television interview, in which he addressed the question of a single parliament in South Africa, spoke of a 'balance of power, in which no group dominated another'.

10. Included amongst the moderate black parties and movements are the United Municipalities of South Africa (UMSA), the Federal Independent Democratic Alliance (FIDA), the Urban Council's Association of South Africa (UCASA), the Church Alliance of South Africa (CASA), Inkatha, and the National Forum (NF). These movements aspire to political status. A giant movement, the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) overshadows most of these, but does not try at the present stage to exercise any political influence over its millions of adherents. CASA, which is based on church membership, claims 12 million black followers.

11. 'I am committed to the politics of negotiation because it is only through negotiation that we can arrive at a non-violent settlement of issues that would otherwise divide us.' Dr. Mangosothu Buthelezi in a public address February, 1988, quoted in *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1989.

12. The government's efforts to persuade black leaders to come forward to negotiate a new future political arrangement for South Africa started in 1985 but have so far had no success in attracting participants. The first forum suggested was a constitutional council; when that failed to stir up interest, former President Botha spoke of the launching of a 'Great Indaba'. This was to take the shape of a National Forum. In May, 1989, an effort to launch a black political party, to be called the National Forum, for the purpose of responding to the obvious need for negotiations, foundered when the strongest black moderate groups, Inkatha, UMSA, and UCASA dissociated themselves from it. (see footnote 10).

12. It is only necessary to look at the life-styles enjoyed by individuals such as Winnie Mandela, Archbishop Tutu and the exiled leadership to appreciate this point.

14. Having repeated this demand on innumerable occasions, Chief Buthelezi has finally put forward a document which he describes as an example of the kink of 'declaration of intent' he has in mind. Its principal provisions are: 'power-sharing', 'universal adult suffrage', and 'common citizenship'.

15. One of the black moderate parties, FIDA, (see footnote 10) has even declared itself in favor of a system similar to the Swiss cantonal system which was mooted in the early eighties by the government as a possible model for South Africa. A strong case for this model has been made in Louw, L. and Kendall, F. *South Africa: The Solution*, Amagi Publications, Bisho, 1986.

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16. This position is fully expounded in an article in the Inkatha journal 'Clarion Call', Vol. 1, 1989, entitled 'We want an Agenda for Negotiations'. The following passage from a speech by Buthelezi is quoted: 'The new constitutional dispensation which the Bill talks about will be a myth unless categorical statements are now made about the scope of the South African Government's willingness to reconstitute South Africa.' It is interesting to compare the position of Joshua Nkomo in the negotiations which took place in Rhodesia in 1960 to the position of the moderates in South Africa today.
17. In spite of current speculation to the effect that the Soviets are encouraging negotiation, it appears that they are still training ANC fighters and saboteurs. This emerges from the news item that a Soviet airliner was forced to land in Dar-es-Salaam in mid-May 1989 because a fight had broken out between ANC cadres on their way to Moscow for training. See *The Star*, Johannesburg, 20 May, 1989.
18. Yu. V. Irkhin, Voprosy iistorii, No. 4, April 1982, abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. xxxiv, No. 27, August 1982.
19. Chief Buthelezi's right hand man Oscar Dhlomo, has recently reiterated the point. 'For one thing we believe that the government now takes us seriously when we insist that neither Dr. Buthelezi nor any other black leader worth of the name will negotiate while Mr. Mandela and his colleagues are in jail. We are fairly certain that when Mr. Mandela is released it will be unconditionally." *Sunday Star*, Johannesburg, 2/5/89.
20. The most dramatic demonstration of the change in white attitudes is demonstrated on the question of scrapping separate residential areas, the bastion of white exclusivity. Although a major debate on this issue continues to rage in the media, some leading social scientists have concluded that resistance to change has abated significantly. Accordingly, Prof. L. Schlemmer is quoted in a media report, 'Most whites are ready for well planned change.' (*The Star*, 29 May, 1989).
21. This campaign has for over two decades been orchestrated by the United Nations, but it has been strangely supported by the Soviet Union, which has had regional and global objectives which would be served by revolution in South Africa, by many socialists and third world states – as a response to either apartheid or capitalism or both. Domestic rivals of the Afrikaner-dominated government of South Africa, have had no hesitation in trying to capitalize on this campaign.
22. In the 21 months before the emergency was declared in 1986, radical groups in the black residential areas had been responsible for destroying or badly damaging 3500 vehicles. 73 black people had been killed, 295 of them murdered by the 'necklace' method.
23. Formerly the British protectorate of Bechuanaland.
24. Reports that the Soviet Union is attempting to encourage the ANC towards negotiation has been common since the conclusion of the Angolan peace accords. One South African Soviet specialist, Dr. Philip Nel of the University of Stellenbosch, has even suggested that the Soviet Union could become the 'ideal mediators' in South Africa (see *Soviet Revue*, University of Stellenbosch, May, 1989.)
25. See *Leadership South Africa*, Vol. 4, No. 4, June 1975, p. 39, as well as *Africa Research Bulletin*, Sept. 15 - Oct. 14, 1984, p. 7446).
26. *Ibid.*
27. *The Sunday Star*, Feb. 17, 1985, and the Human Sciences Research Council).
28. For further details see *S.A. Barometer* Vol. 1, No. 18, Nov. 1987).
29. 'The Voice of the South African People: A Survey of South Africans on the Subject of Sanctions and Foreign Corporate Divestment', The Gallup Organization, 53 Bank St., Princeton, New Jersey.
30. *The Star*, Johannesburg, October, 1988.
31. 'Question 48: Which one of the following leaders or organizations do you support

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most?

Asian		Colored
5	ANC	6
5	UDF	6
26	P.W. Botha	11

32. This point is well illustrated by the cases of the towns of Boksburg and Carletonville in the Transvaal which recently attempted to restore all the trappings of petty apartheid which had been eroded during recent years. The Councils of these towns drew down on themselves the scorn and wrath of the entire country, and it is evident that their challenge to the new spirit of change in South Africa will ultimately fail.
33. *Talking with the ANC*, Bureau for Information, Pretoria, June, 1966, p. 19, quoting 'Sechaba' of September, 1985.
34. *Ibid*.
35. Moulakis, A. *Legitimacy: Proceedings of the Conference in Florence June 3 to June 4, 1982*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1986, p. 3. The definition continues 'In order to elicit and obtain support, a government must exist. No ruler can claim legitimacy unless he is in fact in power or has a good chance of obtaining it. The appeal to the highest principles, the embodiment of the most admirable virtues, the possession of the most venerable titles will be of no avail to a government unable actually to obtain obedience'.
36. The cases of Idi Amin of Uganda or Bokassa of the Central African Republic demonstrate this point.

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TRADITIONAL AMERICAN CONSERVATISM AND "NEO-CONSERVATISM"

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Opinions as to the present general condition of the United States vary widely according to the philosophy and perspicacity of the holder. The great mass of Americans seem currently to believe that the economy is in good shape, since unemployment is low, inflation is low, and therefore that all is well. The American dollar at the time of writing is stable, and in fact has been frustrating the attempts of the central banks to prevent it from strengthening once again. The Dow Jones is currently high, and only a few voices, albeit reputable voices, warn against the dangers inherent in the unprecedented governmental budget deficit and the gigantic balance of payments deficit which normally should be pulling the value of the dollar down. Hard money enthusiasts, who formerly put their faith in gold, have suffered severe losses, as world gold production has increased and the dollar has held its position. On the surface, there seems little to worry about.

However, many conservative ideologists do not share this optimism. The conservatives of America, once a powerful force, have been set back by fundamental divisions within their ranks.[1] On the one hand there are the traditional conservatives, whose primary emphasis still lies in loyalty to America as a nation of people proud of the cultural and scientific achievements of their forebears. On the other hand, there is a new breed of "neo-conservatives" who correspond more closely to nineteenth century liberals.[2] The latter place economic individualism above the interests of the nation, and often look for financial prosperity not in strength at home, but in unfettered worldwide trade. The "neo-conservatives" think not of nations but of individuals, and they chaff above

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all at the old tradition of mercantilism, whereby nations sought to protect their own industries, commerce and labor force against low cost foreign competition by protective tariff barriers. In this question of national loyalty versus individual economic gain lies the distinction which separates these two groups. Both share a loyalty to the concept of private property, for the traditional conservatives believe that no man could be truly free unless he possessed or had the right to possess private property.[3] Both oppose excessive bureaucratization, believing this to be both uneconomical and an undue restriction on the liberties of the individual. Both tend to believe in the maintenance of law and order. But while the traditional conservative ranks loyalty to America first and wishes America to remain a coherent ethnic unit with common national values, thereby preserving its economic independence and viability as a nation-state, the "neo-conservatives" are inspired by an Ayn Rand concept of quasi-existentialist individualism: the self-perceived good of the individual above all national values.

Because the "neo-conservatives" are above all else interested in economic success, the major industrial and commercial powers, many of whom have become international in their vision and activities (in an age of increasing internationalization of industry and commerce), and who therefore regard national boundaries as a restriction on the free movement not only of goods, but of capital and even *labor*, tend to support the "neo-conservative" philosophy both financially and politically.[4] Thus, it is the "neo-conservatives" who more often obtain publicity in the media and who benefit almost exclusively from financial support by the major transnational corporations. And because these transnational corporations have their eyes set on a world market, it is in their interest to see a break down of all national barriers so as to derive the benefits of an international world market; at the same time driving the smaller national firms out of existence as potential competitors. Having no reason to object to this program, the "neo-conservative" ideologists receive

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favorable treatment in the media, and find support for their efforts to advance their ideas before the American public.

But a large segment of the American public, including many small entrepreneurs and working men and women, are not convinced by "neo-conservative" arguments. They resent the movement of American manufacturing capacity overseas to places such as Mexico or Hong Kong, for the sake of low cost labor; they resent permissive governmental attitudes toward the massive legal and illegal immigration of cheap labor, which then competes with American labor inside America; and they have by no means abandoned their traditional precepts of national conservatism in favor of a philosophy in which the only good is an economic good.[5] Since they strongly respect their freedom and their right to private property, but refuse to worship money above all values, they are not so happy as to what is happening. They look beyond the apparent facade of present economic well-being, as evidenced by massive consumption of wealth, to ask what is really happening to the full range of values which they hold dear. They ask whether all other human moral values must give way before the primacy of consumership. They even question the reality of the apparent prosperity which seems to embrace America at the present time. They believe that the American dollar is primarily strong because, while Americans under the guidance of the present administration continue to live high, they are able to do so only because foreign interests are using the dollars which they are accumulating as a result of America's balance of payments deficit to buy more and more American industry and American real estate — most prevalently in the cities. And they are deeply disturbed.[6]

It is therefore important that we should review that which the more thoughtful and the more feeling of the traditional conservatives are currently expressing. They have in a sense become a new "silent majority" in that they have little access to the media, and are powerless to fight the special interest groups which direct the decisions of the United States Congress and the Executive Branch.[7] We should

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examine how they see the contemporary American scene. From here on we shall devote this article to that goal.

Ndabaninge Sithole, one of the "founding fathers" of black African nationalism – a leader in a real rebellion, and now a leader in nation-building – once stated a central truth that "the function of leaders is to solve problems."[8] To which, American traditional conservative ideologists would add that in order to provide solutions to problems, these problems must be adequately defined and identified. They believe that the disturbing signs of decay in American society are not correctly identified in the media, mentioned all too glibly by American legislators, touched upon only lightly by "neo-conservatives," and completely passed over when it comes to designing effective solutions. If the United States is to seriously address the problems which beset American society, these problems must be described in realistic and accurate terms. Furthermore, they maintain that it will require a genuinely *nationalist* leadership to set matters right – not a disorganized multitude of opportunist politicians concerned primarily with their own re-election, and thereby obliged to act in accordance with the demands of special interest groups.

Traditional conservatives believe that most of the problems which confront the United States as it approaches the millennia (2000 A.D.), have a basis in a disintegrating moral order, which is predicated upon the loss of cultural homogeneity and a resultant conflict of values. The United States originally became a great nation due to a number of factors, which range from geographical location to wealth of natural resources. But integral to the national evolution of the United States is the prevalence of traditional Western thought, culture, morals and values. There was general agreement that traditional Western values were sound and that life should be lived in accordance with and around these values. This shared belief in the rectitude and utility of the moral, spiritual, and philosophical underpinnings of Western Civilization gave a degree of unity and consensus to the

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peoples who made the United States the greatest power in the modern world.

But today, few would deny that these traditional Western standards of morals and values are challenged by the most grave threat to their existence - both in the United States and in Western Europe. In fact, traditional conservatives point out that Western values have been under fire since 1848, with the advent of messianic Marxism.[9] The imperatives which Karl Marx espoused are clearly antithetical to the traditional values which have contributed so much toward the advancement of Western civilization – and are clearly directed at the destruction of these values. It is only through such methodology and upon the destruction of traditional Western values that Karl Marx believed his one world state – the "new world order" – could ever arise. And judging by the rapid rise of Bolshevism in Russia after the brutal destruction of traditional Russian society, his analysis must be deemed to be correct.

When viewed from this perspective, it becomes more readily apparent that the crisis which the United States faces is a crisis of morality and values, the results of which are manifest in a crisis of national identity. As the traditional bonds of morals and values are broken, the common bonds which hold U.S. society together – providing a valuable sense of cohesion and identity – are ruptured. When asked to indicate evidence of the dissolving moral order in the United States, the traditional conservative would point to the following developments:

* A drug menace of epidemic proportions which threatens the very societal underpinnings of the United States – not to mention the cost in economic and socio-political terms.[10]

* An economy that is clearly running out of control and devoid of priorities – the future is being mortgaged while the present-day political leadership struggles from crisis to crisis, regardless of the dangerous long-term implications.[11]

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* A criminal justice system that has become corrupted and perverted by its own distortions as to the reality of justice; the courts no longer have the will, or even the capacity, to take hardened repeat-offenders out of circulation for any substantial length of time.[12]

* An educational system that is in a state of disaster — standards have been reduced to the lowest common denominators in order to assure "proportional representation" of every dissatisfied and non-achieving segment of American society, rather than offering the low-achievers *real* hope to escape from their bondage by setting higher standards for all.[13] Whereas such a policy is pursued by the Japanese, traditional conservatives argue that the U.S. presently tends to penalize those elements within society which are achievers.

* An electorate that is essentially disunited on virtually every serious political and social issue bearing on the survival of the United States as a great nation — or even as a nation.[14]

* A political process which has failed to produce the leadership that can articulate the true nature of the problems which beset America, or chart a course with effective solutions and actions.[15]

* A governing system that — in its totality — has been unable to resolve the growing problems in America and, in fact, has only compounded them. This is neither a Republican-Democrat issue nor even a conservative-liberal dilemma; it is beyond party politics, it is a fact of life — *Reality*.

All of these problems are observed with great authority to be interlinked by common threads of moral and mental substance.[16] By focusing on moral order — as the foremost priority — the meaning for the future of the United States becomes more clear. American society in its entirety appears to be afflicted with growing cultural and moral

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confusion and a resultant mental confusion. Since moral and mental disorder interact with one another in the human mind, the two cannot easily be treated as separate conditions. One condition nourishes and sustains the other. By far, however, moral confusion is the more dangerous. Moral disorder poses a threat to the future of the United States by creating a fragmented and disunited society, plagued by uncertainty. A combination of moral and mental confusion and disorder often results in a condition of political instability bordering on the volatile. Such a condition, traditional conservatives maintain, has led to the paralysis and failure of the U.S. governing system by preventing the political leadership from resolving national problems in an effective manner: *Words* are not substitutes for *action*.

A clear understanding of the term moral order and its opposite, moral disorder, is needed to properly grasp the argument that the traditional conservative advances. What is moral order, and what is its purpose? Moral order can be described as that general behavioral condition within a society which is derived by common adherence to cultural codes of conduct and standards of behavior which are either unwritten, as in English common law, or may be incorporated in written form as legal codes and laws, religious tracts and doctrines, or governmental documents such as the Constitution. They are what earlier sociologists customarily called the norms of a society: they are constraints upon individual behavior, obeyed voluntarily by common consent, which prevent anarchy within society. They are the elements of moral order which bond individuals within any society together, and provide that society with integrity and cohesion. The moral confusion which arises from a multitude of conflicting groups, each with its own value system, does the exact opposite, and leads to the disappearance of clear distinctions between what is right and what is wrong.

In the political sense, moral disorder can be described as confusion and uncertainty about what is moral good and what is moral evil; a condition arising from the lack of any

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commonly accepted basis for the derivation of these moral terms. In this political sense, moral good can be defined as that which permits a community of people to flourish and grow as a society and nation. Moral evil can be defined as that which does the opposite. Under this definition, moral good is that which does the most good for the most people, although some elements of a given society might not be included in the pursuit of such moral good. This is due to the nature of the human condition itself, since the races of mankind may be seen to be the product of various hereditary influences and experiences – which make the various ethnic groups different from each other in the deeper, more important depths of psychology and, consequently, ethical preferences and behavioral tendencies.

In nation-states such as the United States, the moral good is commonly defined as that which permits the majority of Americans to flourish and grow, not only in the physical dimension – but in the moral and mental dimensions as well. In a more profound political sense, the fact that the individual man or woman is a product of his genetic inheritance, his or her cultural customs and traditions, and his or her individual accumulated skills, experiences and knowledge, means that while there are *common needs* shared by all individuals, there are also significant *differences*. It is these differences which give rise to political contention and political factions. It should be observed that the more pronounced the different genetic ingredients which mould individuals into the finished product that they become, the more severe will be the propensity for social and political contention and factionalization. This is viewed by traditional conservatives as a fundamental principle. Since genes are basically oriented toward self-preservation, a babel of genes produces a babel of voices, which reflect the different perceptions of personal interests. This creates a need for a higher degree of moral order than would be the case if all Americans were absolutely "equal" in all respects.[17]

These fundamental concepts of man as an individual, of

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the nature of moral order, of the genetic contribution to personality, and what might be regarded in modern terms as the sociobiological nature of moral good, need to be commonly recognized and comprehended among the citizenry of the United States before any agreement can be reached on specific political intentions, aims and purposes, decisions, and actions. American traditional conservatives maintain that this requires a return to the fundamental approach taken by the Founding Fathers in establishing the United States as a nation. In this, the first priority is placed on the moral order itself, without which there is no defense against the combination of powerful forces which are working in an opposite direction – to tear down what has been built.

While some may argue that the truth of what has been outlined herein is a matter of individual judgment, the thoughtful conservative holds that a general survey of what has been transpiring in the United States today confirms that there is considerable substance to their perception of widespread moral disorder and their claim that there is a crisis of national values within American society. The evidence they cite includes the following:

* Rampant use of drugs in epidemic proportions, as encouraged by the preaching of Timothy Leary, Abbie Hoffman and the like, which drains an estimated $300 billion annually from productive use in the American economy.[18]

* The decline of the American educational system and growing cultural illiteracy which borders on disaster. They point to the evidence that the colleges and universities have largely disintegrated as bastions of Western cultural knowledge and value enhancement, largely because of an emphasis on "liberal" existentialist and Marxist philosophies which espouse concepts of "cultural equality" – that are not truly essential to disparate scientific enquiry, as egalitarians claim – which translates into "no cultural values at all". This trend leads to the negation of any sense of racial identity or of unifying Western cultural tradition in the minds of those

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who attend and graduate from American institutions of higher education, and this represents a clear destruction of Western value systems.[19]

* Gross financial mismanagement of the U.S. economy and the national budgetary system in terms of governmental outlays far exceeding tax revenue and income; and financial policies which have resulted in an erosion of the industrial base of the United States.[20]

* Spiritual malaise, disorientation, and loss of focus and direction among the American leadership elite, who have become largely subordinate to the pressures of warring special interest groups; this results in a deterioration of a larger obligation to the greater public good.

* An almost incredible level of ignorance among the American electorate concerning the prehistory, history, geography, and biological and cultural heritage of "Western" man as a distinct, unique and perhaps endangered species.

* The spreading of AIDS by homosexuals – sometimes intentional – which even threatens those nurses and doctors who treat them – and more importantly – threatens to overload and disrupt the nation's health care system.[21]

* The seemingly permanent entrapment of a large minority segment of the population in poverty, slums, homelessness, illiteracy and crime; the latter resulting in increasingly violent crimes of robberies, rapes, assaults, burglaries and car thefts, as well as the extensive spread of juvenile and gang violence.[22]

* Washington, D.C. – America's capital – has become known as the murder capital of the world.[23]

* Children increasingly at risk from poverty, broken homes, eroding school environments, and excessive unsupervised/

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untutored time on their hands.

* Reports that technical manuals have had to be simplified to the lowest possible level indicate the decline in competency of the U.S. labor force, which reflects the decline in reading and comprehension skills amongst the youth graduating from contemporary U.S. schools.

* The accelerating erosion of the traditional white middle-class American family; the high divorce rate, the rise of single parent households, and the growing number of fatherless or motherless children and of women who never produce children as a result of that erosion.[24]

* Extensive abortions among intelligent white middle class women, for personal rather than medical reasons, which to the extent that it results in smaller families in this segment of the population, threatens the quality of future generations of Americans.

* Large migrations of non-Westerners into the United States, and national immigration policies which orchestrate such migratory trends and give preference to non-Western immigration. This is done at the expense of better educated and more homogeneous Western peoples who are currently prevented from immigrating into the United States by a quota system which seems intended to convert the United States from a predominantly white nation into a replica of the Third World.[25]

* Forced racial integration of minorities into all segments of American life, and the preferential advancement of minorities and females to senior positions within not only the Federal government, but also all industries and corporations engaged in business with the government, on the basis of race and sex rather than on ability or performance.[26]

* The creation of a "welfare society" in which large segments of the population, mainly minority ethnic groups, are being

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reared in an environment in which they have little incentive to succeed through their own effort. One result is the large number of offspring produced by unmarried – usually minority – welfare mothers, often of low I.Q. and consequently unsuited to be the prime progenitors of the next generation of American youth. The perpetuation of such large fatherless families has in particular weakened the family stratum in broad segments of the black community, thereby establishing and perpetuating a permanent class for which the general society must care.[27]

* Fear in enforcing the laws of the land, to avoid focusing attention on the disproportionate share of crime committed by minorities. The frequent complaint that the unduly high proportion of blacks, for example, are arrested for crime reflects the alleged "racism" of the police is not lost on politicians, whose gaze is constantly fixed upon election statistics and the power of minority bloc voting.[28]

* Expanding forced feminization of the Armed Forces, church leadership, universities, schools, clubs and associations, which is designed to blur the biological distinctions between man and woman.

* A cultural milieu that seems intent on promoting the effeminization of the American white male and the masculinization of white females.

* Sensationalized crime and violence portrayed in motion picture films and on television without any meaningful moral theme or social value.

* Social engineering – a Marxist tenet – which is resulting in the internationalization of American society at the expense of traditional Western culture, values and morals.[29]

* The resultant popularity of simplistic and primitive styles of rock music, emphasizing rhythm to the exclusion of

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melody and accompanied by "revolutionary" and culturally destructive lyrics, with detrimental impact upon the younger generation.[30]

* An increase in mental and emotional disorders among individuals, due to the incoherence of contemporary American culture, which propagates nihilistic attitudes.[31]

* The Marxist/Jean Paul Sartre Existentialist syndrome in the universities, colleges and high schools of America. This is accompanied by a spreading virus of anti-Western Marxist-oriented liberation theology in the nation's churches.[32]

* Domination by the "Theology of Equality" in all sectors of American life, especially with regard to the "cultural" media, which seeks to destroy all notions of Western biological and cultural identity and primacy.[33]

* Growing sexual promiscuity which has become an everyday occurrence in many segments of the school system down to the grade school level.[34]

* The increasing rise of exotic, abnormal and aberrant cult practices, including even Satanism, which have actually led to the "sacrificial" murder of babies and adolescents.[35]

* Environmental deterioration due to ozone depletion, global warming, the proliferation of hazardous and nuclear wastes, as well as the mountains of garbage and refuse that pollute the soil and water supplies of America.

* Inadequate U.S. Government regard for American nuclear, space, chemical, and biological weaponry vulnerabilities.[36]

* Official U.S. Government rejection of substantive proposals to improve the national security decision-making system and process, and to produce a meaningful National Security Strategy.[37]

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* Societal reluctance to consider and discuss the nature of class, race, sex and psychopolitical warfare unleashed by Karl Marx with the objective of achieving his "new social order" – and the extent of this influence upon American society.[38]

* Tolerance of those proponents who seek the convergence of American beliefs and systems of value with those of the Marxist and radical socialist powers, for the common purpose of bringing about "global democratic peace" or "global democracy" – interchangeable terms for a "new social order" in the world.[39]

Given this complex of crises, conservatives see the United States facing a crisis of national values which is exacerbated by the moral disorder prevalent in contemporary American society. One axiom which Karl Marx clearly understood concerned the concept of "alienation" of man.[40] Moral disorder - due to either an absence of moral values or a chaotic potpourri of contradictory values held by warring segments of a society, or a combination of both – can only lead to a sense of alienation – and nihilism amongst the younger generation, which is the future of America. If alienation is allowed to spread throughout a society it destroys that society's sense of cultural identity and integrity. Karl Marx understood this well, and Marxist revolutionary movements have striven to undermine the societies which they seek to topple by initiating and proliferating moral confusion.

The same problem, a loss of any consensus as to an orderly system of moral values rooted in a sense of common cultural identity and a shared system of values, is seen to be at the root of America's problems, whether social, economic or political – both in the realm of domestic and foreign policy. Traditional Conservatives ask themselves why the present system of government seems to be incapable of resolving the major problems to which we have already referred? To what extent is there a collective subliminal urge

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toward national, cultural, and biological suicide? Is the old stock that peopled North America and made it great being martialled *en masse* – much like lemmings – to drown itself in the sea of biological extinction? To what extent is this drive to ethnic extinction, both cultural and biological, self-induced – and to what extent is it induced by external forces? To what extent have the revolutionary psychopolitical warfare practices of the combined forces of Marxism, socialist Fabianism, Jean Paul Sartre type existentialism, and modern liberalism – which emphasizes egalitarian individualism to the exclusion of national bonds and loyalties – been responsible for this trend and for the other elements of chaos listed above?

Furthermore, and this is a very widespread question put by traditional conservatives: To what extent are Americans actually engaged in a two-front struggle; one against external forces that seek to isolate the United States and render it impotent on the world scene; and the other against internal forces that seek to ideologically emasculate or even dismember the United States by moral and cultural disruption? Impressed by the extent of the decline that they see around them, they ask whether or not it is an irreversible trend, or whether given the effort, the United States could effect an American Renaissance?

In effect, American traditional conservatives see a clear division between two worldviews, with the great mass of the American public (including the majority who would call themselves "conservative," but are unable to see the dangers of the liberal philosophy concealed behind "neo-conservatism") lost hopelessly in the mire between these two conflicting world views. What the true conservatives see is a conflict between traditional Western cultures and values, and those inspired by, or at least allied with, Marxism. And by Marxism they mean not the declining Marxists of central Europe – where Marxism gained control as a result not only of the bloody Bolshevik revolution, but also as a result of the shameful behavior of the Western leaders who in 1945

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transferred most of central Europe to Marxist control at the conclusion of World War II – but the vibrant revolutionary Marxism of activists strongly ensconced in the Western academic world, in the Western entertainment industry, in the Western media, and in the Western body politic.[41] Indeed, traditional conservatives see Marxism as a false ideology, which is little more than revolutionary propaganda, and which can never survive once it gains control of a country; they see Marxism as a revolutionary doctrine which can only thrive as a destructive and parasitic force in free countries which have lost their sense of moral integrity and are ripe for disaffection. Once moral disorder sets in, the young, deprived of any true sense of national identity, culture and morality, are ready to fall into the pit of moral confusion – which represents that state of "alienation" in which disaffection thrives.

Let us conclude by summarizing the essence of the traditional conservative viewpoint. As a result of the advent of Marxism more than one hundred and forty years ago, there has arisen in the Western world two virtually irreconcilable and opposing worldviews. Each of these worldviews centers on the question of the extent to which the peoples of the world should be joined together in a single integrated global society.[42] The underlying fundamental basis of these worldviews are contradictory and mutually exclusive; therefore, both cannot be held by the same person at the same time.

This is in accord with the principle of contradiction defined by Thomas Aquinas as the first and supreme principle of thought, whereby nothing can both *be* and *not be* at the same time and under the same circumstances. Without it, one cannot distinguish what *is* from what *is not*, one being from another, truth from error, good from evil, or beauty from ugliness.[43]

The worldview that incorporates the desirability of such an integrated global society – regardless of the impact on the individual and of restrictions on individual thought and

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freedom that would be imposed by the mere existence of such a "Greater Global Superstate" – is the worldview of "progressive" liberals and Marxists. It is a worldview that encompasses a retrospective negative mental image of the cultural customs and traditions of the Western world, which it seeks constantly to portray as a vast heritage of moral evil. It is a worldview that attributes guilt to the Western world for its alleged practice of slavery, racism, sexism, anti-semitism, militarism, feudalism, chauvinism, Nazism, fascism, colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and the like.

It is a worldview of vitriolic anti-Westernism, viewing Western culture and institutions and Western authority and leadership as being unnecessary, unbeneficial, and harmful. It is a worldview that holds traditional Western methods of organizing its political, economic and military forces as unfair and unjust since all do not share equally in power, prestige, influence, rank, privileges, and rewards for performance.

It is a worldview that has incorporated the Hegelian dialectic of mankind having advanced in linear progression through historical stages of tribalism, slavery and feudalism, which was extended by Karl Marx to include subsequent stages of capitalism, socialism, and then communism as the final stage of humanity's evolution. It is a worldview that holds it necessary to destroy traditional Western societies in order to create a new global social order which will prepare the dawn of a new age for all humanity.

It is a worldview which foresees all of humanity becoming one undifferentiated common mass of people in a world in which all nations and nationalities would be abolished; nationalism, itself, would be prohibited by law. It is a worldview of a universal racially homogenized welfare state that would encompass and enslave the whole of the globe. All means possible – both fair or foul – including unremitting psychopolitical warfare, are to be used to achieve this objective.[44] It is a perverse worldview which maintains that it is proper to indulge in deception and manipulation of truth as related to human nature and the innate differences between genders and between races of people. It is a

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perverse worldview that denies the facts of science and holds it proper to intentionally obscure the reality of characteristic traits among groups of people due to their genetic inheritance: Marxists and their fellow-thinkers suppress common knowledge about the influence of genetics on human behavior, in favor of false ideas that human behavior is totally controlled by environmental forces to the exclusion of genetic factors – in the discredited tradition of Watson, Dewey and Lysenko.[45] It is a worldview that holds it proper to purposely distort prehistory and history in order to advance the mythical ideal of one universal racially homogenized welfare state of uniform consistency and conformity.

It is a worldview which advances worldwide racial integration along with worldwide economic integration and economic "sharing"; this is designed to advance political integration, with the goal of achieving global "economic and social equality." It is a worldview that seeks to break down all national barriers, either through *international* capitalism on the one hand, or international socialism on the other, both placing primacy on economic control of the world, rather than on values themselves or the quality of our civilization.

It is a worldview that nourishes a religion of humanity to advocate the personal transformation of individuals into ostensibly "ideal human beings", but which would in fact reduce them to impotent membership of a faceless universal proletariat, which would be compatible with a presumed new age of "global peace, justice and equality." It is a worldview that does not conform to Thomas Aquinas' principle of contradiction, holding as it does a vision of a world without the freedom to choose between contending views and opinions. It is a world in which the individual who disagrees with the decisions of those who hold power will find no corner of the world in which he can escape the clutches of those who will police the mind.

It is a worldview of those who use glittering generalities and glowing abstractions disconnected from fundamental

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historical, biological, and cultural realities – and laden with a high emotional content – due to moral, mental and physical alienation.

This is the worldview of "progressive" Marxism and of the milder, less obvious forms of the same doctrine, which so often disguise themselves in the cloak of "liberalism."

What then is the worldview of the American traditional conservative? His worldview rejects the desirability of such a new integrated global society. It is a worldview that encompasses a retrospective positive mental image of the cultural customs, traditions, and institutions of the Western world as representing a heritage of moral good. It is a worldview that recognizes the role of the Western peoples in contributing to the cultural and technological advances now available to all mankind, who now strive to emulate their achievements.

It is a worldview of a heroic West: the knightly and warrior West: the West of scholarly monks and great cathedrals; the West of great kings and of a nobility that patronized the arts; the Crusader West; the West of great feats of seafaring and exploration; the West of great scientific and medical discoveries; the West of great navies, great armies, and great battles; the West of great empires and great nations; the conquering West; the engineering and building West; the West of great ideas and great men; the West of great music, great architecture and great art, the West of a great religion and of a great mythology surviving from its ancestral past.

It is a worldview of a proud and heroic West rising from humble beginnings among sturdy, courageous, and often fierce warrior nations whose feats of valor and daring in battle came to be known among the Romans as Furor Germanicus. It is a worldview that honors the Romans, but at the same time appreciates the feats of Arminius in annihilating the Roman legions in the Teutoburger Wald, which preserved English and the other North European languages which we speak today. It is a vision that takes pride in those ancestors who saved Europe from the Mongol hordes, from the Moslem hordes and from the Turkic

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hordes; thereby saving that same Western civilization which the Marxist worldview threatens to eliminate today.

It is a worldview which observes that traditional Western society is properly organic in structure; organic in the sense it is comparable to the human body: with a head of state comparable to the head and brains; the nobility and societal leaders comparable to the internal organs; the church and clergy comparable to the heart; the general population comparable to the main parts of the body; the warriors comparable to the hands that protect the body; the laborers comparable to the feet that enable the body to move from place to place; the crucial information necessary for social decision-making comparable to the senses and nervous system, which connects the various parts of the brain. The various component parts of society are all irrevocably linked in a common effort for the survival of the whole. All of these functional parts comprise a harmonious whole – unless it is afflicted with moral, mental, or physical sickness which can lead to the death of the society, just as it does to the death of the human body.[46]

It is a worldview that feels blessed in its great biological and cultural heritage, fortuitously handed down from ancestors identifiable from prehistoric times as a distinct race, thus making genetic inheritance its most prized possession – the quality upon which its cultural and historical heritage depends. The loss of this genetic identity by forced merger with other peoples is perceived as a final disaster from which there would be no recourse. The conversion of the United States into a miniature "world order" – leading as this would to the eventual extinction of the proud, heroic, unique, distinct race of Western peoples who in fact had founded and built the United States, is seen by traditional conservative Americans as a finite and irrevocable disaster.

Their's is a vision which sees perseverance and determination as a virtual necessity of the human condition and as the mechanism which drives human advancement.

While recognizing the importance of environment and opportunity, they see the genetic differences between the

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peoples of the world as a factor responsible for shaping the rich and varied fabric of cultures and civilizations that beautify world history.

This vision conceives of nations and nationalities as providing a psychologically beneficial sense of national identity and security to those individuals that comprise them; family and national pride are regarded as qualities that are essential to individual self-esteem and sense of purpose. It is a vision that sees each individual linked to humanity as a whole, not as a solitary member of a faceless proletariat, but through self-sufficient participation with his or her own identity as a member of a proudly cohesive nation-family.

It is a worldview which is the irreconcilable opposite of the worldview of "progressive" Marxism, and is thus engaged by Marxists and their liberal brethren in what has become a titanic conflict. It is a worldview that sees Marxist states as dictatorial power-structures which oppress their captive proletariats, who have been deprived of their only true defense against world dictatorship — national pride and national unity. Traditional conservatives see the Marxist product as being an uncompetitive global society which will induce moral, mental and physical entropy in the mass of humanity, thereby reducing it to a melee of helpless, docile and timid sheeplike creatures who may even lose their will to procreate or live. This would bring about not a *new* but a *dark age* .... It is a worldview which sees nationalism and the sense of national purpose as the primary bulwark against the threat of international totalitarian dictatorship.

It is a vision which sees national pride as the most vital force in the defense of freedom and preservation of the individual.

FOOTNOTES

1. Indicative of fundamental divisions within Conservative ranks is a book by David G. Green, *The New Conservatism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987). This is elaborated upon further in two articles by Dr. Edwin J. Feulner, President of The Heritage Foundation; the foremost Conservative public policy foundation: Edwin J. Feulner, "Bush: Less Is More", *The Washington Post*, October 15, 1989; and "Conservatism: The Agony of Victory", *The New York Times*, October 27, 1989.

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2. Similar delineations are indicated by William Lind in *Cultural Conservatism: Toward A New National Agenda*. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Cultural Conservatism/Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1987).

3. In fact, Thomas Jefferson adapted the phrase "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence from the natural law compact of John Locke's "life, liberty and property". A reason for this change did include the institution of slavery, and the categorization as to what was "property". For an interesting analysis, see Drs. Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, *The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development*, (New York City, N.Y.: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1970). P. 90.

4. Ms. Willa Johnson has conducted extensive research on corporate financial support of liberal causes, on behalf of the Capital Research Center; see also: Drs. Roger Meiners and David A. Laband, *Patterns of Corporate Philanthropy, Public Affairs Giving and the Corporate 250*, (Washington, D.C.: Capital Research Center and Center for Policy Studies, Clemson University (1988).

5. One of the largest arguments in favor of providing "legal status" for illegal immigrants (primarily, Mexican migrant workers) during Congressional Hearings on the Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration legislation was the allegation that these laborers took jobs which no one wanted. "Though many Americans remain unaware of it, an ethnic transformation of the nation is taking place. Immigration peaked in the first two decades of this century. It then began to climb in 1965, with legislation that eliminated ethnic bias in the immigration laws and loosened quotas. Since 1980 the influx has risen dramatically: 570,000 new Americans a year (not counting the 3 million or so illegal aliens who may achieve legal status under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act). That 570,000 is 30 percent higher than the average number in the 1970's and well above the number of new arrivals in any year in the previous five decades. Legal and illegal aliens account for one-fourth to one-third of the country's population growth in the 1980's, according to the Census Bureau. The origins of the emigres are unprecedented as well. Latins and Asians make up a far greater proportion of immigrants today than ever before, so much so that in 1985 only 11 percent were of European ancestry. Latin Americans made up 40 percent, and Asians, the largest group, 46 percent. Those shifts, along with the low fertility of native-born white Americans, represent staggering changes in the makeup of American cities, where new immigrants tend to settle. The terminology of Census reports has not kept pace. From 1980 to 1986 the number of U. S. residents of, in the government's phrase, "a race other than black or white" increased 45 percent. By 2030, demographers predict, Americans of European ancestry will no longer be in the majority". For the larger dimension of this issue, one should consider: "The New Faces of America's People", Insight Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 3, January 16, 1989, p. 8-9.

6. At the time of writing, Japanese interests purchased Rockefeller Center in New York City, as well as Columbia Pictures.

7. It is interesting that many conservative organizations have taken to pamphleteering and newsletters to establish their own communications networks – in response to being "shut out of the media". One such example is "The McAlvaney Intelligence Advisor" – published in Phoenix, Arizona.

8. A noted Zimbabwean statesman, Pastor Sithole is the author of numerous manuscripts, publications and books, most recently *The Secret of America's Success - Africa's Great Hope*, (Washington, D. C.: Gazaland Publishers, 1988).

9. Marxism may be interpreted in a "messianic" sense in that it is often treated as a state religion.

10. See: *National Drug Control Strategy*, (The White House,1989); *The White House*

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Conference for a Drug Free America, (The White House, June, 1988); *Toward A Drug-Free America*, (National Drug Policy Board, 1988); and "Crack Cocaine – Overview 1989" (Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice). All are official U.S. Government documents and publications.

11. Stanley W. Cloud, "Is Government Dead?", Time, Vol. 134, No. 17, October, 23, 1989 p. 29-32; also consider Richard D. Lamm, Richard A. Caldwell and Ira H. Mehlman, *Hard Choices* (Denver: The Center for Public Policy and Contemporary Issues/University of Denver, 1989) p. 1-11.

12. "A 1986 study by the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics showed that only 17 percent of the 3.2 million persons in the federal and state systems under correctional supervision that year were in prison."; see Charlotte Low Allen, "The Success of Authority in Prison Management", *Insight*, Vol. 5, No. 7, February 13, 1989, p. 19. Also note that each week, the State of Florida releases approximately 900 prisoners – including many repeat offenders – because the state incarceration facilities are overcrowded; "Twenty/Twenty", ABC Television, November 10, 1989.

13. Chester E. Finn, Jr., "A Nation Still At Risk", *Commentary*, May, 1989, p. 17; and; "The Campus: An Island of Repressions in a Sea of Freedom", *Commentary*, September, 1989, p. 17.

14. Stanley W. Cloud, *Op. Cit.*

15. *Ibid*; also, see the work of The U.S. Global Strategy Council, Washington, D.C.

16. The following premises have been expounded by noted Strategist/Philosopher John R. Boyd in public presentations and private conversations, as part of his "Discourse on Winning and Loosing", an unpublished manuscript that serves as the basis for his numerous presentations before senior level political, governmental, military and business leaders.

17. "Equal" before *the law*, not equal, *among themselves*; see Drs. Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, *Op. Cit.*

18. *National Drug Control Strategy*, et. al., Op. Cit.

19. Otto Scott, "A Tale of Two Revolutions", *Conservative Digest*, September/October, 1989, p. 51: "an estimated 40,000 American Marxist professors...."

20. Stanley W. Cloud, *Op. Cit.*; Richard Lamm, *et. al.*, *Op. Cit.*

21. With regards to AIDS: "The disease rate for blacks is three times that for whites (it is 12 times as common, when white homosexual and bisexual males are excluded) and more than twice as prevalent among Hispanics, according to the Federal Centers for Disease Control. Blacks and Hispanics account for 33,000 out of 80,000 U.S. cases.", David Holzman, "Vernacular Lowdown on AIDS", *Insight*, Vol. 4, No. 52, December 26, 1988 – January 2, 1989, p. 26.

22. Statistics show that "In 1980, 95 percent of those who committed crimes against blacks were themselves black, and most of the criminals were under the age of 24. Their victims are primarily black women over 25, black men age 50 to 54, and black youngsters of 12 to 15. Says Robert L. Woodson, president of the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise in Washington, a self-help organization, 'A civil war is raging within the black community. . .'" Carolyn Lochhead, "Poor Neighborhoods Fall To A Widening Decay", *Insight*, Vol 5, No. 14, April 3, 1989, p. 12.

23. This is not strictly true, in that the murder rate in Mozambique is higher than in Washington D.C.

24. See, for example: "The New Faces of America's People", *Op. Cit.*: "...low fertility of native-born white Americans represent staggering changes..."

25. *Ibid*; For the larger dimensions of this problem, see Count de Marenches and Christine Ockrent, *The Evil Empire*, (London, U.K.: Sidgwick & Jackson, Ltd., 1988) p. 173.: "... the population explosion. This is very much a taboo subject, because it

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is highly emotive, and it cannot be dealt with phlegmatically without the term 'racist' being brandished. We are supposed to bury our heads in the sand....Out of every ten babies born, nine are born in the Third World. Some misinformed people think that, with its 320 million inhabitants, the EEC represents one of the greatest concentrations of population in the world. That is a serious mistake. We shall soon account for a mere five percent or so of the total..."

26. This is the natural progression of the Equal Employment Opportunity guidelines which make affirmative action programs rule of law; which in some cases discriminates against whites. Aside from pre-designating certain politically appointed positions as "female" and "minority" positions in the Bush Administration, senior Republican leadership calls for a "moral imperative" to reach out to black and Hispanic minorities. See "First Monday", Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter, 1989, published by the Republican National Committee, p. 2, 4, 17, 18.

27. "For a long time, the subject of black family breakdown was taboo, until trends became norms and like patterns emerged among whites. The change has been astonishing: In 1950, only 9 percent of black homes were headed by one parent; in 1965, 28 percent; in 1970, 33.3 percent. Today, half of all black families with children are headed by a single parent and some 60 percent of black births are out of wedlock. While starting from a proportionally lower base, the white underclass is following a like trend. Illegitimate births rose from 2.3 percent of all white berths in 1960 to 12.8 percent in 1983; even these numbers obscure the fact that for whites, as for other groups, illegitimacy is much higher among the poor....White or black, with few exceptions, out-of-wedlock teenage pregnancy dooms both mother and child to lives of dependency. American teenagers have the highest pregnancy and abortion rates in the west; in 1983, 86 percent of black and nearly 40 percent of white babies born to girls under age 19 were illegitimate. Carolyn Lochhead, *Op. Cit.*

28. *Ibid*; also note Justice/DEA report "Crack Cocaine – Overview 1989" (*Op. Cit.*) which decisively clarifies crack cocaine as primarily a black/inner city drug which has a drastic effect within the minority community.

29. Stephen Goode, "On the Outs Over Who Gets In", *Insight*, Vol. 5, No. 41, October 9, 1989. p. 8. An excellent article on the "social engineering" at the University of California at Berkeley, which turned minorities into an overwhelming majority of students.

30. See: *Washington Post*, Sunday, October 15, 1989, Style Section.

31. With regard to psychological distortion consider "The New America", *Business Week*, September 25. 1989, p. 91-179; also consider William B. Johnston, *Work Force 2000: Demographics as Destiny*, U.S. Department of Labor/Hudson Institute, June 15, 1986.

32. See Otto Scott, *Op. Cit.*33.

33 See Mark Snyderman and Stanley Roth, *The IQ Controversy: The Media and Public Policy* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988) for a revealing analysis of media support for the myth of equality.

34. Jim Schollaert, "Our Schools Shouldn't Teach No-Fault Morality," *Washington Post*, Sunday, March 12, 1989, p. D-8.

35. Maury Terry, *The Ultimate Evil*, (New York City: Doubleday & Company, 1987). It is also of interest that Max Weber, the noted sociologist, expressed the opinion that with the expansion of bureaucratic controls, many people would embrace exotic cults as an escape from the meaningless boredom of a life deprived of traditional values.

36. Drs. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Neil C. Livingstone, *America The Vulnerable*, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987).

37. The *National Security Strategy of the United States* was initially published by the

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White House in 1987, after efforts by The U.S. Global Strategy Council resulted in passage of the legislation which required this document. It was subsequently published in 1988, and a third edition is expected to be released in February, 1990. The two former publications are topical in their orientation and avoid serious issues and difficult choices; it remains to be seen how the 1990 edition is oriented.

38. Possibly the best and most authentic sourcebook for the study of Marxist tactics is *A Handbook of Marxism*, comprising a collation of texts by Marx, Engels, and Lenin (New York: International Publishers 1935). More recently we might refer readers to *Community Action*, by Henri Lamourex, Robert Mayer and Jean Panet-Raymond (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1989), which is essentially a Marxist handbook for promoting social upheaval.

39. It is almost incredible how elements completely antithetical to our nation's systems and values are tolerated – and even advanced – within the United States. See: S. Steven Powell, *Covert Cadre – Inside the Institute for Policy Studies*, Ottawa, Illinois: Greenhill Publications, Inc. 1988): and W. Raymond Wannall, "The FBI: Perennial Target of the Left", *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol.13 No 3., Fall 1988, p.279-299.

40. See: Isaiah Berlin, *Karl Marx: His Life and Environment*, (New York City, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1972); and Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, (New York City, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

41. Youth is a primary target of Marxists; see: Otto Scott, *Op. Cit.*

42. Bearing in mind that there is growing global interdependence among nations and peoples, the central question becomes: *To what extent national integrity and principle is to be sacrificed in favor of economic imperatives?*

43. John R. Boyd, *Op. Cit.*

44. V. I. Lenin carried Marxist doctrine forward with his own tactical adaptations, which have subsequently become part and parcel of Soviet policy.

45. See J.W. Jamieson "Conway Zirkle and the Persistence of 'Marxian Biology' in the Western Social Sciences" in *The Mankind Quarterly*, Volume XXII, No 3, Spring 1982 pp. 185-191. Also Bernard D. Davis, *Storm over Biology* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986).

46. This theory was expressed in the personal writings of Dr. Dmitry Mikheyev, a defector from the Soviet Union, who authored *The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Defense Initiative*, (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon Brassey/Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Tufts University, 1987). The theory of the state as an organism transcending its component parts seems to originate in very early Indo-European social concepts, being echoed in Germanic and early Greek thought, and even in the traditions of the Aryans who invaded India: "Theorists enumerate seven elements of sovereignty, which are occasionally compared to the limbs and parts of the human body – the king to the head, the ministers to the eyes, the ally to the ear, the treasury to the mouth, the army to the mind, the fortifications to the arms, and the land and people to the legs." *The Wonder that Was India*, A.L. Basham, Grove Press Inc., New York, 1959. p. 88.

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BOOK REVIEWS

WHY AFRICA IS POOR

By Dr. W. Harding le Riche
Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 1987

Four years have passed since the world press focused on famine and draught-stricken Ethiopia. Well into 1985 scenes of starving children appeared on the daily news throughout western countries. With such media exposure a massive, and in many cases frenzied, aid movement came into being. Governments, churches and relief organizations all jumped on an aid bandwagon. Then there was the all to familiar involvement of rock musicians with their "We are the World" theme song and "Live Aid, Band Aid" concerts.

Many areas of debate in academic and development strategy circles were opened. Observers and planners were not only interested in why the famine struck Ethiopia, but why social and economic conditions in Africa were deteriorating. Volumes of studies have been produced since, but from University of Toronto Professor Emeritus W. Harding le Riche comes a small introductory treatise.

Why Africa Is Poor follows a non-ideological format. Harding le Riche is an epidemiologist (a physician who studies epidemic diseases) and he writes about the African socio-economic mess as if he were describing the cause, symptoms, impacts and finally the cure for a deadly virus. The reader is presented with many depressing economic statistics, i.e. that Africa's grain production per head has dropped substantially in the period from 1967 to 1984, and that its food import bill has climbed from US $600 million in 1972 to US $5.4 billion in 1983. To le Riche economic statistics are not problems in themselves but are rather symptoms of many underlying biological problems, particularly overpopulation.

Population growth creates new demands on the rather fragile African environment. More people means "continuous

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overuse of biological systems"; forests have to be chopped down to make way for new agricultural land as well as for fuel. Therefore trees "no longer recycle mineral nutrients... the soil fertility deteriorates." Ethiopia is cited as a prime example of where this form of ecological destruction is occurring.

Moreover le Riche finds considerable fault in the many 'do-gooder' schemes hatched by so-called experts in the First World. One such failure is a costly Canadian scheme to grow wheat in Tanzania which resulted in "severe erosion" because "fields should not be laid out in big areas as they are in Saskatchewan." Equally to blame are African governments, which are "more interested in the maintenance of their own power and in the accumulation of personal wealth" than in the welfare of their own people.

After the diagnosis le Riche ends with a prescription of possible solutions. If the African peasant were given just small self-help aid he could by trial and error discover techniques to produce enough food, and in harmony with the environment. The African woman's movement is seen as a force for proper family planning and hence a curb on population growth.

Why Africa Is Poor is not a comprehensive study but for the serious student of contemporary African problems Harding le Riche has written a valuable condensed introduction.

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EDUCATION AND ETHNICITY:
The U.S. Experiment in School Education

By Dr. Ralph Scott
Director, Educational Clinic, University of Northern Iowa

PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE: A NEW DILEMMA FOR AMERICAN BLACKS



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Longitudinal Demographics on Black Achievement and Middle Class Flight
"Push-Through" Educational Programs

It is perplexing that circumstances have worsened for literally millions of minority youths during a period which has witnessed the burgeoning of special programs designed to help them. For more than three decades the entire structure of U.S. education has been dramatically reshaped. However, as U.S. schools become racially 'balanced,' educators were forced to deal with large ethnic achievement gaps at the high school level. It is not uncommon, for example, for a tenth grade student to have trouble reading a third grade textbook while sitting beside classmates capable of college work. Typically, ability grouping was abolished, and classrooms and instructional groupings were racially balanced. Other race-conscious intervention measures followed: informal quotas on student discipline, on grading practices and in composition of 'special' classrooms. Ethnic quotas on discipline and suspensions have forced teachers to tolerate behavior which is most efficaciously curbed during the formative years. Racial quotas for exceptional students have radically altered what is meant by the terms 'mentally retarded,' 'gifted' and 'learning disabled.' Uncritical promotions have led to unacceptably high failure rates in high school and universities. The sensitive racial topics consideed throughout this book are intended to promote rethinking of basic educational strategies which have proven to be harmful for both black and white students alike.

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